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3.An absolute proof for the moderate strength of the Persian army is not to be concluded from the march action, in that, according to Janke, a rather large number of more or less usable passes lead over the Amanus mountain chain into the plain of Issus. Nevertheless it can hardly be assumed that there was an elaborate allocation of forces to various approach roads, and since in the bat tle it was almost exclusively the Greeks who played a significant infantry role, then the other infantry contingents on hand cannot have been so very strong.
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Kromayer, in the work cited above, believes that the Persian army can be estimated at 50，000 to 60，000 men, since the Seleucids had raised armies of similar strength. The Diadochi states differ, however, from the Achaemenidae Empire precisely in the fact that they had a completely different concept of war, and in any case no comparison is possible in view of the positive factors that exclude the possibility of an army of more than some 25，000 men.
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4.Arrian 2.5.1 reports that Parmenio had been sent out in advance with the Greeks and other troops from Tarsus in order to secure the Cilician-Syrian passes. Now since the Greeks are not mentioned in the two sources specifying the battle formation at Issus, we can accept the account above with certainty. Köhler, in “The Conquest of Asia”（“Die Eroberung Asiens”），in Abhandlungen der Berliner Akademie，1898，p.130，believes that Alexander did not need to post troops to cover his rear, since the Persian army was, obviously, in front of him. The flimsiness of this conclusion is evident.
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5.Arrian’s description, that behind the Persian battle line, which he describes for us, there still stood in useless depth huge numbers of barbarian peoples, has been understood by recent historians as an echelon formation. Aside from the fact that an echeloned formation, as we shall see, means a refinement of tactics that did not occur until a later period, Arrian’s report is naturally only the complement of his estimate of the Persian army at a strength of 600，000 men. What the Greeks saw in front of them was only a moderate-sized army; the barbarians, however, were, once and for all, masses—consequently these masses were placed somewhere or other in the rear, drawn up “in unusable depth.”
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6.Polybius 12.17.7，“… the peltasts in a line which stretched to the mountains，”* according to Callisthenes. These lightly armed men, who stretched out all the way to the mountains, were probably principally Persian archers. Arrian, in 2.10.6，reports specifically that the Macedonians, after moving forward slowly at first in order not to have their battle line become wavy，finally attacked on the run so that they would not suffer too much from the enemy archers.
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That the front of the Persians did not extend the length of the river is shown expressly in Arrian 2. 9.4，where it is said that the Macedonians, after Alexander had drawn the troops from the flank guard positions to him, outflanked the Persian formation. The sen tence in 2.8.6，“The ground on which they were standing allowed this number of men to be contained in a straight phalanx，”* could be interpreted to mean that the width of the plain would not have contained any more than were formed up, so that the phalanx stretched out from the sea to the mountain. The citation above, however, excludes this interpretation.
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7.According to Polybius, Callisthenes estimated that the plain of Pajas was not quite 14 stadia（254 kilometers）wide and that the Macedonian phalanx remained at a considerable distance from the mountains. Arrian reports that their left flank touched the sea. Now the plain is not 2½but 4 kilometers wide according to Janke，5 kilometers by Hossbach’s estimate—an error of estimation that is not abnormal（see Dittberner, p.122）；nevertheless, we may believe Callisthenes when he says the Macedonian front was considerably less than 2½kilometers wide. It therefore reached from the sea about the same distance—or perhaps not quite as far—as the river was more or less fordable for infantry.
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8.Curtius 3.11.18：“Graeci … abrupti a ceteris haud sane fugientibus similes evaserunt.”（“The Greeks, separated from the rest, had escaped, not at all in the way deserters do.”）
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4 高加米拉会战
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1.Graf York, A Brief Survey of the Campaigns of Alexander the Great（Kurze Uebersicht der Feldzüge Alexanders des Grossen），p.32.
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2.Reported by Mandrot, Jahrbuch für Schweizerische Geschichte，6（1881）：263.
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3.General von Verdy says，“Twenty-four squadrons（3，600 horses）must be considered as the maximum strength of a cavalry division, since with larger numbers the control of the battle succeeds only with very outstandingly talented leaders, and even with them only under conditions of thorough training of lower commanders and troops.”
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4.See also Cyropaedia 7.1；also 6.2 and Book 8，conclusion.
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5.Diodorus describes how terrible the wounds caused by these scythes were, but also makes it clear that the number of wounded or killed was only small, a point specifically emphasized by Arrian.
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6.Arrian says，“of the men surrounding Alexander，”* at the most 100 men were killed; the expression is very indefinite. If one relates it to the total losses of the Macedonian army, as is usually the case, this small number would contradict Arrian’s own description of the battle. Niese claims that it applies only to the actual Macedonians.Still other interpretations are possible, but there is no purpose in accumulating speculations on the subject.
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5 海达斯佩斯河会战
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1.Curtius’figures are worthless. At no place in the Anabasis does Arrian give an overall number, but mentions only in the Indica, Chapter 19，that the King, when he started his withdrawal, was followed by 120，000 combatants（“fit for battle”*），including many barbarians. Huge levies of Indian princes, more or less fictitious, may have been included in the count. Even putting that point aside, it is not known what the origin of this number is and whether it is reliable. We may rely on the numbers Arrian gives in the Anabasis concerning the Macedonian army, since he is depending here significantly on Ptolemy, but what we find in the Indica may have been taken from almost any unclear source. Plutarch, Chapter 66，even puts the army that makes the march through Gadrosia at 120，000 men on foot and 150，000 horsemen.
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The computation by Rüstow and Köchly（p.298）is not sufficiently supported; they claim to estimate the strength of the army concentrated on the Hydaspes at 69，000 men and 10，000 horses. The authors themselves characterize the advance guard force as the one “that really fights the battles.”And that is the way it actually is; and here I ask, Why should a commander like Alexander have complicated the conduct of the war by dragging along with him other large masses of troops for which there never appears any need throughout the course of the war?
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2. The rest of the army—according to the positive statement of Arrian, which we have no reason to doubt—did not cross over\the Hydaspes until the battle was decided and therefore may not be counted as participating in the actual combat.
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3.Cramer, Contributions to the History of Alexander the Great（Beiträge zur Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen），Marburg dissertation，1893.
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4.In any event Rüstow and Köchly’s idea that this Indian prince, Abisares, moved up to Porus on the right bank of the Hydaspes, is false. There he would have run directly into the hands of the Macedonians and would have been intercepted without being able to receive help from Porus or himself helping Porus. Curtius（8.47）also says expressly that Porus expected the reinforcements on the left bank.
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5.In his essay “The Use of the Elephant for Military Purposes in Antiquity”（“Die Verwendung des Elefanten zu kriegerischen Zwecken im Altertum”），Jahrbücher fur die deutsche Armee and Marine, Vol.49，December 1883，Major Ohlendorf states the belief that the infantry had the mission of preventing the elephants from turning around.It is difficult to know how the infantry was supposed to go about that. The concept is apparently founded on a translation error.
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6.Alexander had also taken along to the crossing point two taxis of pezetairoi. Nevertheless, they do not appear in the battle formation; only hypaspists and light infantry were involved. The number, too—a total of 6，000 men on foot—eliminates them. Rüstow and Köchly（p.229）have assumed that they were left behind at the crossing point in order to oppose Abisares in case of need. That would have been an error, even if Abisares was expected here; primarily, it was a question of striking Porus with a combination of all one’s forces and of avoiding a fight with Abisares until that was accomplished. An isolated force of light infantry could easily have fallen a victim to him. The reason the pezetairoi were not in the battle is probably simply that they had not completed their crossing.To cross a broad river with inflated skins and just a few boats requires a great deal of time.
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6 作为统帅的亚历山大
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1.Against Philip*（Philippics）3.123.para.49.
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