1700072679

1700072680 9.For the earlier period this right of the centurions is not directly proved for us, and whoever sees in the Roman citizen army a levy of property owners could harbor the presumption that this kind of discipline was not introduced until the changeover to recruiting among the masses. As I conceive the history of the Roman military constitution, however, there can be no doubt that the discipline was based from the start on the same principles. Wherever in the highest position the death sentence is handled with such discretionary power, it lies in the nature of things that subordinate officials, too, have broad authority. On the other hand, it also lies in the nature of things that, as long as the centurion felt himself to be a citizen among fellow citizens, he made certain distinctions, and the respected head of a household was not really exposed to the danger of strokes in ordinary service.

1700072681

1700072682 Against my concept it would be possible to cite Polybius 6. 37.8，where tribunes are given the right to punish, to fine, and to lash（“fines, or sureties, or flogging”*），without mentioning the centurions. But Polybius is speaking here of punishment in the framework of formal proceedings, in addition to which there could very well have existed an additional beating by the captains, not specifically provided by the law, in order to maintain good order.

1700072683

1700072684 10.See also above, p.263，and below, p.292.

1700072685

1700072686 11.Livy 29.9.4. Valerius Maximus 2.7.4. Frontinus, Strategemetos 4.1.30-31.“Cotta consul P. Aurelium sanguine sibi junctum, quern obsidioni Lipararum, ipse ad auspicia repetenda Messanam transiturus, praefecerat, cum agger incensus et capta castra essent, virgis caesum in numerum gregalium peditum referri et muneribus fungi jussit.”（“When the consul Cotta was on the point of going to Messana to take the auspices again, he placed in command of the blockade of the Liparian Islands a certain Publius Aurelius who was related to him by blood. But when the latter’s line of blockade was burned and his camp was captured, Cotta ordered him to be flogged, reduced to the ranks, and to perform the tasks of a common soldier.”）

1700072687

1700072688 4　皮洛士　无

1700072689

1700072690 5　第一次布匿战争

1700072691

1700072692 1.Unger, Rheinisches Museum 34：102.von Scala, Römische Studien（a complimentary greeting from Innsbruck to the 42d Assembly of German Philologues，1893），showed that it was probable that Naevius, too, who did not write until he had reached an advanced age, had already used Philinus.

1700072693

1700072694 2.Very enlightening on this point is W. Soltau in Neues Jahrbuch für Philologie 154（1896）：164.

1700072695

1700072696 第五篇　第二次布匿战争

1700072697

1700072698 1　第二次布匿战争的研究方法

1700072699

1700072700 1.This opinion has, moreover, already been expressed by another writer, Unger in Rheinisches Museum 34：97.

1700072701

1700072702 2　坎尼会战

1700072703

1700072704 1. The average depth was naturally considerably smaller, since the intervals, which had become irregular during the approach march, had to be filled up before the impact with the enemy by having rearward troops spring forward. In earlier editions I still admitted the possibility of a doubled length with correspondingly lesser depth. But I have now become convinced that a front of nearly 2 kilometers would no longer have been capable of forward movement in orderly fashion. One can grasp this more clearly by imagining a street like “Unter den Linden” in Berlin, which is almost 1 kilometer long and about 90 paces wide. The Roman infantry front at Cannae would therefore have reached about from the monument of Frederick the Great to the Wilhelmstrasse and would have overflowed to some extent in its depth the width of this street.

1700072705

1700072706 2.Polybius says that the Iberian and Gallic cavalry were on the left flank, the Numidians on the right, and he later characterizes the fighting of the latter as simple skirmishing.In the battle on the Trebia he makes a distinction between the heavy cavalry and the Numidians. By that account, then, the Iberian cavalry were the heavy units—a fact that does not necessarily eliminate the possibility of Hannibal’s also having had African cuirassiers, only a potiori may the light cavalry have been called the Numidian.

1700072707

1700072708 3　第二次布匿战争的基本战略问题

1700072709

1700072710 1.Polybius 3.89.9.

1700072711

1700072712 2.I am not adding any for the fleet, since at this time they would have left very few Roman citizens aboard ship. Since there was no real sea war taking place, they were able to provide the crews from allies and slaves（except for the one fleet legion）.

1700072713

1700072714 3.Livy 34.50.

1700072715

1700072716 4.Livy，37.60.

1700072717

1700072718 5.I do not see fit to agree with the idea that fear of the wild Gauls, who formed such a large percentage of the Punic army, caused the Italians to adhere to Rome; for the defections increased continuously in the years 210 and 211 B.C.，although that fear, to whatever extent it existed, must have been getting stronger and stronger.

1700072719

1700072720 6. The numerous victories that the Romans are supposed to have won from Hannibal from 216 to 203 B.C. according to Livy, were, as is so excellently explained by W. Streit in On the History of the Second Punic War in Italy after the Battle of Cannae（Zur Geschichte des zweiten punischen Krieges in Italien nach der Schlacht bei Canna, Berlin，1887），patriotic Roman fantasies—frankly, pure lies. Very nicely was Streit able to add up that Hannibal is supposed to have lost 120，000 killed in all these battles from Cannae on. Where it was a question of larger battles, as at Herdoniae and Numistro, victory still went to the Carthaginians. The alleged victories of Marcellus at Nola turn out to be very insignificant engagements.

1700072721

1700072722 7.It is precisely this way that Polybius describes the situation（9.3-4）.

1700072723

1700072724 4　战前战略态势回顾

1700072725

1700072726 1. The Second Punic War and its Historical Sources, Polybius and Livy, Explained from Strategic-Tactical Viewpoints. The years 219 and 218 B.C, exclusive of the Crossing of the Alps. An Essay by Joseph Fuchs, Imperial and Royal Professor in Wiener-Neustadt.（Der zweite punische Krieg und seine Quellen Polybius und Livius nach strategisch-taktischen Gesichtspunkten beleuchtet. Die Jahre 219 und 218，mit Aus-schluss des Alpenüberganges. Ein Versuch von Joseph Fuchs, k.k. Professor in Wiener-Neustadt.）Wiener-Neustadt，1894. In Rom-mission bei: Carl Blumrich, Wiener-Neustadt; M. Perles, Wien; T. Thomas, Leipzig.

1700072727

1700072728 Hannibal’s Crossing of the Alps. Conclusions from Research and Travel, by Joseph Fuchs, Imperial and Royal Professor in Wiener-Neustadt. With two maps and one illustration.（Hannibal’s Alpenübergang. Ein Studien-und Reiseergebnis von Joseph Fuchs, k.k. Professor in Wiener-Neustadt. Mit zwei Karten und einer Abbil-dung.）Vienna, Carl Konegen，1897.

[ 上一页 ]  [ :1.700072679e+09 ]  [ 下一页 ]