1700072779

1700072780 5.In the second volume of his Antike Schlachtfelder, Kromayer has placed the battle somewhat differently than was earlier the case; nothing new has resulted from this change insofar as the actual events are concerned. Whether his account of the strategic relationships of the entire war, which are treated very thoroughly on the basis of specialized topographical research, is to the point, I have not verified in detail.

1700072781

1700072782 2　职业军队：大队战术

1700072783

1700072784 1.J.J.Müller, in Philologus 34（1876）：125，has already observed that the four regular legions could not possibly have absorbed the entire mass of service-obligated young men. He believes therefore that, depending on need, the youngest year-groups—e.g.，ten—were inducted. But even that would give much too large a number.

1700072785

1700072786 2.Fröhlich, in Caesar’s Method of Waging War（Kriegswesen Cäsars）pp.13-14，effectively raises doubts whether the definitive introduction of the cohort tactics should really be ascribed to Marius. Mad-wig believed that it did not occur until the War with the Allies. On the other hand, it is perhaps possible to prove its existence as early as the Jugurthine War.It is my opinion, however, that every probability points to the fact that Marius was the reformer. The cohorts that are referred to in the Jugurthine War（Sallust 51.3；100.4）need not be considered as tactical units but merely as parts of the legion, and if, according to a Sisenna fragment, there was still on one occasion in the War with the Allies a battle by maniples, there is little to be concluded from that, since, after all, there were maniples in existence both before and after that event.

1700072787

1700072788 3.Nitzsch, in History of the Roman Republic（Geschichte der römischen Republik）（published by Thouret），1：181，has already drawn attention to the fact that if, after Cannae, legions appeared formed up one behind the other, that was related to the fact that in the newly formed legions the differences of age did not play the same role as in earlier days.

1700072789

1700072790 4.When we read in Livy 7.34（for the year 340 B.C.）that the hastati and principes of a legion were detached, or in 10.14（for the year 297 B.C.）the hastati of a legion, that point has, of course, no historical value, but it may be cited here as a reflection of the experience of the second century B.C.

1700072791

1700072792 5.In the Livy Epitome, Book 67，it is stated that in the battle of Arausio 80，000 soldiers，40，000 supply train drivers and camp-followers（calones et lixae）were killed. These figures are certainly very exaggerated, but it is perhaps worthy of note that at this time a strength amounting to 50 percent of that of the combatants was attributed to the supply train. We could conclude from this that even before the time of Marius the veliti had disappeared for the most part, or at times perhaps completely, out of the legions, and the orderly and supply train system had been organized differently, on a practical basis.

1700072793

1700072794 6.Stolle, in The Romans’Camp and Army（Das Lager und Heer der Römer）（1912）opposes the idea that the number 6，000 is to be regarded as normal for the legion, and therefore 600 for the cohort, and we must agree with him that it is not as well founded as had been believed up to now. Nevertheless, it seems quite plausible to me, and the differences can, at least for our purposes, be ignored.

1700072795

1700072796 7.Of course, that has not been proved directly, but as Marquardt has remarked（2：339），it is very probable. See also Polybius 11.23，where it is stated that three maniples were called a cohort.

1700072797

1700072798 8. The passage where Polybius describes this quality of the Roman battle formation—that it was at the same time impenetrable（consequently in close order）and capable in all its individual units of turning in any desired direction（15.15.7）—is unfortunately somewhat obscure in its wording, but according to the sense quite clear and very valuable. The two characteristics of impenetrability and mobility can only be united by having intervals between the cohorts and keeping these intervals as small as possible. The large intervals that Veith（in Vol.3，Part 2，p.701）uses this passage to support are not only not proved by it, but are in fact contradicted, since a battle formation with intervals in its front is not impenetrable. The small intervals, as I conceive them, do not remove the quality of impenetrability, since they are closed up at the moment of impact by the press from the rear.

1700072799

1700072800 9.Livy 43.14. Polybius 35.4.

1700072801

1700072802 10.See the source citations in Mommsen, Roman History（Römische Geschichte）2：107 and 175；Marquardt, The Roman National Constitution（Römische Staatsverfassung），2：381.

1700072803

1700072804 11.Plutarch, Marius, Chapter 9.

1700072805

1700072806 3　百夫长

1700072807

1700072808 1.Correctly noted and solidly documented but expressed somewhat too strongly by Fröhlich in Caesar’s Method of Waging War（Kriegswesen Cäsars），p.19.

1700072809

1700072810 2.Polybius 6.34.One would expect that, corresponding to the 10 cohorts of the legion，10 tribunes would be assigned; however, even under the empire, there were only 6. Vegetius 2.12，states，“Cohortes a tribunis vel a praepositis regebantur”（“the cohorts ought to be commanded by tribunes or others set over them”）. The contradiction in the fact that the cohort appears as the basic tactical unit but the centurion is the key leader stems from the development of the army from a general citizen levy. For a long time already, the tribunes had had the character of magistrates, whereas the centurions had become soldiers pure and simple.

1700072811

1700072812 3.See also the passages in Marquardt，2：545；Festus, p.198，says that he had moved into the position of the old accensus（orderly）and on p.184 that the centurion had chosen him “rerum privatarum ministrum”（“the one who attends to private affairs”）.

1700072813

1700072814 4.Vegetius 2.7.

1700072815

1700072816 5.During the period of the Empire we see many titles of men with special functions who, in our system, would probably be designated as privates first-class or as noncommissioned officers with administrative functions. See I.H. Drake, The principalis of the Early Empire，1905，and Domaszewski, The Rank Structure of the Roman Army（Die Rangordnung des römischen Heeres）1908.

1700072817

1700072818 4　米特拉达梯

1700072819

1700072820 1.Memnon, who also says not a word about the second battle. Episodes of the History of Greece（Fragmenta historiae Graeciae）（ed. Carolus Müller），3.542.

1700072821

1700072822 2.Kromayer, Ancient Battlefields（Antike Schlachtfelder）Vol.2，has tried to reconstruct at Chaeronea a full-fledged battle, something that has just as little corroboration in the sources and is objectively just as impossible as the same author’s battle of Magnesia. It would be superfluous to give detailed proof for this.

1700072823

1700072824 3.That the largest part of the army had spread out to plunder is not a sufficient reason, for if the remainder was much weaker than the Romans, we must ask ourselves again why Sulla did not take advantage of this opportunity to attack.

1700072825

1700072826 4.K.Eckhardt, Die armenischen Feldzüge des Lucullus, Berlin dissertation 1909，Klio, Vols.9 and 10. The military-objective analysis is not incisive enough. Nor does Gröbe, in Deutsche. Literaturzeitung, Vol.47，1910，agree with him.

1700072827

1700072828 5　罗马人与帕提亚人

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