1700072879

1700072880 3.Strictly speaking, Caesar does not say—and Konrad Lehmann has called attention to this point—that the 306，000 men were actually on hand, but he only says that the Romans had reported to him that they knew exactly how many each tribe at their assembly had promised to provide.

1700072881

1700072882 4.Concerning the maneuver that they carried out, see p.457，above.

1700072883

1700072884 5　维钦托利

1700072885

1700072886 1.Caesar himself says（7.34）there were 10 legions, that is, the Seventh to the Fifteenth, and the First. In addition, after the siege of Alesia, the Sixth appears. In this connection, see the comment by Napoleon III（in Uebersicht，2：282）. Göler, p.333，rejects the “Sixth Legion” and names instead the “Third.” Both Meusel and Kübler, however, have correctly accepted the “VI” version（8.4）. See also Domaszewski, Neue Heidelberger Jahrbücher 4（1894）：158. In this connection, see also Chapter VII, below，first paragraph.

1700072887

1700072888 2.Bell. Gall.7.65.

1700072889

1700072890 3.After careful examination of all the various hypotheses that have been advanced concerning the location of this battle, Holmes decided（p.780）that it was impossible to arrive at a definite answer but that the most likely possibility was the concept of Gouget, who seeks to place the battlefield near Dijon, on the Ouche. Under any circumstances, the place favored by Napoleon III, some 25 miles farther toward the northeast between the Vingeanne and the Badin, south of Langres, is incorrect.

1700072891

1700072892 4.See also Bell. Civ.3.47. It is not easy to imagine how an army that numbered all together surely 100，000 souls, and probably considerably more, could have fed itself and all its horses for almost six weeks in one location in the middle of enemy territory（see also Ilerda）. Great quantities of supplies necessarily had to be brought up over long distances. How did they manage to get through the enemy areas? My concept is that supplies were already stocked in Vienne and were transported up the Saône to a point only some 45 miles overland from Alesia. Later we find the Sixth Legion joined up with the main army; perhaps this legion, escorting the supply transport, pushed its way through during the siege. It may already have started on its march when Caesar moved down toward it from the north. In the period immediately following his victory, while the Gauls were still occupied with their preparations and the assembling of their army, this legion, marching along the left bank of the Saône, was undoubtedly able to bring up the supply train with relatively little danger, and on the final stretch Caesar may have sent out troops and vehicles to meet them. But of course it is still surprising that, even if the supply train was protected to a certain extent against the main force of the Gauls by the river, the Sequani in league with the Helvetii did not attempt to intercept the supplies. After all, up to that point the whole strategy of the Gauls had been directed toward cutting off the Romans’food supplies. Could it possibly be that the Sequani, contrary to what Caesar reported, did not take part in the rebellion at all? However that may be, no army as large as the Roman one before Alesia could feed itself simply from the immediately surrounding countryside. The execution of the siege of Alesia is inconceivable without envisaging that large supply trains of food and forage made their way through successfully, and these trains must have been accompanied by troops who protected them. The reader is reminded of the difficulty of supplying rations for the German army that was besieging Metz in 1870—despite the close proximity of the German border and the availability of the railroad net . This situation is presented in my lecture “Mind and Mass in History”（“Geist und Masse in der Geschichte”），Preussische Jahrbücher 174（1912）：193.

1700072893

1700072894 5.According to the manuscripts, Labienus carried out his sortie with 39 or 40 cohorts. As has long been recognized, this number is too large; it is impossible that more than one-third of the entire force of heavy infantry could have been available at one spot for a sortie. For this reason it has been conjectured that “XL” should read “XI，” and the more recent editors, Meusel as well as Kübler, have placed “XI” in the text. If this number were definite, we could conclude from it that the Gallic assault columns cannot have been as strong as Caesar reports; but since this number is based only on conjecture, we cannot go any further in evaluating it.

1700072895

1700072896 6.Veith, p.177，recounts that Vercingetorix spared neither time nor effort in continuously training his army according to the Roman pattern. Not only does Caesar make no mention of this, but also this report is based on a false concept of the nature of the training. Closely associated with training is a discipline that cannot be improvised, even by means of the most extreme strictness, but which can only be developed very gradually, through habit and tradition. What Caesar says（7.4）is that Vercingetorix assembled and dealt with his army with the most extreme severity and cruelty and（7.29-30）that he forced them, against their custom, to fortify their camp in the Roman manner.

1700072897

1700072898 6　罗马针对蛮族的战法

1700072899

1700072900 1. The description by Diodorus, in 5.28 ff.，is also colorful, to be sure, but it is nevertheless of no significance for us.

1700072901

1700072902 2.Theodor Reinach, Mithridates Eupator, trans, by Goetz, pp.355 and 358.

1700072903

1700072904 7　内战记：意大利与西班牙

1700072905

1700072906 1.See also pp.495 and 499 above. Even if these numbers have not been directly handed down to us in the sources, I believe that one can still give them with certainty. Domaszewski, in his valuable essay “The Armies of the Civil Wars in the Years 49 to 42 B.C.”（“Die Heere der Bügerkriege in den Jahren 49 bis 42 v. Chr.”），Neue Heidelberger Jahrbücher, Vol.4，1894，has pointed out that Caesar had 11 legions at the outbreak of the civil war. Since, however, only 10 are mentioned in the campaign against Vercingetorix and 11 in the following winter quarters, but Caesar had given up 2 legions, he could really only have had 9 remaining. Domaszewski explains the difference by saying that Caesar, as soon as he saw the conflict coming on, immediately formed 2 new legions as replacements for those he had given up. But it seems to me that there is a still better explanation. In the year 52 B.C, in addition to the above-mentioned 10 legions, Caesar also had 22 cohorts that were defending the province（7.65）and that had been levied in the province itself, so that they were not all composed of Roman citizens. The Fifth Legion, Alauda, was such a legion of noncitizens. According to Suetonius（Caesar, Chapter 24），Caesar had already formed it during the Gallic War and not, as Domaszewski believes, as late as the year 50 B.C. There is nothing more natural than for us to assume that it belonged to those 22 cohorts of the year 52 B.C.，and the same for the Sixth Legion, although of course Suetonius speaks of only one such barbarian legion. If we consider, however, that the Sixth Legion now appears in the Commentaries for the first time; that, as Napoleon III has already remarked, it arrived before Alesia as part of the main army; that Caesar cannot possibly have still had a veteran legion in Cisalpine Gaul at that time; that nothing would be more natural than for Caesar, after he had defeated Vercingetorix and the province was no longer in need of protection, to order up to his main force a part of the garrison there, in preparation for the decisive battle—under these circumstances we can hardly reach any other conclusion than that this legion was also a part of those 22 cohorts “praesidia ex ipsa coacta provincia”（“the garrisons drawn from the province itself）.

1700072907

1700072908 In opposition to this it could be argued that in the Bellum Alexandrinum, Chapter 69，it is said that the Sixth Legion had been reduced to 1，000 men as a result of hardships and battle losses（“crebritate bellorum”[“the frequency of the wars”]）and that it was deactivated in 45 B. C.as a veteran legion. Even if it was not formed, however, until the winter of 53-52 B.C.（but perhaps also earlier），it had still participated in the battles in defense of the province, the battle against the relief of Alesia, and later the entire civil war and therefore had at least six years of intensive battle experience behind it when it followed Caesar from Egypt against Phar-naces. In a footnote on his page 171 Domaszewski, even on the assumption that the Fifth, Alauda, Legion was not formed until 50 B.C.，cites it as a veteran legion in 48 B.C.

1700072909

1700072910 （Added in the second edition.）Gröbe（Festschrift fur Otto Hirschfeld，1903，reprinted in the 2d ed, of Drumann’s Römische Geschichte，3：702），in a study concerning Caesar’s legions, likewise came to the conclusion that the Fifth Legion had been formed from the cohorts that had been mentioned as being in the province in 52 B.C. But he fixes the organization of this unit as not occurring until 51 B.C. The Sixth Legion that participated in the civil war was supposedly not formed until 50 B.C, after the older Sixth Legion had been transferred to Pompey（and was designated as the First Legion in his army）.

1700072911

1700072912 The 8 cohorts that I assume to have been in Cisalpine Gaul are not considered by Gröbe.Consequently, he gives Caesar only 10 legions in the year 52 B.C. The difference, however, is smaller than it appears, since it is only a question of whether legions were formed from the 22 cohorts somewhat earlier or later and whether the 8 cohorts in Cisalpine Gaul were already in existence in 52 B.C. Cicero’s letter to Atticus in December 50 B.C.，cited by Gröbe, seems to point to the formation of a considerable number of new units in 50 B.C.：（7.7.6）“Imbecillo resistendum fuit et id erat facile; nunc legiones XI, equitatus tantus, quantum volet, Transpa-dani.”（“Resistance was weak, and the task was easy; now there were 11 legions and as much cavalry as he might wish, levied from the region north of the Po.”）But there is not really anything to be learned from this passage, since under any circumstances Caesar had had in 52 B.C.，in addition to his 10 legions, the 22 cohorts.

1700072913

1700072914 2. The cited dates are in accordance with Stoffel’s calculations, based on the estimates of the astronomer Leverrier, which were requested by Napoleon III. According to Ideler, Mommsen, Matzat, Soltau, and Unger, the events occurred some three weeks earlier.

1700072915

1700072916 3.When Caesar moved out on the following day and initially took the route back toward Ilerda, the Pompeian soldiers naturally believed that a lack of provisions was forcing the enemy to retire. This does not contradict the sentence above, however.

1700072917

1700072918 8　希腊战役

1700072919

1700072920 1.Perhaps even a few more.Gröbe, in Drumann’s Roman History（Römische Geschichte），2d ed.，3：710.

1700072921

1700072922 2.28 November 49 B.C, according to Stoffel；5 November, according to Mommsen.

1700072923

1700072924 3.These observations and the confirmation of these points had already been made by a commission sent out by Napoleon III in 1861 in a work published by L. Heuzay, Julius Caesar’s Military Operations, studied on the Terrain by the Macedonian Commission（Les operations militaires de Jules Cesar，étudiees sur le terrain par la mission de Macédoine）（Paris，1886），which was confirmed by Stoffel in Life of Caesar（Vie de Cesar）1：138.

1700072925

1700072926 4.Domaszewski, in Armies of the Civil Wars（Heere der Bürgerkriege）pp.171-172，considers it impossible for legions to have come from Italy to Illyria, since the Pompeians controlled the sea. This reason is not convincing, since the land route was open.

1700072927

1700072928 5.Up to the present this point has probably not been sufficiently emphasized. Ranke, in his World History（Weltgeschichte），even states the opinion that we have descriptions of the battle of Pharsalus that stem from supporters of the Senate and of Pompey. Such is the case only to the extent that Livy wrote from the Pompeian point of view and Lucanus, particularly, presented the civil war with this bias. But these two were already significantly dependent on written sources, and since, despite their bias, they have practically nothing that does not go back to either Caesar or Pollio, that is a sure proof that a truly Pompeian original source containing unique information either did not exist or had already disappeared at that time. Lucanus apparently did do his best to find such a source but it is downright astonishing how little of a positive nature his work contains which would not be known from other sources. Plathner, in On the Credibility of the History of the Civil War（Zur Glaubwürdigkeit der Geschichte des Bürgerkrieges）（Bernburg Pro-gramm，1882），has compiled these points very well and has shown that Lucanus used Livy as a source. And so the two of them were able to express their sympathy for Pompey’s cause only through the material handed down from the enemy side.

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