1700084736 Cavalry in single line（en haye）is useless; squadrons composed of 400 riders are the best; squadrons of 1，500 and 2，000，as is prescribed for the reîtres, would defeat them if they were dealing only with these 400；and if there were 1，200 in three units, charging one after the other, I would consider them to have the advantage. So many men in close formation only create confusion, and only a fourth of them fight. This large number of soldiers in a squadron is useful for the reîtres, because three-fourths of their men are nothing but villeins. The first troops that charge against these large bodies throw them into disorder, principally striking them on the flank. And even if the body can hold off the first attackers, the second and third squadrons sweep them away and break them up, charging from one end to the other and passing through; after the first two ranks are penetrated, there is little danger from the rest. He who has the larger number of squadrons of 300 and 400 must win the victory. Gaspard de Saulx-Tavannes, Mémoires, Ed. Buchon，1836，p.328 ff.

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1700084738 42.I find a similar argument in a Venetian account of 1596：

1700084739

1700084740 The reîtres were easily broken up by the lances of the light cavalry.Formerly, when each rank had made its wheel, the reîtres customarily tightened their whole formation and awaited the assault, facing the lances that were coming toward them, and then, widening their formation, they would let them enter among them and would handle them roughly with their pistols and their arms. But now the lances no longer come all together in squadrons but, divided into diverse and small detachments, they assault the squadrons of reîtres from all sides and harass them and throw them back and run through them from one side to the other and break them up with great facility. Tommaseco Contarini, Relazione di Germania，1596. In Relazione degli Ambasc. Veneti.，Ed. Albèri, Series I，6：235.

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1700084742 43.It was a question in ancient times and among those of the present time whether it was better to go into combat at a trot or to await the enemy in place; it seems that the momentum and the gallop increase the power of the men and horses to mow down the squadrons but it also gives much more opportunity to those who have no desire to be involved in this charge to halt, hold their mounts in place, and separate themselves from the charge, such as new soldiers and those the captain does not trust. It seems that it would be better to have them wait in formation and firmly fixed in place or at least not to take up the trot or gallop before a distance of twenty paces from the enemy, because then those who would fall out would be recognized, and the cowards would be too ashamed to leave their position at the moment of encountering the enemy, being the more easily seen and recognized by their captains, who would force them to be courageous in spite of themselves. Jean Gaspard de Saulx-Tavannes, Mémoires, Ed. Buchon，1836，p.116.

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1700084744 44.French ordinance of 16 October 1568.“It is likewise ordered that the companies of each regiment of cavalry will march together and in the formation that they are to maintain while fighting, in order that each man will be accustomed to holding his position.”Nothing further was prescribed. H. Choppin, Les Origines de la Cavalerie française, Paris and Nancy，1905，p.22.

1700084745

1700084746 45.Quite similar descriptions and observations are found in the History of the Civil Wars in France（Storia delle guerre civili di Francia），by the Italian Davila, and in the Art of War，“The Difference between Launders and Pistolers，”1590，by the Englishman Roger Williams. They are quoted by C. H. Firth in Cromwell’s Army, p.129.

1700084747

1700084748 46.In the Commentaires, Vol.XI, Chaps.11，12，Ed. Lonmier-Guillaume，2：214-222.

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1700084750 47.In his History of the Netherlands War（Geschichte des Niederländischen Krieges），Mendoza reports expressly in his account of the battle on the Mooker Heide that the “horsemen” on the Spanish side had awaited the attack of the enemy squadrons in place—as a result of which, to be sure, they were defeated. It was only a counterattack by another Spanish cavalry unit that threw back the Gueux.

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1700084752 48.Historia, Book 44. Ed.1578，p.560.

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1700084754 2　射手数量的增加与步兵战术的完善

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1700084756 1.Rüstow, Geschichte der Infanterie，1：242 f.，349. Jähns，1：724，726，731. Hobohm，2：472. Pätel, The Organization of the Hessian Army under Philip the Magnanimous（Die Organisation des hessischen Heeres unter Philipp dem Grossmütigen）. Philip gave the marksmen one guilder more per month than the spearmen; nevertheless, they did not reach half the strength.

1700084757

1700084758 2.Jähns，1：726.

1700084759

1700084760 3.Relazione di Vincenzo Quirini, December 1507（Relazione degli ambassadore Veneti[Eugen Albèri, Series I，6：21]）.

1700084761

1700084762 4.Clonard-Brix, p.57.

1700084763

1700084764 5.Book XV, Basel，1578，1：315.

1700084765

1700084766 6.Truthful Description of the Other Campaign in Austria against the Turks … in the Past Year 1532. Described in Detail. And now Prepared in Print for the First Time in this Year of 1539. Reprinted in J.U.D. Goebel, Contributions to the National History of Europe under Emperor Charles V（Beiträge zur Staatsgeschichte von Europa unter Kaiser Karl V.），Lemgo，1767，p.326. Further information on the caracole is to be found in Hobohm，2：394，405-407，468，483，508.

1700084767

1700084768 7.Rabutin, Commentaires, Ed. Buchon, p.530.

1700084769

1700084770 8.Quoted in Rüstow，1：264.

1700084771

1700084772 9.Discourse XVIII, Paradoxe 2，p.384.

1700084773

1700084774 10.Jovius, Life of Pescara（Le vite …），Venice，1581，p.213.

1700084775

1700084776 11.1 September 1546. Avila, German edition, p.39.

1700084777

1700084778 12.There are also reports of mixed combat of marksmen and horsemen（Rüstow，1：314，from Monluc），but these can only have been exceptional cases that had no further development.

1700084779

1700084780 13.Jovius in 1535 before Goleta：“duas sclopetariorum manus, quas manicas vocabant, quod cornuum instar …”（“two bands of sclopetarii, which they call sleeves because they are like wings”）. Book 34，Edition of 1578，p.392. In 1542 before Ofen, the Italian infantry of Alessandro Vitelli “promoto hastatorum agmine et utrinque sclopettariis in cornua expansis Barbaras invadunt”（“After the column of the pikemen had been moved forward and on both sides the sclopetarii had been extended on the wings, they attacked the barbarians”）. Jovius, Histories, Book 42，p.518.

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1700084782 14.As we have already seen on p.94 above, Rüstow called this formation the “Hungarian order，” which he based on the Vienna parade of 1532. But that was only a schematic representation without practical significance. The expression is not derived from the sources any more than is the “Spanish brigade.” Wallhausen speaks not of a “Hungarian order，” but only of a “Hungarian installation，” that is, an administrative arrangement rather than a tactical one. In his Art of Dismounted Warfare（Kriegskunst zu Fuss），Book I, Chap.6，p.110，he says that in Hungary no formation other than the square was used. Jähns，1：711，calls it fatal that there had been acceptance of the procedure advocated by the Italian Tartaglia calling for placing the marksmen in the outer ranks of the square rather than as wings resting on the squares of spearmen, as had already been recommended by Seldeneck in 1480. This criticism seems to me to fail to recognize the principal point. While it is true that the formation of marksmen in wings offered the advantage of better sequence of fire and also a reasonably sure protection, nevertheless, when the attacking horsemen approached, the marksmen always had to find protection either among or inside of the spearmen.

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1700084784 15.As an example of how little we can depend on isolated reports, even when they appear to be well founded, let us note that Jorga, History of the Ottoman Empire（Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches），3：295，tells of a defeat of the Turks in 1593 in which “the janissaries were destroyed by the new cavalry of the West, the heavy horsemen clad in iron on armored horses, and by the harquebusiers.”A Turkish source and a Polish one are cited as a basis. Consequently, the writers had heard of the “new cavalry of the West，” but they had not understood in what respect it was new, and so they describe it as the ancient knights. If we were not informed from other sources, it would be absolutely impossible to recognize what is correct in this exaggerated description. This is a counterpart to the transposition of Winkelried into a knightly battle. A similar situation is to be found in the same work on p.314.

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