1700084960 3.Campaigns of Prince Eugene（Feldzüge des Prinzen Eugen），1：507.

1700084961

1700084962 4.Susane, Histoire de l’infanterie，1：78.

1700084963

1700084964 5.The Spanish terzios, which were created in 1544，may have served as a model; their relationship to the columellas is not clear.

1700084965

1700084966 6.Mention, L’armée de l’ancien régime.1900.

1700084967

1700084968 7.Ritter, German History in the Period of the Counterreformation（Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Gegenreformation），3：518.

1700084969

1700084970 8.André，Le Tellier, p.26.

1700084971

1700084972 9.André，p.217.

1700084973

1700084974 10.According to Susane, Ed.of 1876，p.312，at the beginning of 1791 the rank and file of the infantry did not number more than 125，000 men.

1700084975

1700084976 11.Susane, Histoire de la cavallerie française, pp.136，154.

1700084977

1700084978 12.Louis André，Michel Le Tellier et l’organisation de l’armée monarchique, Paris, Felix Alcan，1906. This is a large work, supported by many documents. At times the tendency to emphasize Le Tellier’s accomplishments is somewhat too strong. In 1900 the French War Ministry published a work entitled Historiques des Corps de Troupe de l’armée française（1569-1900）. The introduction gives a summary of the important references since the work by Daniel in 1721. The book contains a tabular presentation of all troop units since 1589 without any further source studies, as well as the names of the commanders, of the battles in which the units participated, and so forth.

1700084979

1700084980 13.Susane, p.100. De la Noue concludes that the Spanish infantry was better than the French from the fact that so many noblemen were in the Spanish service（Jähns, p.564）. A remarkable account of weekly changes of the Spanish commanders, determined by lot, is reported for the year 1538 by Jovius, Book 37，Ed.1578，pp.364，366.

1700084981

1700084982 14.Discours XIV, Ed.1587，p.338.

1700084983

1700084984 15.The first trace of a distinction in principle between officers and noncommissioned officers I find in a remark by de la Noue in Discours XIII, Ed.1587，p.322. In that passage he praises the Spanish for obeying the orders of even simple sergeants, and their officers all the more.

1700084985

1700084986 16.I.G. Hoyer, History of the Art of War（Geschichte der Kriegskunst），p.188，who was still familiar with the living tradition, considers that the principal reason for the poor discipline of the French in the eighteenth century was the selling of officer positions. But we may not observe such points in isolation and then consider them as basic causes. In the English army, too, the sale of positions was common, and it not only maintained its discipline, but this deformity even offered the advantage that an outstanding man, if he was also rich, could attain a higher command position at a very young age. Thus Wellington became a lieutenant colonel at age twenty-three.

1700084987

1700084988 17.The relationship of the noble and bourgeois officers in the French army is treated very thoroughly in the book by Louis Tuetey, The Officers under the Ancien Régime, Nobles and Commoners（Les officiers sous l’ancien régime, nobles et roturiers），Paris，1908.

1700084989

1700084990 18.Puységur, Chap.VI, p.50，estimates sixteen to seventeen men for each officer, but on p.103，some twenty-five men per officer. Sicard, Histoire des institutions militaires des Français，2：229，estimates twelve to thirteen men per officer（79，050：6553），and on p.244，nineteen to twenty men（686：35 in the infantry battalion）. Susane, Histoire de l’infanterie française，1：278，has fifteen men per officer（685：35）. Berenhorst, Observations（Betrachtungen），1：61，estimates eighteen men for one officer（900：50）. Susane adds to his numbers the statement that in 1718 the number was found to be much too large and consequently the number of companies was reduced, but in 1734 they were again increased. Hoyer, Geschichte der Kriegskunst，2：505，states that, as a result of the reforms of the minister of war, St. Germain, the strength of the companies was fixed at 125 souls, including seven or eight officers. Chuquet says the number of French officers in 1789 was about 9，000. In Austria, too, the number of officers at the time of Prince Eugene was very large. Montecuccoli required thirty-three officers for 1，500 men. In December 1740 Prussia had 3，116 officers for about 100，000 men, and in 17865，300 officers for some 200，000 men. The Thüna regiment in 1784 numbered fifty-two officers and 2，186 noncommissioned officers and men, including forty reserves, consequently one officer for forty-two men.Militär-Wochenblatt，1909，col.3768.

1700084991

1700084992 19.The statements in the biographies by Sarrans-Jeune and Kläber, concerning Bernadotte’s entrance into service, do not agree completely.

1700084993

1700084994 20.Daniels, Preussische Jahrbücher，77：523.

1700084995

1700084996 21.Hoyer, Geschichte der Kriegskunst，2：199. According to Nys, International Law（Le droit international），3：512，the first treaty on ransoms was made in 1550 between Maurice of Saxony and Magdeburg. The ransom was not to exceed one month’s pay. Heffter-Geffcken, International Law（Völkerrecht），section 142，names as the oldest agreement concerning the exchange of prisoners and ransoms a treaty between France and Holland in 1673. Pradier-Fodéré，Traité de droit international public，7：45，refers to still other treaties. At times the maximum limit for a ransom was fixed at the pay for a quarter of the year.

1700084997

1700084998 22.The first promise to care for the sick and wounded that I can remember having read is contained in a pay contract of Stralsund of 1510（Beck, Artikelsbriefe, p.118），where care of the wounded and of disabled veterans is promised.

1700084999

1700085000 23.Daniels，“Ferdinand von Braunschweig，”Preussische Jahrbücher，80：509. See also 79：287.

1700085001

1700085002 3　勃兰登堡-普鲁士

1700085003

1700085004 1.The Netherlander Le Hon（Hondius）wrote concerning Wallhausen（Jähns，2：1039）：

1700085005

1700085006 Wallhausen has made a large book of the drills of a regiment which do not occur among us and were also not used by the Prince of Orange … which are nothing more than fantasies that one puts on paper and which cannot be applied by any officer or soldier, indeed not by the author himself, who, like Icarus, wants to fly so high that he must fall down from above, who thinks that by putting figures on paper they must be heard by many people.

1700085007

1700085008 The Frenchman Bardin called Wallhausen’s Kriegskunst zu Fuss “an illegible confused mixture, from which there is nothing to be learned”（Jähns，2：1042）.

1700085009

[ 上一页 ]  [ :1.70008496e+09 ]  [ 下一页 ]