1700084900 3.Special study on the battle by Gigon, La troisième guerre de religion，1912. Gigon gives the Huguenots a strength of 12，000 infantry and 7，000 cavalry and the Catholics 15，000 infantry and 8，000 cavalry. Other writers assume considerably higher numbers for the Catholics. According to Popelinière, Coligny supposedly used the method of blending the infantry and the cavalry（“d’enlacer l’infanterie et la cavallerie”）in small units. The account of the battle, however, does not show that.

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1700084902 4.The standard monograph is by J. Krebs, Berlin，1879. Brendel，1875，gives nothing useful from a military standpoint. A few details are to be found in Riezler, Sitzungsberichte der Münchener Akademie, Phil. Abt.，Vol.23，1906.

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1700084904 5.Riezler, p.84，of course assumes that the army of the League was only 10，000 men strong and had lose 12，000 to 15，000 men from sickness in the preceding campaign. The “Hungarian fever” was raging at that time in all camps.

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1700084906 6.According to Anhalt, the formation of the Bohemians was 3，750 paces wide at most, and it appears as if the animal park was not included in that figure. According to the illustration in Krebs, however, the width was not even 2，000 meters, including the position in the animal park, and, remarkably enough, this was estimated on the same scale as equal to 5，000 feet. On page 171 Krebs assumes that the front was about 3，600 meters. In any case, the front was very long for the small army.

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1700084908 7.Later, Tilly reproached his colleague Buquoi for having divided up his horsemen into “little squadrons”（“squadronelli”）.

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1700084910 8.In his report Christian speaks only of Thurn’s musketeers, as if there were no pikemen there at all.

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1700084912 9.According to Gindely，2：119，the units（Fähnlein）of the Bohemian regiments were composed of 24 privates first class，76 pikemen, and 200 musketeers.

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1700084914 10.The standard special study on the battle is by Walter Opitz（Leipzig, A. Deichert，1892）. The dissertation by Wangerin, Halle，1896，is only a study of the sources without significant conclusions.

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1700084916 11.Opitz, p.76，established the fact that Tilly wanted to move from Leipzig to the Elbe, in order to gain a crossing and to draw Field Marshal Tiefenbach to him from Silesia. Once he had this latter force, Pappenheim was to be detached to Mecklenburg in the rear of the Swedish king. That was the plan in case the enemy again avoided battle. For the battle itself the plan was only significant to the extent that it may have contributed to the fact that they did not want to go back behind the Elster to await Aldringer.

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1700084918 12.Jähns, History of Military Sciences（Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften），1：572.

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1700084920 13.Following Rüstow’s sample, Opitz has Tilly’s infantry arranged in the form of a Spanish brigade. It may be that they were formed this way for a moment. It is not reported, and, of course, it does not matter tactically, since in their movement forward it would have been neither possible nor advantageous to hold the four units together in some kind of prescribed figure. It is expressly stated in a French report and in Chemnitz（Opitz, p.92）that Tilly’s entire army stood in a single echelon, and Montecuccoli, Writings，2：581，says that Tilly was defeated at Leipzig mainly because he had drawn up his entire army in a single, right-angled front without reserves. The discrepancy that, according to Field Marshal Horn’s report, Tilly’s infantry was aligned in four battalions, whereas the French report states fourteen battalions（Opitz, p.93），can probably be explained by the fact that in the latter figure the cavalry formations are also counted as battalions. Furthermore, as in the infantry, several regiments of cavalry may have been assembled in a single tactical unit.

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1700084922 14.In his sketch, Opitz obviously shows the Swedes as much too wide, the Saxons as too narrow. Since it is reported of both formations that they were a good 21/2 miles wide（extract from Schreiber’s report of 8 September. Droysen, Archives for Saxon History [Archiv für sächsische Geschichte]，7：348）and the right flank of the Swedes extended beyond the enemy flank, then the imperial right flank must no doubt have extended beyond the enemy flank, the Saxons.

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1700084924 15.Montecuccoli, Works，2：579，states that the principal reason for the Swedish victory was that they placed the musketeers between the cavalry. The cavalry had to be so formed that the enemy first had to pass through the musket fire, and in the weakened condition into which that brought him, he was then attacked by the cavalry.

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1700084926 16.This action by the artillery is not mentioned in the actual battle reports, but it does appear in Chemnitz and Montecuccoli. This is consistent with the fact that Tilly, in his various reports（Droysen, Archives for Saxon History，7：391-392），strongly emphasized the enemy’s superiority in artillery.

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1700084928 17.Karl Deuticke，“The Battle of Lützen”（“Die Schlacht bei Lützen”），Giessen dissertation，1917. It was not until the appearance of this excellent study, in which the scattered sources, especially letters, were collected and studied with the greatest care with the help of the Stockholm Library, that a correct and reliable picture of the details of this battle was achieved.

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1700084930 18.It is not definitely reported as to whether Wallenstein had additional light pieces along with his twenty-one heavy cannon. We only know from several letters in the Fontes rerum austriacarum（Sources of Austrian History），Vol.65，that he had procured such cannon.

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1700084932 19.Deuticke, p.67.

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1700084934 20.Unfortunately, we do not have information on the strength of this corps; it can hardly have been more than 6，000 men. On the day of the battle it was still at Torgau and would therefore not have been able to reach the vicinity of Lützen for several days. Gustavus Adolphus had ordered it to follow the route via Riesa and Oschatz in order to avoid Eilenburg and Leipzig, which were occupied by the emperor’s forces.

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1700084936 21.The more recent monographs on this battle, on which my account is based, are principally those of Walter Struck, Stralsund，1893，and Erich Leo, Halle，1900. But neither of them distinguishes sufficiently between a positive decision to seek the battle and the mere risk of bringing on the battle as the result of a maneuver. Nor has the lively description of the battle by Colonel Kaiser in the Literarische Beilage des Staatsanzeigers für Württemberg，1897，come to grips with this decisive point. It was only later that I became acquainted with “From Lützen to Nördlingen”（“Von Lützen nach Nördlingen”）by Karl Jacob（1904），who seeks to prove that Bernhard von Weimar was unjustly exalted and Swedish Field Marshal Horn was a much better strategist. What Jacob says in Horn’s favor may well be essentially correct, but his pejorative judgment of Bernhard shows prejudice and insufficient training in military history. In the points of controversy between Leo and Struck, Jacob correctly sides strongly with Struck.

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1700084938 22.Jacob criticizes Bernhard for attacking at all. He believes that wing should have maintained a purely defensive stance in order to cover a possible withdrawal with its full strength still available. Such conduct would have been poor testimony for the military genius of Bernhard. Of course, since the battle was lost, the defeat was all the more frightful in that Bernhard had insufficient reserves to send in to cover the withdrawal. Nevertheless, if he had remained passive in the battle for this eventuality, a victory would have been impossible, since the enemy could then have had all the more troops to employ against Horn. From all appearances, Bernhard understood his mission absolutely correctly—to keep the enemy on his flank as occupied as possible but without bringing on the decisive battle there.

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1700084940 23.Leo, p.59，estimates the strength of the Catholic army between 40，000 and 50，000 men, a small portion of which remained in position facing Nördlingen, while he considers the strength of the Swedes between 19，000 and 22，000 regulars and 5，000 to 6，000 Württemberg militia. M. Ritter, History of the Thirty Years’War（Geschichte des Dreissigjährigen Krieges），p.580，agrees with these estimates, as does Jacob, p.109. Unfortunately, we learn nothing specific about the employment and conduct of this militia in the battle. It must have been in position on Bernhard’s flank and therefore probably remained unengaged in the actual battle but was overtaken by the enemy on the withdrawal and cut down. Even in Kaiser’s account, where we would most likely expect it, there is nothing further of any significance.

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1700084942 24.Leo, p.66，note, cites several sources to the effect that Bernhard from the very start—that is, as early as in the council of war that decided on the march onto the Arnsberg—wished to bring on the decisive battle and so recommended. But Leo’s sources are not completely reliable, and it could, for example, easily be the case that remarks by the prince on the evening of the march or the morning of the battle, when it was a question of whether or not they should seek to take the Allbuch position by force, were transposed back to the council of war.

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1700084944 25.The authoritative monograph is Rudolf Schmidt’s “The Battle of Wittstock”（“Die Schlacht bei Wittstock”），Halle，1876.

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1700084946 26.Letter to Field Marshal Count Götz, who was in command in Hesse, dated 9 October, and therefore five days after the battle. Quoted in von dem Decken, Duke George of Braunschweig and Lüneburg（Herzog Georg von Braunschweig und Lüneburg），3：277.

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1700084948 第三篇　常备军时代

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