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2.The results of the February recruiting were estimated at 180，000 men, while the levée en masse of August produced between 425，000 and 450，000. Kuhl, Bonaparte’s First Campaign（Bonapartes erster Feldzug），pp.32-33.
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3.According to the apparently generally reliable description by Duruy in the memoirs of Barras.
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4.Of course, other judgments concerning the newly formed French officer corps read in quite the opposite way; for example, von der Marwitz, Autobiography（Lebensbeschreibung），edited by Meusel，1：459.
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5.According to the Wars of Frederick the Great（Kriege Friedrichs des Grossen）by the Great General Staff, Vol.1，Supplement No.2，p.38，that had already been the case in 1740.
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6.Lehmann, Scharnhorst，2：147.
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7.Supplements to the Militär-Wochenblatt，1901，p.436.
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8.That is correctly given strong emphasis by Caemmerer, The Development of the Strategic Science in the Nineteenth Century（Die Entwicklung der strategischen Wissenschaft im 19.Jahrhundert），1904，Chap.2.
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9.Klippel, Life of Scharnhorst（Leben Scharnhorsts），1：44，note. The agreement in principle expressed here was nevertheless very limited from a practical viewpoint, according to Lehmann, Scharnhorst，1：51.
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10.Jähns，3：2588.
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11.Certainly with accuracy.Kuhl, p.43.
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12.A particularly valuable witness is Duhesme, who participated in the wars of the revolution from the start and in 1814，as a lieutenant general, published a book, Essay on the Light Infantry（Essai sur l’infanterie légère），which he had begun to write in 1805. He shows that skirmishing was accepted only as an expedient, and on p.114 he says that in 1793 the entire French infantry had adopted the combat method of the light infantry. This point is not expressed entirely appropriately, since, of course, the new combat method consisted not only of skirmishing but also of the following assault columns, which did not belong to the nature of the light infantry.
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13.The quotations are from Kuhl, p.44.
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14.Hermann Giehrl reports very clearly and accurately from the sources concerning other branches of Napoleon’s military activity in his work General Napoleon as an Organizer（Der Feldherr Napoleon als Organisator），Observations on His Means of Transport and Communications, His Methods of Working and Command, Berlin, E. S. Mittler and Son，1911.
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15.2：360.
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16.Reprinted in Klippel，3：40.
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17.In a thorough study，“The Expenditure of Manpower in the Principal Battles of the Last Centuries”（“Der Menschenverbrauch in den Hauptschlachten der letzten Jahrhunderte”），Preussische Jahrbücher，72（1893）：105，Gustav Roloff established a wavelike falling and rising of the casualty figures since the seventeenth century, in which various factors（weapons, tactics, strategy）work together and in opposition to one another.
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18.Freytag-Loringhoven, Napoleon’s Military Leadership（Die Heerführung Napoleons），p.43，estimated for 1809“hardly more than one and a half cannon for 1，000 men，” and for 1812 he estimates three and a half.
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19.Caemmerer, History of Strategic Science（Geschichte der strategischen Wissenschaft），p.14 f.，from Colin, L’Education militaire de Napoléon.
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20.Caemmerer gives a masterful survey of the difference in battle leadership between Frederick and Napoleon in Defense and Weapons（Wehr und Waffen），2：100 ff.，especially p.108.
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21.According to Lehmann, Scharnhorst，2：149.
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22.History of the Infantry（Geschichte der Infanterie），2：296.
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23.Compare Gneisenau’s statement to York on the evening of the battle on the Katzbach. Delbrück, Life of Gneisenau（Leben Gneisenaus），1：342. On 24 October 1805 Napoleon wrote in Augsburg to the general intendant of the army, Petit, that he had necessarily operated without depots but despite the favorable season and the repeated victories, the soldiers had suffered a great deal.“In a season when there were no potatoes in the fields, or if the army experienced some reverses, the lack of depots would lead to the greatest misfortunes.”
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24.Lauriston to the major general，25 May 1813：
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I must call the attention of Your Highness to the march of the troops. The lack of supplies since several days causes the soldier to dare everything in order to procure rations. There are definitely fewer stragglers than there are men who move out ahead at the moment they sight some town or village. The generals make every effort to stop this disorder; the small number of officers paralyzes these measures, especially because the officers themselves are looking for foodstuffs（Rousset, La grande armée de 1813）.
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The connection between discipline and regular rations is indicated very well in a corps order by Blücher（drawn up by Gneisenau）of 8 May 1813：“In order to maintain our discipline we must be sure to impress on the soldier on the one hand that we are using every measure at our disposal to satisfy his needs, but on the other hand we must also observe a strict economy.” And it goes on to say
:“… so that the soldier is completely convinced of the concern of his superiors …”Reported in the “Life of Reiher”（“Leben Reihers”），Supplements to the Militär-Wochenblatt，1861，p.84.
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