1700085410 12.A particularly valuable witness is Duhesme, who participated in the wars of the revolution from the start and in 1814，as a lieutenant general, published a book, Essay on the Light Infantry（Essai sur l’infanterie légère），which he had begun to write in 1805. He shows that skirmishing was accepted only as an expedient, and on p.114 he says that in 1793 the entire French infantry had adopted the combat method of the light infantry. This point is not expressed entirely appropriately, since, of course, the new combat method consisted not only of skirmishing but also of the following assault columns, which did not belong to the nature of the light infantry.

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1700085412 13.The quotations are from Kuhl, p.44.

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1700085414 14.Hermann Giehrl reports very clearly and accurately from the sources concerning other branches of Napoleon’s military activity in his work General Napoleon as an Organizer（Der Feldherr Napoleon als Organisator），Observations on His Means of Transport and Communications, His Methods of Working and Command, Berlin, E. S. Mittler and Son，1911.

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1700085416 15.2：360.

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1700085418 16.Reprinted in Klippel，3：40.

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1700085420 17.In a thorough study，“The Expenditure of Manpower in the Principal Battles of the Last Centuries”（“Der Menschenverbrauch in den Hauptschlachten der letzten Jahrhunderte”），Preussische Jahrbücher，72（1893）：105，Gustav Roloff established a wavelike falling and rising of the casualty figures since the seventeenth century, in which various factors（weapons, tactics, strategy）work together and in opposition to one another.

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1700085422 18.Freytag-Loringhoven, Napoleon’s Military Leadership（Die Heerführung Napoleons），p.43，estimated for 1809“hardly more than one and a half cannon for 1，000 men，” and for 1812 he estimates three and a half.

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1700085424 19.Caemmerer, History of Strategic Science（Geschichte der strategischen Wissenschaft），p.14 f.，from Colin, L’Education militaire de Napoléon.

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1700085426 20.Caemmerer gives a masterful survey of the difference in battle leadership between Frederick and Napoleon in Defense and Weapons（Wehr und Waffen），2：100 ff.，especially p.108.

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1700085428 21.According to Lehmann, Scharnhorst，2：149.

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1700085430 22.History of the Infantry（Geschichte der Infanterie），2：296.

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1700085432 23.Compare Gneisenau’s statement to York on the evening of the battle on the Katzbach. Delbrück, Life of Gneisenau（Leben Gneisenaus），1：342. On 24 October 1805 Napoleon wrote in Augsburg to the general intendant of the army, Petit, that he had necessarily operated without depots but despite the favorable season and the repeated victories, the soldiers had suffered a great deal.“In a season when there were no potatoes in the fields, or if the army experienced some reverses, the lack of depots would lead to the greatest misfortunes.”

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1700085434 24.Lauriston to the major general，25 May 1813：

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1700085436 I must call the attention of Your Highness to the march of the troops. The lack of supplies since several days causes the soldier to dare everything in order to procure rations. There are definitely fewer stragglers than there are men who move out ahead at the moment they sight some town or village. The generals make every effort to stop this disorder; the small number of officers paralyzes these measures, especially because the officers themselves are looking for foodstuffs（Rousset, La grande armée de 1813）.

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1700085438 The connection between discipline and regular rations is indicated very well in a corps order by Blücher（drawn up by Gneisenau）of 8 May 1813：“In order to maintain our discipline we must be sure to impress on the soldier on the one hand that we are using every measure at our disposal to satisfy his needs, but on the other hand we must also observe a strict economy.” And it goes on to say:“… so that the soldier is completely convinced of the concern of his superiors …”Reported in the “Life of Reiher”（“Leben Reihers”），Supplements to the Militär-Wochenblatt，1861，p.84.

1700085439

1700085440 25.von Lettow-Vorbeck，“The French Conscription under Napoleon I”）（“Die französische Konskription unter Napoleon I.”），Supplements to the Militär-Wochenblatt，1892，Book 3.

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1700085442 3　拿破仑的战略

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1700085444 1.Napoleon as Commander（Napoleon als Feldherr），by Count York, is a popular and frequently read book, and I have taken points here and there from it; nevertheless, its most important points must be rejected. The author depends, to his detriment, more on Jomini than on Clausewitz. It is as if the old Gneisenau-York antagonism once more was expressed here, as if the grandson of General York was unwilling to recognize the friend and disciple of Gneisenau, Clausewitz. His study of the sources is often insufficient, and we must particularly reject the idea that Napoleon’s power was declining from 1809 on and that he fell because of his own doings. A principal passage that he cites as proof（2：95，letter to Clarke of 21 August 1809）is based on an erroneous translation. Napoleon does not say that one may be allowed to fight a battle only “when one has no new turn of fortune to hope for，” but that one should not fight as long as one can hope that the chances of success will still increase. See note 4，below.

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1700085446 2.Thoughts and General Rules for War（Pensées et règles générals pour la guerre），1755. Article：“Projets de campagne.”

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1700085448 3.See p.313 above; further, to Winterfeld，5 August 1757：“I intended to march between Reichenbach and Bernstädtel in order to cause him（the enemy）jealousy over Görlitz; if this works, that will be good, but if he is unwilling to move from Zittau, I will be forced to attack him where I find him. I do not know anything else to do.”

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1700085450 4.To the minister of war, Clarke，21 August 1809：“… that battles should not take place if one cannot estimate in his favor 70 chances for success out of 100，even that one may fight a battle only when one has no new chances to expect, since by its nature the outcome of a battle is always doubtful; but once the decision is made, one must conquer or perish.”

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1700085452 5.To Prince Henry，8 March 1760.

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1700085454 6.The passages in which Napoleon expresses himself in favor of keeping all his troops assembled before the battle are collected in an excellent study by Balck，“Napoleonic Preparation for Battle and Battle Leadership”（“Napoleonische Schlachtenanlage und Schlachtenleitung”），supplements to the Militär-Wochenblatt, Book 2，1901.

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1700085456 7.Similarly in Oeuvres XXIX, pp.70，78，91，143.“Réflexions sur les projets de campagne，”1775.“Exposé sur le gouvernement prussien，”1776.“Réflexions sur les mesures à prendre au cas d’une guerre nouvelle avec les Autrichiens，”（“Reflections on the Measures to Be Taken in Case of a New War with the Austrians”），1779.

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1700085458 8.For the details, the reader is referred to “Studies on the First Phase of the Campaign of 1796 in Italy”（“Studien zur ersten Phase des Feldzuges von 1796 in Italien”），by Erich Eckstorff, Berlin dissertation，1901，where the completely false accounts by Jomini and Count York are refuted and an error by Clausewitz is also corrected.

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