1700085480 18.See my article “Erzherzog Carl” in the Recollections（Erinnerungen），p.590. See also in this connection Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften，27：380，where older theoreticians are cited, whose teachings were adopted by the archduke.

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1700085482 19.August Menge, The Battle of Aspern（Die Schlacht bei Aspern），Berlin, Georg Stilke，1900. Holtzheimer，“Schlacht bei Wagram，”Berlin dissertation，1904. In his book Napoleon as Commander，2：247，Count York compared Napoleon with Frederick and Archduke Charles in the following manner：

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1700085484 If the Napoleonic strategy possessed a grandeur in its plans and a boldness in its execution that I, at least, cannot recognize to the same degree in Frederick or Archduke Charles, on the other hand the behavior of the latter two does not show the decline from the earlier summit; they remained true to their own conduct, even if this never reached the full military greatness of the Napoleonic.

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1700085486 This kind of comparison must be rejected in every respect. Neither did Napoleon decline from his summit, nor may the archduke be compared with Frederick in this way, nor may the difference in their epochs be ignored in the comparison between Napoleon and Frederick, nor may the change in Frederick himself be left out of consideration. If one claimed to measure strategists only by the “grandeur of their plans and the boldness in their execution，” then of course it would be precisely Frederick who “declined from his summit.”

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1700085488 20.In conjunction with this battle, Napoleon once developed for an Austrian officer the difference between his conduct of battle and that of the Austrians（quoted, for example, in Knesebecks Trilogie, and in Ranke, in “Hardenberg，”Werke，48：125）. Ranke finds that it is a generalized description of the second day of Wagram. The passage here reads as follows：

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1700085490 You normally move forward in small corps that are brought together as a whole by your battle plan; you make your dispositions on the day before the battle, when you do not yet know the enemy’s maneuver. In doing so, you can only take into account the terrain. I do not deploy before the battle; during the night before the battle I keep my troops carefully assembled. At the first rays of the sun, I reconnoiter the enemy. As soon as I am informed about his movements, I make my dispositions, but they are based more on the enemy than on the terrain.

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1700085492 I cannot find that in this point Napoleon hit precisely on the difference between the French and the Austrians. It is rather the difference between the offensive battle and the defensive that he portrays. For that reason it is applicable to the battle of Wagram. At Austerlitz, however, Napoleon, too, made his battle plan on the preceding day and deployed his troops in conformance with the terrain. If there was on the other side no commander who waited until the morning of the battle to order the approach march and the attack, but instead the general staff provided for a detailed disposition, that still does not mean that the important and decisive difference of the opposing arrangements is to be found precisely in this point.

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1700085494 21.On 11 October 1805 Napoleon had Berthier write to Marmont as follows：

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1700085496 In all the letters that General Marmont writes me, he speaks to me about rations. I repeat to him that in the wars of movement and invasion that the emperor is waging there are no depots; it is the business of the commanding generals of the corps to provide for themselves the means of feeding the troops in the areas through which they march.

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1700085498 On 8 July 1812 word was sent to Poniatowski that His Majesty was very dissatisfied to see that he spoke of pay and bread when it was a question of pursuing the enemy.

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1700085500 22.The account in my Gneisenau is supplemented by an article “General Wolseley on Napoleon, Wellington and Gneisenau” in my Recollections, Articles, and Speeches（Erinnerungen, Aufsätze, und Reden）.

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1700085502 23.See “On the Difference, etc.”（“Ueber die Verschiedenheit, usw”）in my Historical and Political Esays（Historische und Politische Aufsätze），P.273；2d Ed, p.269 f.，and “Frederick, Napoleon, Moltke，”P.45，where it is explained that even when a battle was in prospect, as was actually the case in 1778，that did not change anything in the strategic basic character of the war plan. After all, there are also battles in the strategy of attrition.

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1700085504 24.Koser, Friedrich der Grosse，2：400（4th Ed.）understands it in this way：“In keeping with Frederick’s theory, the final decision in a war between Prussia and Austria would necessarily take place in Moravia.”A similar comment is on p.457. In another passage（p.585）it was quoted, on the other hand, that “the main blow was to be struck at the enemy by the capture of Prague，” from which he would not be able to recover. The error lies in the fact that a decisive significance is attributed to the question “Bohemia or Moravia?” as such. The significance, however varies according to the circumstances. As practice has indeed shown, on one occasion it is the one country, and on the other occasion the other country where it appears more advantageous to seek the decision. In theory, a campaign into Moravia offered many advantages, but they were not so great as to prevent Frederick very frequently from preferring to move into Bohemia.

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1700085506 4　沙恩霍斯特、格奈泽瑙、克劳塞维茨

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1700085508 1.Lehmann, Scharnhorst，1：254.

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1700085510 2.According to the supplement in Lehmann’s Scharnhorst，1：543，Prince Ferdinand of Braunschweig was perhaps the very first to express this idea of using the third rank for the skirmisher fight, when in January 1761 he commanded a general in the Hanoverian light troops to equip the third rank with grooved-bore muskets.

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1700085512 3.Documentary Contributions to the History of the Prussian Army（Urkundliche Beiträge zur Geschichte des preussischen Heeres），Vol.5，“The Combat Training of the Prussian Infantry of 1806”（“Die Gefechtsausbildung der preussichen Infanterie von 1806”），by Jany，1903. Möllendorff’s order reads as follows：“The position of the musket must be shown to the men better, so that they no longer lean their head against the stock and aim, as formerly, but press the butt against the shoulder, holding the head upright, and thus hold the musket horizontally as His Majesty the King primarily reminded them and commanded at this year’s review.”In 1807 the Reorganization Commission recommended the “introduction of stocks more definitely curved, which make aiming possible.”Scherbening, The Reorganization of the Prussian Army（Die Reorganisation der preussischen Armee）.

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1700085514 4.Life of Gneisenau（Leben Gneisenaus），3d Ed.，1907. Supplemented by the article “New Information on 1813”（“Neues über 1813”），Preussische Jahrbücher, Vol.157，July，1914.“General von Clausewitz”；“The Prussian Officer Class”（“Der preussische Offizierstand”）—both articles in the Historical and Political Essays（Historische und politische Aufsätze），2d Ed.，1907.“On Max Lehmann’s Stein”（“Ueber Max Lehmanns Stein”），Preussische Jahrbücher, Vol.134，1908.“From Arminius to Scharnhorst”（“Von Armin bis Scharnhorst”），in the collection In Defense and Weapons（In Wehr und Waffen），edited by von Caemmerer and von Ardenne.

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1700085516 5.Very well explained by Ommen, The Conduct of War of Archduke Charles（Die Kriegführung des Erzherzogs Karl）.

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1700085518 6.The same thing is reported by Valory of the Prussian cavalry in 1742，Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen，7：310. Valory wrote that an outstanding Prussian officer had told him that in the battle of Chotusitz, when the closely formed Prussian squadrons had reached the enemy, it was first necessary to shout to the men that they were to strike with their sabers. Frederick himself told the same thing to Count Gisors. Rousset, Le comte de Gisors, p.105.

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1700085520 7.According to A. Müffling, My Life（Mein Leben），p.31.

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1700085522 8.Fr.Meinecke, Life of Boyen（Leben Boyens）.

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1700085524 9.These instructions are from the year 1809，and they were then assembled as training regulations in 1812. As a continuation of the distinction between line infantry and light infantry, there still also remained the difference between the musketeer（or grenadier）battalions and the fusilier battalions, but this difference can be passed over, since it had no practical significance.

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1700085526 10.The history of the wars of liberation has in no work been at the same time more extensively developed and more confused than by the Memorable Recollections from the Life of the Imperial Russian General of Infantry Carl Frederick Count von Toll（Denkwürdigkeiten aus dem Leben des kaiserlichen russischen Generals der Infanterie Carl Friedrich Grafen von Toll）by Theodor von Bernhardi. The book is excellently written, the author is a competent military analyst, and the papers left by Toll provided him the most valuable material—it is no wonder that for a long time his judgment enjoyed an almost saintly respect. I, too, long deferred to his authority and only by laborious research learned to overcome his prejudice, point by point.

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1700085528 11.Critical extremists have also puttered around with this great deed. In addition to my Gneisenau, these have also been very well rejected by Caemmerer in The Wars of Liberation. A Strategic Survey（Die Befreiungskriege. Ein strategischer Ueberblick），1907.

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