1700088959 2.Polyaenus 3.9.11：Iphicrates has a fixed point on the terrain in front of the camp occupied, in order to protect the camp. Of course, immediately thereafter it is recounted again（para.17）that Iphicrates, in enemy territory, also had a trench dug around the camp so that, as commander, he would perhaps not have to say:“I had not thought of that.”（“I did not think as befits a general.”*）Judging from that, it probably happened more often, after all, than appears in the sources, that at least a trench was dug for the protection of the camp.

1700088960

1700088961 3.Polybius calls it four-sided; the later camp description of Hyginus gives the shape as rectangular. The corners were rounded off in the later period, and presumably also from the start. To a certain extent the camp was naturally always laid out in conformity with the terrain, without eliminating the basic shape. Some of the camps of Caesar in Gaul are to this very day so well preserved that Napoleon III was able to have their size and shape very accurately established through excavations.

1700088962

1700088963 We cannot go into the details of the Roman camp here. I refer the reader, in addition to Marquardt, to Fröhlich, Caesar’s Military System（Kriegswesen Cäsars），pp.74 and 220 ff.

1700088964

1700088965 4.It is usually assumed（see Marquardt, p.426），on the basis of a description by Cicero in the Tusculanae Disputationes（2.16.37），that the legionaries regularly carried along the fortification stakes. Against this viewpoint, Liers（p.155）properly cited three passages from Livy（8.38.7；10.25.6；25.36.5），where it is related as the normal thing that the soldiers did not cut the stakes until reaching the camp site; and he gives a fourth citation（33.6.1），where the practice of carrying them along obviously appears as something exceptional.

1700088966

1700088967 （Added in the third edition.）Stolle, in The Roman Legionary and his Equipment（Der Römische Legionar und sein Gepäk）（1914），believes, after all, that he must go along with the account that the fortification stake also was included in the soldier’s regular equipment; that it was, however, only a rather thin pole, the weight of which he estimates at 1，310 grams. See below, excursus 6 to Book VI, Chapter II.

1700088968

1700088969 5.See also Adolf Bauer. Greek Military Antiquity（Griechisches Kriegsaltertum），para.39.

1700088970

1700088971 6.Gilbert, in Handbook of Greek National Antiquities（Handbuch der griechischen Staatsaltertümer）（2d ed.），1：356，note, states: “The commander has the power of the death sentence in the field” and cites as authority Lysias 13（“Against Agoratos”*），67. The passage reads: “He was caught while he was sending secret signals to the enemy and was executed on a plank by order of Lamachus.”* There was, consequently, one man who was beaten to death for treason under Lamachus before Syracuse. Under which form of judgment that took place we do not know. It is naturally to be assumed that crimes like treason could, in the field, be immediately punished by death, but how far in this procedure the disciplinary power of the commander came into the picture cannot be seen from the cited passage.

1700088972

1700088973 7.Aristotle, in Politics 3.14（9）.2，says that in combat the Spartan kings had the power of life and death; out of combat this was not the case. This base is too narrow for the formation of real military discipline.

1700088974

1700088975 8.Correctly pointed out by Beloch in Greek History（Griechische Geschichte），2：479.

1700088976

1700088977 9.For the earlier period this right of the centurions is not directly proved for us, and whoever sees in the Roman citizen army a levy of property owners could harbor the presumption that this kind of discipline was not introduced until the changeover to recruiting among the masses. As I conceive the history of the Roman military constitution, however, there can be no doubt that the discipline was based from the start on the same principles. Wherever in the highest position the death sentence is handled with such discretionary power, it lies in the nature of things that subordinate officials, too, have broad authority. On the other hand, it also lies in the nature of things that, as long as the centurion felt himself to be a citizen among fellow citizens, he made certain distinctions, and the respected head of a household was not really exposed to the danger of strokes in ordinary service.

1700088978

1700088979 Against my concept it would be possible to cite Polybius 6. 37.8，where tribunes are given the right to punish, to fine, and to lash（“fines, or sureties, or flogging”*），without mentioning the centurions. But Polybius is speaking here of punishment in the framework of formal proceedings, in addition to which there could very well have existed an additional beating by the captains, not specifically provided by the law, in order to maintain good order.

1700088980

1700088981 10.See also above, p.263，and below, p.292.

1700088982

1700088983 11.Livy 29.9.4. Valerius Maximus 2.7.4. Frontinus, Strategemetos 4.1.30-31.“Cotta consul P. Aurelium sanguine sibi junctum, quern obsidioni Lipararum, ipse ad auspicia repetenda Messanam transiturus, praefecerat, cum agger incensus et capta castra essent, virgis caesum in numerum gregalium peditum referri et muneribus fungi jussit.”（“When the consul Cotta was on the point of going to Messana to take the auspices again, he placed in command of the blockade of the Liparian Islands a certain Publius Aurelius who was related to him by blood. But when the latter’s line of blockade was burned and his camp was captured, Cotta ordered him to be flogged, reduced to the ranks, and to perform the tasks of a common soldier.”）

1700088984

1700088985 4　皮洛士　无

1700088986

1700088987 5　第一次布匿战争

1700088988

1700088989 1.Unger, Rheinisches Museum 34：102.von Scala, Römische Studien（a complimentary greeting from Innsbruck to the 42d Assembly of German Philologues，1893），showed that it was probable that Naevius, too, who did not write until he had reached an advanced age, had already used Philinus.

1700088990

1700088991 2.Very enlightening on this point is W. Soltau in Neues Jahrbuch für Philologie 154（1896）：164.

1700088992

1700088993 第五篇　第二次布匿战争

1700088994

1700088995 1　第二次布匿战争的研究方法

1700088996

1700088997 1.This opinion has, moreover, already been expressed by another writer, Unger in Rheinisches Museum 34：97.

1700088998

1700088999 2　坎尼会战

1700089000

1700089001 1. The average depth was naturally considerably smaller, since the intervals, which had become irregular during the approach march, had to be filled up before the impact with the enemy by having rearward troops spring forward. In earlier editions I still admitted the possibility of a doubled length with correspondingly lesser depth. But I have now become convinced that a front of nearly 2 kilometers would no longer have been capable of forward movement in orderly fashion. One can grasp this more clearly by imagining a street like “Unter den Linden” in Berlin, which is almost 1 kilometer long and about 90 paces wide. The Roman infantry front at Cannae would therefore have reached about from the monument of Frederick the Great to the Wilhelmstrasse and would have overflowed to some extent in its depth the width of this street.

1700089002

1700089003 2.Polybius says that the Iberian and Gallic cavalry were on the left flank, the Numidians on the right, and he later characterizes the fighting of the latter as simple skirmishing.In the battle on the Trebia he makes a distinction between the heavy cavalry and the Numidians. By that account, then, the Iberian cavalry were the heavy units—a fact that does not necessarily eliminate the possibility of Hannibal’s also having had African cuirassiers, only a potiori may the light cavalry have been called the Numidian.

1700089004

1700089005 3　第二次布匿战争的基本战略问题

1700089006

1700089007 1.Polybius 3.89.9.

1700089008

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