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6. The numerous victories that the Romans are supposed to have won from Hannibal from 216 to 203 B.C. according to Livy, were, as is so excellently explained by W. Streit in On the History of the Second Punic War in Italy after the Battle of Cannae（Zur Geschichte des zweiten punischen Krieges in Italien nach der Schlacht bei Canna, Berlin，1887），patriotic Roman fantasies—frankly, pure lies. Very nicely was Streit able to add up that Hannibal is supposed to have lost 120，000 killed in all these battles from Cannae on. Where it was a question of larger battles, as at Herdoniae and Numistro, victory still went to the Carthaginians. The alleged victories of Marcellus at Nola turn out to be very insignificant engagements.
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7.It is precisely this way that Polybius describes the situation（9.3-4）.
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4 战前战略态势回顾
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1. The Second Punic War and its Historical Sources, Polybius and Livy, Explained from Strategic-Tactical Viewpoints. The years 219 and 218 B.C, exclusive of the Crossing of the Alps. An Essay by Joseph Fuchs, Imperial and Royal Professor in Wiener-Neustadt.（Der zweite punische Krieg und seine Quellen Polybius und Livius nach strategisch-taktischen Gesichtspunkten beleuchtet. Die Jahre 219 und 218，mit Aus-schluss des Alpenüberganges. Ein Versuch von Joseph Fuchs, k.k. Professor in Wiener-Neustadt.）Wiener-Neustadt，1894. In Rom-mission bei: Carl Blumrich, Wiener-Neustadt; M. Perles, Wien; T. Thomas, Leipzig.
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Hannibal’s Crossing of the Alps. Conclusions from Research and Travel, by Joseph Fuchs, Imperial and Royal Professor in Wiener-Neustadt. With two maps and one illustration.（Hannibal’s Alpenübergang. Ein Studien-und Reiseergebnis von Joseph Fuchs, k.k. Professor in Wiener-Neustadt. Mit zwei Karten und einer Abbil-dung.）Vienna, Carl Konegen，1897.
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The question of which pass Hannibal used for his crossing of the Alps does not belong in the framework of this book, since no important strategic or tactical conclusions result from the variety of routes. Fuchs has decided on the Mont Genevre Pass. Konrad Lehmann in The Attacks of the Three Barcas Against Italy（Die Angriffe der drei Barkiden auf Italien），1905，has once again, with a very thorough argument, pointed to the Little Saint Bernard. Subsequently, French Captain of Engineers Colin, too, has appeared in this arena with a work entitled Hannibal in Gaul（Annibal en Gaule），1904. To date, none of the various theories has been able to win general acceptance.
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5 罗马占据上风
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1.Raimund Oehler, The Last Campaign of Hasdrubal Barca and the Battle on the Metaurus. An historical-topographical Study.（Der letzte Feldzug des Barkiden Hasdrubal und die Schlacht am Metaurus.Eine historisch-topographische Studie.）1897. The significant aspects of its conclusions were rejected by Konrad Lehmann, Deutsche Literaturzeitung，1897，No.23，Column 902.
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Lehmann himself later treated the battle in detail in his book The Attacks of the three Boreas（Die Angriffe der drei Barkiden），1905，and sought to reconstruct the battle, but the result remains subject to serious doubts. I doubt that, in view of the sources available, it will ever be possible to gain a positive insight into the battle. Even the army strengths are very uncertain. Lehmann estimates that Hannibal still had 15，000 men and Hasdrubal 12，000，whereas there were 150，000 Romans under arms in Italy. With numbers such as these, the Romans’conduct would be incomprehensible. See also the critique of Kromayer, Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen，169，No.2（June 1907）：458. Beversdorff gives Hasdrubal 15，000 men on the Metaurus, whereas Kromayer estimates some 30，000.
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2.Mommsen, Political Law（Staatsrecht），Vol.2，Part 1，p.652.
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3.Livy 29.19.
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4.Livy 30.1.10.
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5.Livy 24.18.
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6.Livy 27.7.
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7. The Locrians made such a complaint on this score that the Senate conducted an investigation. Livy 29.8-22.
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6 扎马-那拉加拉会战：梯队战术
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1.Livy 27.49.
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2.Why he did not go directly to Carthage is not reported. Perhaps he simply did not want to arrive in the capital with the few survivors of the battle and may have had in Hadrumet some troop reinforcements and supplies of weapons, which, if brought along with him, would still give him a position and the city a possibility to defend itself.
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3.Livy 29.22.
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4.See also p.276，above.
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7 汉尼拔与西庇阿
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1.In the speech that Livy has the elderly Quintus Fabius Max-imus and Scipio himself make in the Senate concerning the planned expedition, this motive does not appear with correct emphasis.If he pointed this out, Scipio would have been placing too much stress on the difficulty of the whole undertaking, whereas his speech was based, and necessarily so, on emphasizing the concept of the offensive with unconditional confidence.
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2.We can assume that Hannibal returned to Africa in the fall of 203 B.C. and that the battle of Naraggara took place in about August of 202 B.C. Lehmann, p.555.
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3.Proved by Konrad Lehmann in Jahrbücher fur klassische Philologie 153：573.
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第六篇 作为世界征服者的罗马军队
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