1700096810
4.Preussische Jahrbücher，69：674. Dissertation, p.21.
1700096811
1700096812
5.See Vol.I, pp.162，211，218，241.
1700096813
1700096814
6.Jähns, Kriegswissenschaften, p.943.
1700096815
1700096816
7.Loserth, p.489.
1700096817
1700096818
8.Palacky, Geschichte Böhmens，3：2：361.
1700096819
1700096820
9.That the Hussites had already won a great victory over the Germans on 14 June 1420 at the Witkoberg（Ziska Mountain），east of Prague, is but a fable. See Bezold, King Sigismund and the Wars of the Empire against the Hussites（König Sigmund und die Reichskriege gegen die Hussiten），1：41 ff. Loserth, History of the Later Middle Ages（Geschichte des späteren Mittelalters），p.490. This battle may very well be compared with the engagement at Valmy in 1792. They only repulsed an attack by the enemy. But that very success was sufficient and aroused belief in the future. Likewise the victory at Wischerad on 1 November 1420 does not yet show anything of the special Hussite combat methods. Since the German princes had returned home, Sigismund had only his own forces at hand, consisting principally of Moravians. He planned to relieve Wischerad, near Prague, and was definitely counting on a sortie by the garrison. But since the garrison had already agreed to an armistice, it could not act. We may therefore assume that the army of Prague, with its reinforcements from lords and other cities, had a large numerical superiority. Only a small mounted contingent of the Taborites was present.
1700096821
1700096822
10.The Mitteilungen des Vereins für Geschichte der Deutschen in Böhmen，31（1893）: 297，contains the description of the illustration of a Hussite battlewagon in a Munich manuscript by A. Wiedemann. Despite the very definite caption “This is the Hussite wagon fort on which the Hussites fight. It is good and straight，” the illustration does not seem to me to be very reliable.
1700096823
1700096824
The regulation that the wagons were to move in four columns and the two outer columns were somewhat longer than the inner ones, in order to form the forward and rear sides of the camp with the additional wagons, is, after all, only theory, or it refers only to the last formation before the deployment. Entire marches in the prescribed four columns could be carried out in only a very few places on this earth. See Wulf, pp.27，29.he two inner columns formed a small rectangle in the interior, with entry passages.
1700096825
1700096826
According to Wulf’s dissertation, p. 43，in Hungary in 1423 Ziska made a bastion in front of the forward and rear gates of his wagon fort, surrounded them with a trench, and placed muskets in them.
1700096827
1700096828
11.Historia Bohemorum, Chap.40，as cited in Wulf, Dissertation, p.16.
1700096829
1700096830
12.Wulf, Dissertation, p.43；according to Köhler，3：1：303 ff.
1700096831
1700096832
13.As an example of how far an oral legend that is correct in itself can lead astray an author who no longer understands it, let us observe what Ludwig von Eyb has to say about the formation on a ridge. Eyb was a Brandenburg captain and wrote his Kriegsbuch around 1500. In the chapter on the wagon forts, he, too, points out the requirement that they were to deploy on a ridge, but as the reason for this he says that it was to prevent the possibility of their being placed under water.
1700096833
1700096834
14.Wulf, Dissertation, p.53.
1700096835
1700096836
15.Wulf, Preussische Jahrbücher, p.680.
1700096837
1700096838
16.A tabulation by von Wulf of the army strengths shown in the sources is to be found in the Mitteilungen des Vereins für die Geschichte der Deutschen in Böhmen，31：92. Prague，1893.
1700096839
1700096840
17.We owe this knowledge to an excellent treatment by Ernst Kroker，“Saxony and the Hussite Wars”（“Sachsen und die Hussitenkriege”），in the Neues Archiv für sächsische Geschichte，21（1900）：1. The following citations are also taken from this article and the book by Fr.von Bezold, König Sigmund und die Reichskriege gegen die Hussiten（1872-1877）.
1700096841
1700096842
18.Acts of the German Imperial Diet（Deutsche Reichstagsakten），VIII, No.93.
1700096843
1700096844
19.Palacky, Geschichte von Böhmen，3：2：250.
1700096845
1700096846
20.Deutsche Reichstagsakten, VIII, No.94.
1700096847
1700096848
21.Deutsche Reichstagsakten, VIII, No.390.
1700096849
1700096850
22.Bezold，2：78.
1700096851
1700096852
23.Riedel, Codex Diplomaticus Brandenburgensis（Documentary Codex of Brandenburg），4：1：210.
1700096853
1700096854
24.Bezold，2：110.
1700096855
1700096856
25.It is interesting to see from the discussions how confused they were on the decisive numerical relationships. It was proposed that the tenth man, the twentieth, and the thirtieth should be taken, but the men from Ulm thought that even if only one man in 100 was outfitted, that would still result in a large army. In 1428，however, they had planned to outfit every fourth man. Erben，“The Levy of Albrecht V against the Hussites”（“Der Aufgebot Albrechts V.gegen die Hussiten”），Mitteilungen des Oesterreichischen Instituts，23：264.
1700096857
1700096858
26.Bezold，3：144，assumes a strength of 100，000 men for this army，but without sufficient basis. Kroker did not discuss this campaign.
1700096859
[
上一页 ]
[ :1.70009681e+09 ]
[
下一页 ]