1700100720

1700100721 20.In the word “wooden”Jähns saw indirect proof of its derivation from the madfaa. That does not seem clear to me.

1700100722

1700100723 21.Jovius, Elogia virorum bellica virtute illustrium（Aphorisms of Men Distinguished by Military Virtue），Basel，1575，p.184. Also Guicciardini, Historia d’Italia, Venice，1562，4：100.

1700100724

1700100725 22.Jacobs, p.53.

1700100726

1700100727 23.Jacobs, p.51 ff.，p.136.

1700100728

1700100729 24.Napoléon, Etudes, p.66.

1700100730

1700100731 25.Baarmann，“The Development of the Gun Carriage up to the Beginning of the Sixteenth Century and Its Relationship to that of the Rifle Stock”（“Die Entwicklung der Geschützlafette bis zum Beginn des 16. Jahrhunderts und ihrer Beziehungen zu der des Gewehrschaftes”），Festschrift für Thierbach, p.54. A very valuable study. I cannot agree with the differing opinions in Essenwein and Gohlke（Geschichte der Feuerwaffen）. According to von Graevenitz, Gattamelata and Colleoni and Their Relationships to the Art（Gattamelata und Colleoni und ihre Beziehungen zur Kunst），Leipzig，1906，p.96，Colleoni placed cannon on mobile carriages and thereby became the creator of the field artillery in Italy.

1700100732

1700100733 26.Robertus Valturius, de re militari（On Military Affairs），Verona，1482，has a series of illustrations of cannon in Book X. Among them are also bombs with burning tinder, but in other respects the pictures are fantasies.

1700100734

1700100735 27.On his rapid march from Rome to Naples in 1495，Charles VIII bombarded the city of Monte Fortino so that it could be taken by storm（Pilorgerie, Campagne de 1494-1495，p.174）. The same procedure was repeated at Monte di San Giovanni（p.174）. Charles VIII himself gives testimony in a letter written on the day of the victory（9 February 1495）of “a bombardment of four hours.”During that time an extensive breach had been made（p.176）. In a letter dated 11 February, Charles refers to Monte Fortino as “one of the fortified places of this country famous for its strength.”He did not move out against this city until after the midday meal, and less than an hour after the first shot the attack had already succeeded（pp.177-178）. A letter from a high-ranking French officer from Naples, written in February 1495，states：“Our artillery is not large, but we have found more in this city and large stocks of powder. But we have a shortage of iron bolts because here they have only stones”（p.197）.—In the presence of the king the shooting was better—“Today the king went to dine with the artillery, and in short order the cannoneers fired so well that they knocked down a tower”（13 March 1495）.（Pilorgerie, Campagne de 1494-1495，p.211）.

1700100736

1700100737 28.Beck, History of Iron（Geschichte des Eisens），1：906，says that iron balls were among the earliest proof for the invention of iron casting and existed long before 1470，when Louis XI supposedly bought the secret from a German Jew（p.910）. On p.915 he even claims they go back to the beginning of the fifteenth century. But that certainly seems false. In those cases where iron balls are mentioned earlier, they may have been, as Beck himself says, forged balls, and the cast-iron balls that appeared toward the end of the fifteenth century were regarded as something entirely new. Jähns，1：427，cites the statement from an anonymous military book dated 1450 to the effect that stone balls were to be preferred because they were much less expensive than those of iron or lead. The high price, however, can hardly have been a decisive factor when we realize that, although the individual stone ball was much cheaper, the manufacture, transportation, and manipulation of the cannon that it required were all the more costly. The manuscript of a book on pyrotechnics that Jähns，2：405，places in the year 1454 recommends covering iron balls with cast lead. This can no doubt refer only to forged iron balls which were rounded off with the lead casting, something that could not be done easily by forging. This would therefore seem to be indirect proof that the casting of iron itself was not yet understood. A Nuremberg inventory of 1462 that is mentioned in Jähns，1：427，does not show iron cannon balls.

1700100738

1700100739 29.Liebe，“The Social Rank of Artillery”（“Die soziale Wertung der Artillerie”），Zeitschrift für historische Waffenkunde，2：146.

1700100740

1700100741 30.De la Noue，26.Discours, Observations militaires, ed.of 1587，p.755.

1700100742

1700100743 31.Sello，“The Campaign of Burgrave Frederick in February 1414”（“Der Feldzug Burggraf Friedrichs im Februar 1414”），Zeitschrift für Preussische Geschichte，19（1882）：101.

1700100744

1700100745 32.Sello, p.101.

1700100746

1700100747 33.The last three examples are taken from the collected passages in R. Schneider, Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum，1909，p.139. The effectiveness of the giant Turkish cannon before Constantinople is pictured on the other side, however, as very strong. See Essenwein, p.34，and Jacobs, p.128 ff.

1700100748

1700100749 34.Rudolf Schneider, Anonymi de rebus bellicis liber，1908. Schneider，“Beginning and End of the Torsion Engines”（“Anfang und Ende der Torsionsgeschütze”），Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum，1909. Schneider, The Artillery of the Middle Ages（Die Artillerie des Mittelalters），1910. In these otherwise excellent writings I consider as erroneous what is said about the Carolingian period. The capitularies are not “laws，” but simple prescriptions for individual cases, and there is no proof that leverage engines did not exist at the time of Charlemagne. Consequently, nothing prevents us from considering that the passages from Paulus Diaconus and from the vita Hludowici（Life of Hludowicus）cited by Schneider, p.24 f.，refer to such leverage engines. There is no basis（p.61）for ascribing their invention to the Normans. Erroneous, too, is the rationale on p.22 for the inability of the scara to manufacture and use projectile weapons.

1700100750

1700100751 35.Rathgen and Schäfer，“Feuer-und Fernwaffen beim päpstlichen Heer.”

1700100752

1700100753 36.Jähns, p.429. Burckhardt, Geschichte der Renaissance in Italien, Sect.108，p.224，says that Federigo of Urbino（1444-1482）introduced low forts instead of high ones, since the cannon was less effective against the lower ones. Von Stetten, Geschichte von Augsburg，1：195 ff.，reports that, whereas in that city in the second half of the fifteenth century the very energetic work on the city fortifications still consisted of raising the height of the walls, with the turn of the century a clearly recognizable turnabout took place. Walls and towers were lowered to a certain height, strong mounds of earth were erected, the moats were deepened and “lined，” bastions and ravelins were installed, and so on. The law governing the radius became stricter and stricter; in 1542，despite the protests of the clergy, even a church was razed. For further information, see the considerations of Guicciardini in Historia d’Iitalia, Venice，1562，pp.388，425. According to this source, the conquest of Otranto by the Turks in 1480 and the reconquest by Duke Alfonso of Calabria in the following year were landmarks in siege warfare. De la Noue，18.discours，2. Paradox. Ed.1587，p.387. I shall go no further into the techniques either of fortification or of the attack; instead, I refer the reader to the corresponding sections in Jähns, Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften. From a methodological viewpoint, it is interesting to see what kinds of exaggerations gain credence in something that is new and surprising. In his History of the Artillery, Napoleon III establishes the fact that Charles VIII in his campaign into Italy in 1494 transported 100 cannon of medium caliber and 40 heavy cannon. A whole series of authors, however, give him as many as 240 cannon and 2，040 field pieces, indeed as many as 6，000 light cannon. These exaggerations are due in part to copying errors and in part to the fact that the 6，000“vastardeurs”（pioneers, workers）who accompanied the army were misunderstood as cannon.

1700100754

1700100755 37.According to Sources for the History of Firearms（Quellen zur Geschichte der Feuerwaffen），p.100，the word “cannon” appears for the first time in a Spanish ordnance book of Charles V.

1700100756

1700100757 38.Guicciardini, Historia d’Italia，1：24. Jovius for the year 1515. Hist. Lib.XV，1：298.

1700100758

1700100759 39.von Ellgger, Military System and Military Art of the Swiss Confederation（Kriegswesen und Kriegskunst der schweizerischen Eidgenossen），Lucerne，1873，p.139.

1700100760

1700100761 40.Jovius lib. I for the year 1494 and lib.XV before Marignano.

1700100762

1700100763 41.The Swiss at Frastenz（Die Schweizer bei Frastenz）：Stettier，342，cited in Ranke, Werke，34：115. Valerius Anshelm, Bern Chronicle, Bern，1826，2：396. Jovius, Leben Gonsalvos, Venice，1581，p.292，at Cerignola in 1503. Likewise at Suriano in 1497：Jovius, Hist.lib.IV. At Marignano: Jovius, Lib.XV. At Ravenna in 1512: Jovius, Leben Leos, X，lib.II；Guicciardini, Historia d’Italia, lib.XI; Reissner, Leben Frundsbergs, Frankfurt，1620，fol.41-42. At Novara the Swiss supposedly fired with conquered French cannon they had turned around: Fleuranges, Mémoires, p.151.

1700100764

1700100765 The Venetian ambassador Quirini wrote the following description of the German battle square at the end of 1507:

1700100766

1700100767 … as soon as they see the fire of the cannon, the infantrymen automatically have to lift the halberds and long lances all together over their heads and to cross one lance over the other, and likewise the halberds, and at the same time to drop to the ground so low that the cannon, which do not fire downward, pass over them or hit in the halberds and long lances, not doing much harm to the infantrymen of the formation. For this reason, the Germans customarily now make the wheels of the gun carriages so small and low that the enemies can be harmed, even if they drop down as indicated; and when the formation is about to assault, the halberdiers and likewise those with the long lances all lower their halberds and also their long lances, with the points forward and not above their shoulders.（Relazioni degli Ambasc. Veneti [Reports of the Venetian Ambassadors]，Ed. Albèri, Series I，6：21-22）.

1700100768

1700100769 In 1537 de Langey taught that the best defense against the artillery was to take it by storm so that it would not have time for a second shot, or to approach it in a wide formation so that it would hit fewer men. Trewer Rath, fol. III, recommends having 300“runners”（including a few good musketeers）close quickly on the cannon.

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