1700100844

1700100845 7.Paetel, p.231.

1700100846

1700100847 8.Saxon Articles of War of 1546（Sächsische Kriegsartikel von 1546）. Published in the Militär-Wochenblatt, No.157，1909，by G. Berbig.

1700100848

1700100849 9.Eidgenössische Abschiede，3.1.599.

1700100850

1700100851 10.When the wars of religion started in 1562，the soldiers on both sides initially conducted themselves very properly. Among the Huguenots no swearing was heard, and no gambling or prostitutes were to be seen. The population was not bothered. But Coligny said at that time to de la Noue: “That will not last two months.” He was completely right. Furthermore, on occasion he took stringent steps and had robbers hanged. De la Noue, Discours 26，Observations militaires, Ed.1587，pp.681-686.

1700100852

1700100853 11.De la Noue treats these fraternal groups thoroughly. Discours 16，Ed.1587，p.352 ff.

1700100854

1700100855 12.Jähns，2：924.

1700100856

1700100857 13.S.C. Gigon, La troisième guerre de religion. Jarnac-Moncontour（1568-1569），p.376.

1700100858

1700100859 14.The Art of Dismounted War（Kriegskunst zu Fuss），pp.20-21.

1700100860

1700100861 15.For example, Georg von Lüneburg had no fewer than 1，200 Poles in his service in 1636.

1700100862

1700100863 16.Archives Oranien-Nassau，2d Series，2：275.

1700100864

1700100865 17.Archives, p.10.

1700100866

1700100867 18.Chemnitz, Swedish War（Schwedischer Krieg），Part IV, Book 2，p.141.

1700100868

1700100869 19.Pufendorf, B.19，Ed.1688，2：320. Apparently from Chemnitz.

1700100870

1700100871 20.Such a convention “de bonne guerre”（“of good war”）was signed by Gonzago and Brissac in 1553. Hardy, Histoire de la tactique française, p.463. Men-at-arms and private soldiers “will suddenly be released，” without having to pay, after they have been “dévalisés”—that is, disarmed and relieved of their possessions.

1700100872

1700100873 21.Kriegskunst zu Fuss, pp.16，22. Jähns，2：1018.

1700100874

1700100875 5　战例介绍

1700100876

1700100877 1.Hobohm，2：518.

1700100878

1700100879 2.This battle is thoroughly treated by Rüstow in History of the Infantry（Geschichte der Infanterie），by Jähns in Manual of a History of Warfare（Handbuch einer Geschichte des Kriegswesens），and by Ranke, History of the Romanic and Germanic Peoples（Geschichte der romanischen und germanischen Völker），Werke，33：25. All these accounts, which differ significantly from one another, need serious correcting. Rüstow based his work too exclusively on Guicciardini, while Ranke and Jähns used as their principal source Coccinius, who can hardly be compared to the better sources. The standard study, based on the sources, is the Berlin dissertation by Erich Siedersleben（1907）. Published by Georg Nauck. His principal sources are a letter written by Fabricius Colonna, who commanded the knights on the Spanish side（printed in Marino Sanuto, Diarii，14：176. Venice，1886），and a report from the Florentine ambassador, Pandolfini, who was present at the battle in the French headquarters（printed in Desjardins, Négociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane，2：581.Paris，1861）.

1700100880

1700100881 3.According to Colonna’s letter.

1700100882

1700100883 4.The Italian survey map indicates that the ditch still exists today but does not extend as close to the Ronco as it did, according to our sources, at the time of the battle in 1512.

1700100884

1700100885 5.I include the 400 lances that were in position at the Ronco bridge under Alègre and intervened in the battle.

1700100886

1700100887 6.The artillery maneuver is not completely clear, since we cannot assume, as Guicciardini recounts, that Este drove completely into the right flank of the enemy, and the cannon certainly did not have enough range to shoot along the entire enemy front. Perhaps another inspection of the battlefield would clarify this point.

1700100888

1700100889 7.This battle is treated in two valuable monographs that appeared in quick succession: Novara and Dijon. Apogee and Decline of the Swiss Great Power in the Sixteenth Century（Novara und Dijon. Höhepunkt und Verfall der schweizerischen Grossmacht im 16. Jahrhundert），by Doctor of Philosophy E. Gagliardi. Zurich，1907. Published by Leemann Brothers and Co.“The Battle of Novara”（“Die Schlacht bei Novara”），by Georg Fischer. Berlin dissertation，1908. Published by Georg Nauck.

1700100890

1700100891 8.Gagliardi and Fischer arrange the individual elements of the battle very differently, indeed even contradicting one another, since Fischer places on the right flank what Gagliardi seems to report for the left flank. I agree with Fischer. Nevertheless, when Fischer assigns only 1，000 men to the north square of the Swiss，2，000 to the center square, and 7，000 to the south square, I do not say that that is impossible, but I do not consider it as certain. If the Swiss had good information on the enemy and knew that the lansquenets were in the southern part of the camp but that there was no favorable terrain there for horsemen, they may well have made the northerly and central columns of infantry very weak, assigning in return the horsemen to the former and the cannon to the latter. But they may have given these two units only missions calling for demonstrations, while assigning the actual attack exclusively to the third square and giving it seven-tenths of the entire infantry. But we may believe such fine points only if we have direct and reliable sources concerning them.Consequently, although I agree essentially with Fischer, I have expressed myself more carefully and with more restraint and have avoided giving specific numbers for the various troop units.

1700100892

1700100893 9.The sources speak of 400 Swiss halberdiers who reportedly first drove off the harquebusiers of the lansquenets and then attacked the main body in the flank. Gagliardi（p.162）considers them to be a unit that arrived by chance, while Fischer（p.138）considers this a detachment that was sent out intentionally. I suspect that these were men who welled out on one side when the main bodies clashed.

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