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2.E. Fueter, in a review of Hobohm’s work in the Historische Zeitschrift，113：578，while recognizing the high value of the work, nevertheless takes exception in detail to many points, charges the author with a lack of methodological schooling and even insufficient knowledge of warfare and of the Italian language. I have checked on these accusations and have compared them with a handwritten countercritique by Hobohm. The result is that the reproach falls back on the critic. Even if all the details that he criticizes were real errors, in comparison with the stupendous scholarship and the critical perceptiveness with which Hobohm sweeps aside mountains of misjudgments appearing in the sources and constructs positive new knowledge, those errors would have very little significance. But my study shows that of all the objections and corrections made by Fueter, not even a single one—really not a single one—is justified. It is not that Hobohm’s understanding of Italian is insufficient, but rather that Fueter did not know the differences between modern Italian and the Italian of the sixteenth century. It is not Hobohm who introduces erroneous material concerning the warfare of that time but Fueter. Let us give but three examples: Machiavelli recommends that in the selection of corporals for the militia it should be taken into consideration that they are acceptable to the other conscripts（“scripti”）. Fueter is not familiar with this principle and this language. He claims he is bringing sense into this prescription by translating conscripts（“scripti”）with the word “instructions” and says that Hobohm, because of what is actually his correct translation of the passage, is unknowledgeable. Furthermore, Machiavelli recruited his militia exclusively from the peasants of the subjected countryside, and not from the burghers. Fueter read Hobohm’s book so hastily that he attributed to these peasants the attitudes of the “Florentine merchant nation.”
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A third feature of Machiavelli’s militia system was the fact that Florence did its best, even though not always with success, to prevent its subjects from going off as mercenaries, whereas in Switzerland and Germany that was officially permitted and often even more or less organized. Fueter had such little understanding of these opposite attitudes, which are explained by Hobohm in a very interesting and thorough manner, that he believes Machiavelli borrowed the official regulations for sending men off for mercenary service from the Swiss military system, and he attempts to correct Hobohm in this matter with strong emphasis. And thus it continues point by point, and I can only regret that the Historische Zeitschrift has misled its readers on such a basic work.
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3.Jähns，1：336.
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4.Historia d’Italia, L.IX. Venice，1562，p.425.
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5.Jovius, Elogia virorum bellica virtute illustrium（Aphorisms of Men Distinguished by Military Virtues），Basel，1575，p.323.
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6.Hobohm，2：457，464. False army strengths for Novara and Marignano: Discorsi，2：18. Also Escher，“The Swiss Foot Troops in the Fifteenth Century and at the Beginning of the Sixteenth Century”（“Das schweizerische Fussvolk im 15.und im Anfang des 16. Jahrhunderts”），Neujahrsblätter der Züricher Feuerwerker，1904-1907，explains thoroughly that Machiavelli does not portray correctly either the armament or the formation of the Swiss.
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第二篇 宗教战争时期
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1 骑士向现代骑兵的过渡
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1.George T. Denison’s History of the Cavalry from the Earliest Times, with Observations Concerning Its Future（Geschichte der Kavallerie seit den frühesten Zeiten mit Betrachtungen über ihre Zukunft），（German version by Brix, Berlin，1879）has no scientific-historical value.
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2.Concerning the dispute over the explanation of the name, see Mangold in the Jahresbericht der Geschichtswissenschaften，3（1892）：247. The hussars are mentioned quite often in the Küstrin Battle Report on Mühlberg in Ranke, Werke，6：244-246，and in the report of the Nuremberg participant in the war, Joachim Imhof, in Knaake, Contributions to the History of Charles V（Beiträge zur Geschichte Karls V.），Stendal，1864，p.46. Of particular interest is Avila, History of the Schmalkaldic War（Geschichte des Schmalkaldischen Krieges），German edition, p.123. According to Susane，1：150，there had been Hungarian cavalry in France since 1635；in 1693 a regiment of hussars was formed.
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3.See Jähns，1：498，concerning this book. Hauser, in Les Sources de l’histoire de France，2：25，rejects du Bellay as the author and says, probably correctly, that the edition of 1548 was the oldest（Jähns assumes 1535）. A very large part of the contents, but not the passage above copied from Vol.I, Chap.8，is taken from Machiavelli. See Gebelin, Quid rei militaris doctrina renascentibus litteris antiquitatis debuerit（What Military Doctrine Owed to the Renaissance），Bordeaux，1881，p.44.
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4.Jovius, Book 44，Ed.1578，p.555.
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5.Book 45，p.610.
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6.Report of the Venetian Ambassador Navagero of July 1546（Bericht des venezianischen Gesandten Navagero vom Juli 1546），in Albèri, Series I, Vol.I, pp.314，328. He also describes the arms of these horsemen（p.314）. The pistol, which another report shows them as having（Ranke, Werke，4：223），is not yet mentioned in this report.
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7.Alois Mocenigo, Relazione di Germania，1548. Ed. Fiedler, Fontes rer.austriacarum（Sources of Austrian History），30：120，Vienna，1870.
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8.Vol.Ill, Book 3，Chap.2，p.289.
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9.Jähns，1：740.
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10.See the detailed extract in Jähns’Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften，1：474.
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11.Jähns，1：521.
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12.Napoleon III writes in his article entitled “On the Past and Future of Artillery”（“Du passé et de l’avenir de l’artillerie”），Oeuvres，4：200：
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Saint-Luc says in his Observations militaires that the duke of Alba, having found the squadrons of the reîtres too deep, wanted to form his own men with their front twice as wide as their depth. In this way, supposing that each horse would occupy a space of 6 paces by 2，he estimated that a squadron of 1，700 horses in seventeen ranks would occupy a rectangle of 102 paces by 204.
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The passage by Saint-Luc does not yet seem to have been printed.
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13.Edited by Buchon, p.122.
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14.That may be concluded from Discourse XV（Ed.1587，p.345），where it is assumed that a victorious squadron would still only directly throw back fifteen or sixteen of the enemy drawn up in line, that is, with a normal strength of 100，one-sixth or one-seventh of the total. See Discourse XVIII.
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15.Napoleon III, in the work cited in Note 12 above, says that Henry IV had squadrons of 300 to 500 horses, which were drawn up in five ranks. He states that Montgomery required that the men-at-arms were to form in ten ranks and the light horse in seven. Billon, in Les principes de l’art militaire, German edition, p.254（1613），would have the squadron formed with a depth of five ranks，“for the horses do not press one another strongly.”
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