1700101151 Follow-up forces ca. 7，000

1700101152

1700101153 Withdrawn from Prussia 13，600

1700101154

1700101155 Total: approximately 40，000

1700101156

1700101157 Some 36，000 men remained behind in Sweden, Finland, Prussia, and so forth. Consequently, the entire military strength amounted to 76，000 men，43，000 of whom were levied nationals.

1700101158

1700101159 3.Jähns，2：952.

1700101160

1700101161 4.In his writings of the year 1673（Schriften，2：672），Montecuccoli actually considers the usual ratio of two-thirds musketeers and one-third pikemen to be wrong. He believes more pikemen are needed to cover the musketeers in battle, for the latter, alone, would be overpowered by the cavalry. He points out that this was what happened at Lens, for example, where Condé defeated the Lotharingians. At Breitenfeld, hesays, the Holstein regiment held fast because of its pikemen until it was overcome by the artillery. He reports the same thing in 2：223. He claims that the ratio of two-thirds to one-third was acceptable only because on so many occasions outside of battle the musketeers were more useful than the pikemen.

1700101162

1700101163 5.“The Swedish Discipline，” cited in Firth, Cromwell’s Army, p. 105.

1700101164

1700101165 6.According to Firth, p.104.

1700101166

1700101167 7.Firth, Cromwell’s Army, p.98，from the Swedish Intelligencer，1：124.

1700101168

1700101169 8.On the leather cannon, see Gohlke in the Zeitschrift für historische Waffenkunde，4：392，and Feldhaus, p.121.“Leather pieces” are also mentioned in the introductory poem to the Little War Book（Kriegsbüchlein）of Lavater of Zurich，1644. He says they did not come first from Sweden to Zurich，“but rather from us to them.”

1700101170

1700101171 9.Letter to Aldringer，2 January 1633，reproduced in Förster, Wallenstein’s Letters（Wallensteins Briefe）. Daniel’s statement in History of the Military（Geschichte des Kriegswesens），5：12，that Henry IV of France had already required that his squadrons fire a single salvo with their pistols and then attack with cold steel, must be based on a misunderstanding. I have found nothing on this in the sources, and the objective prerequisite for such action is missing, that is, a stricter discipline. Davila states expressly that at Ivry, the last large battle of Henry IV, his squadrons used the caracole.

1700101172

1700101173 10.This explanation has been preserved for us in the work of an English military author, Turner, and it goes back to English officers who had served under Gustavus Adolphus. I draw the quotation from Firth, Cromwell’s Army, p.289. The passages cited in Mareks, Coligny, p.56，and Hobohm, Machiavelli，2：373，385，which seem to prove an earlier occurrence of the running of the spear gauntlet—especially Bouchet, Preuves de l’histoire de l’illustre maison de Coligny（Evidence on the History of the Illustrious House of Coligny），1642，p.457—are based on erroneous translations.“Passer par les piques”（“to pass before the pikes”）is the “law of the long spears，” mentioned on p.61 above. Of course, La Curne de St. Palaye, Dictionnaire de l’ancien langage français, Vol.8，understands this expression as meaning striking with the spear shafts. I consider that impossible; the spears are too long to be used that way.

1700101174

1700101175 11.Cited in Firth, Cromwell’s Army, p.321.

1700101176

1700101177 5　克伦威尔

1700101178

1700101179 1.The outstanding book by C.H. Firth, Cromwell’s Army, London，1902，covers exhaustively the subject of Cromwell as a military organizer, the role in which he is of most interest to us. The extensive work by Fritz Hoenig, Oliver Cromwell, Berlin，1887，is not up to par. See the review in the Historische Zeitschrift，63：482，and the Historical Review, Vol.15（1889），19，p.599. It was only in his later writings that Hoenig brought his considerable talent to its full development.

1700101180

1700101181 2.According to Hoenig, II，2，269，this command originated in 1643.

1700101182

1700101183 3.According to an estimate by W.G. Ross, reported in the Historische Zeitschrift，63（1889）：484，the parliamentary army numbered 13，500 men, including 7，000 infantry, whereas the royal army had only 8，000 men, half infantry and half cavalry. See Firth, p.111.

1700101184

1700101185 4.Hoenig attributed to Cromwell specific creations in the tactical employment of cavalry, the formation of echelons, and so on, and saw in him the predecessor of Frederick and Seydlitz and even the guiding spirit for our time. I cannot agree with him on this. The entire organization of military units of the seventeenth century with the matter of effectiveness of their weapons is too different from the conditions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to justify such comparisons. Hoenig is also in error（I，2，247）when he attributes to Cromwell the formation of divisions in the Napoleonic sense.

1700101186

1700101187 5.Firth, p.101.

1700101188

1700101189 6.See my article “Anglicanism and Presbyterianism” in the Historisch-Politische Aufsätze.

1700101190

1700101191 6　战例介绍

1700101192

1700101193 1.H.von Koss，“The Battles of St. Quentin and Gravelingen”（“Die Schlachten bei St. Quentin und Gravelingen”），Berlin dissertation，1914，E. Ebering Press. I am not so sure whether the analysis of Gravelingen in this otherwise very worthwhile work is appropriate. The points raised by Elkan against this work in his review in the Historische Zeitschrift，116：533，apply only to secondary items, partly simple typographical errors. The question, too, of the intervention of the English ships, which Koss, with good reasons, doubts, is not significant from the military history viewpoint, but, on the basis of testimony cited by Elkan and overlooked by Koss, this point calls for further study.

1700101194

1700101195 2.Swiss battle reports in Segesser, Ludwig Pfyffer and His Times（Ludwig Pfyffer und seine Zeit），1：621.

1700101196

1700101197 3.Special study on the battle by Gigon, La troisième guerre de religion，1912. Gigon gives the Huguenots a strength of 12，000 infantry and 7，000 cavalry and the Catholics 15，000 infantry and 8，000 cavalry. Other writers assume considerably higher numbers for the Catholics. According to Popelinière, Coligny supposedly used the method of blending the infantry and the cavalry（“d’enlacer l’infanterie et la cavallerie”）in small units. The account of the battle, however, does not show that.

1700101198

1700101199 4.The standard monograph is by J. Krebs, Berlin，1879. Brendel，1875，gives nothing useful from a military standpoint. A few details are to be found in Riezler, Sitzungsberichte der Münchener Akademie, Phil. Abt.，Vol.23，1906.

1700101200

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