1700101180

1700101181 2.According to Hoenig, II，2，269，this command originated in 1643.

1700101182

1700101183 3.According to an estimate by W.G. Ross, reported in the Historische Zeitschrift，63（1889）：484，the parliamentary army numbered 13，500 men, including 7，000 infantry, whereas the royal army had only 8，000 men, half infantry and half cavalry. See Firth, p.111.

1700101184

1700101185 4.Hoenig attributed to Cromwell specific creations in the tactical employment of cavalry, the formation of echelons, and so on, and saw in him the predecessor of Frederick and Seydlitz and even the guiding spirit for our time. I cannot agree with him on this. The entire organization of military units of the seventeenth century with the matter of effectiveness of their weapons is too different from the conditions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to justify such comparisons. Hoenig is also in error（I，2，247）when he attributes to Cromwell the formation of divisions in the Napoleonic sense.

1700101186

1700101187 5.Firth, p.101.

1700101188

1700101189 6.See my article “Anglicanism and Presbyterianism” in the Historisch-Politische Aufsätze.

1700101190

1700101191 6　战例介绍

1700101192

1700101193 1.H.von Koss，“The Battles of St. Quentin and Gravelingen”（“Die Schlachten bei St. Quentin und Gravelingen”），Berlin dissertation，1914，E. Ebering Press. I am not so sure whether the analysis of Gravelingen in this otherwise very worthwhile work is appropriate. The points raised by Elkan against this work in his review in the Historische Zeitschrift，116：533，apply only to secondary items, partly simple typographical errors. The question, too, of the intervention of the English ships, which Koss, with good reasons, doubts, is not significant from the military history viewpoint, but, on the basis of testimony cited by Elkan and overlooked by Koss, this point calls for further study.

1700101194

1700101195 2.Swiss battle reports in Segesser, Ludwig Pfyffer and His Times（Ludwig Pfyffer und seine Zeit），1：621.

1700101196

1700101197 3.Special study on the battle by Gigon, La troisième guerre de religion，1912. Gigon gives the Huguenots a strength of 12，000 infantry and 7，000 cavalry and the Catholics 15，000 infantry and 8，000 cavalry. Other writers assume considerably higher numbers for the Catholics. According to Popelinière, Coligny supposedly used the method of blending the infantry and the cavalry（“d’enlacer l’infanterie et la cavallerie”）in small units. The account of the battle, however, does not show that.

1700101198

1700101199 4.The standard monograph is by J. Krebs, Berlin，1879. Brendel，1875，gives nothing useful from a military standpoint. A few details are to be found in Riezler, Sitzungsberichte der Münchener Akademie, Phil. Abt.，Vol.23，1906.

1700101200

1700101201 5.Riezler, p.84，of course assumes that the army of the League was only 10，000 men strong and had lose 12，000 to 15，000 men from sickness in the preceding campaign. The “Hungarian fever” was raging at that time in all camps.

1700101202

1700101203 6.According to Anhalt, the formation of the Bohemians was 3，750 paces wide at most, and it appears as if the animal park was not included in that figure. According to the illustration in Krebs, however, the width was not even 2，000 meters, including the position in the animal park, and, remarkably enough, this was estimated on the same scale as equal to 5，000 feet. On page 171 Krebs assumes that the front was about 3，600 meters. In any case, the front was very long for the small army.

1700101204

1700101205 7.Later, Tilly reproached his colleague Buquoi for having divided up his horsemen into “little squadrons”（“squadronelli”）.

1700101206

1700101207 8.In his report Christian speaks only of Thurn’s musketeers, as if there were no pikemen there at all.

1700101208

1700101209 9.According to Gindely，2：119，the units（Fähnlein）of the Bohemian regiments were composed of 24 privates first class，76 pikemen, and 200 musketeers.

1700101210

1700101211 10.The standard special study on the battle is by Walter Opitz（Leipzig, A. Deichert，1892）. The dissertation by Wangerin, Halle，1896，is only a study of the sources without significant conclusions.

1700101212

1700101213 11.Opitz, p.76，established the fact that Tilly wanted to move from Leipzig to the Elbe, in order to gain a crossing and to draw Field Marshal Tiefenbach to him from Silesia. Once he had this latter force, Pappenheim was to be detached to Mecklenburg in the rear of the Swedish king. That was the plan in case the enemy again avoided battle. For the battle itself the plan was only significant to the extent that it may have contributed to the fact that they did not want to go back behind the Elster to await Aldringer.

1700101214

1700101215 12.Jähns, History of Military Sciences（Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften），1：572.

1700101216

1700101217 13.Following Rüstow’s sample, Opitz has Tilly’s infantry arranged in the form of a Spanish brigade. It may be that they were formed this way for a moment. It is not reported, and, of course, it does not matter tactically, since in their movement forward it would have been neither possible nor advantageous to hold the four units together in some kind of prescribed figure. It is expressly stated in a French report and in Chemnitz（Opitz, p.92）that Tilly’s entire army stood in a single echelon, and Montecuccoli, Writings，2：581，says that Tilly was defeated at Leipzig mainly because he had drawn up his entire army in a single, right-angled front without reserves. The discrepancy that, according to Field Marshal Horn’s report, Tilly’s infantry was aligned in four battalions, whereas the French report states fourteen battalions（Opitz, p.93），can probably be explained by the fact that in the latter figure the cavalry formations are also counted as battalions. Furthermore, as in the infantry, several regiments of cavalry may have been assembled in a single tactical unit.

1700101218

1700101219 14.In his sketch, Opitz obviously shows the Swedes as much too wide, the Saxons as too narrow. Since it is reported of both formations that they were a good 21/2 miles wide（extract from Schreiber’s report of 8 September. Droysen, Archives for Saxon History [Archiv für sächsische Geschichte]，7：348）and the right flank of the Swedes extended beyond the enemy flank, then the imperial right flank must no doubt have extended beyond the enemy flank, the Saxons.

1700101220

1700101221 15.Montecuccoli, Works，2：579，states that the principal reason for the Swedish victory was that they placed the musketeers between the cavalry. The cavalry had to be so formed that the enemy first had to pass through the musket fire, and in the weakened condition into which that brought him, he was then attacked by the cavalry.

1700101222

1700101223 16.This action by the artillery is not mentioned in the actual battle reports, but it does appear in Chemnitz and Montecuccoli. This is consistent with the fact that Tilly, in his various reports（Droysen, Archives for Saxon History，7：391-392），strongly emphasized the enemy’s superiority in artillery.

1700101224

1700101225 17.Karl Deuticke，“The Battle of Lützen”（“Die Schlacht bei Lützen”），Giessen dissertation，1917. It was not until the appearance of this excellent study, in which the scattered sources, especially letters, were collected and studied with the greatest care with the help of the Stockholm Library, that a correct and reliable picture of the details of this battle was achieved.

1700101226

1700101227 18.It is not definitely reported as to whether Wallenstein had additional light pieces along with his twenty-one heavy cannon. We only know from several letters in the Fontes rerum austriacarum（Sources of Austrian History），Vol.65，that he had procured such cannon.

1700101228

1700101229 19.Deuticke, p.67.

[ 上一页 ]  [ :1.70010118e+09 ]  [ 下一页 ]