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15.Montecuccoli, Works,2:579,states that the principal reason for the Swedish victory was that they placed the musketeers between the cavalry. The cavalry had to be so formed that the enemy first had to pass through the musket fire, and in the weakened condition into which that brought him, he was then attacked by the cavalry.
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16.This action by the artillery is not mentioned in the actual battle reports, but it does appear in Chemnitz and Montecuccoli. This is consistent with the fact that Tilly, in his various reports(Droysen, Archives for Saxon History,7:391-392),strongly emphasized the enemy’s superiority in artillery.
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17.Karl Deuticke,“The Battle of Lützen”(“Die Schlacht bei Lützen”),Giessen dissertation,1917. It was not until the appearance of this excellent study, in which the scattered sources, especially letters, were collected and studied with the greatest care with the help of the Stockholm Library, that a correct and reliable picture of the details of this battle was achieved.
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18.It is not definitely reported as to whether Wallenstein had additional light pieces along with his twenty-one heavy cannon. We only know from several letters in the Fontes rerum austriacarum(Sources of Austrian History),Vol.65,that he had procured such cannon.
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19.Deuticke, p.67.
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20.Unfortunately, we do not have information on the strength of this corps; it can hardly have been more than 6,000 men. On the day of the battle it was still at Torgau and would therefore not have been able to reach the vicinity of Lützen for several days. Gustavus Adolphus had ordered it to follow the route via Riesa and Oschatz in order to avoid Eilenburg and Leipzig, which were occupied by the emperor’s forces.
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21.The more recent monographs on this battle, on which my account is based, are principally those of Walter Struck, Stralsund,1893,and Erich Leo, Halle,1900. But neither of them distinguishes sufficiently between a positive decision to seek the battle and the mere risk of bringing on the battle as the result of a maneuver. Nor has the lively description of the battle by Colonel Kaiser in the Literarische Beilage des Staatsanzeigers für Württemberg,1897,come to grips with this decisive point. It was only later that I became acquainted with “From Lützen to Nördlingen”(“Von Lützen nach Nördlingen”)by Karl Jacob(1904),who seeks to prove that Bernhard von Weimar was unjustly exalted and Swedish Field Marshal Horn was a much better strategist. What Jacob says in Horn’s favor may well be essentially correct, but his pejorative judgment of Bernhard shows prejudice and insufficient training in military history. In the points of controversy between Leo and Struck, Jacob correctly sides strongly with Struck.
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22.Jacob criticizes Bernhard for attacking at all. He believes that wing should have maintained a purely defensive stance in order to cover a possible withdrawal with its full strength still available. Such conduct would have been poor testimony for the military genius of Bernhard. Of course, since the battle was lost, the defeat was all the more frightful in that Bernhard had insufficient reserves to send in to cover the withdrawal. Nevertheless, if he had remained passive in the battle for this eventuality, a victory would have been impossible, since the enemy could then have had all the more troops to employ against Horn. From all appearances, Bernhard understood his mission absolutely correctly—to keep the enemy on his flank as occupied as possible but without bringing on the decisive battle there.
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23.Leo, p.59,estimates the strength of the Catholic army between 40,000 and 50,000 men, a small portion of which remained in position facing Nördlingen, while he considers the strength of the Swedes between 19,000 and 22,000 regulars and 5,000 to 6,000 Württemberg militia. M. Ritter, History of the Thirty Years’War(Geschichte des Dreissigjährigen Krieges),p.580,agrees with these estimates, as does Jacob, p.109. Unfortunately, we learn nothing specific about the employment and conduct of this militia in the battle. It must have been in position on Bernhard’s flank and therefore probably remained unengaged in the actual battle but was overtaken by the enemy on the withdrawal and cut down. Even in Kaiser’s account, where we would most likely expect it, there is nothing further of any significance.
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24.Leo, p.66,note, cites several sources to the effect that Bernhard from the very start—that is, as early as in the council of war that decided on the march onto the Arnsberg—wished to bring on the decisive battle and so recommended. But Leo’s sources are not completely reliable, and it could, for example, easily be the case that remarks by the prince on the evening of the march or the morning of the battle, when it was a question of whether or not they should seek to take the Allbuch position by force, were transposed back to the council of war.
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25.The authoritative monograph is Rudolf Schmidt’s “The Battle of Wittstock”(“Die Schlacht bei Wittstock”),Halle,1876.
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26.Letter to Field Marshal Count Götz, who was in command in Hesse, dated 9 October, and therefore five days after the battle. Quoted in von dem Decken, Duke George of Braunschweig and Lüneburg(Herzog Georg von Braunschweig und Lüneburg),3:277.
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第三篇 常备军时代
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1 总论
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1.On the origin and development of the Austrian army see History of the Imperial and Royal Armed Forces from 1618 to the End of the Nineteenth Century(Geschichte der kaiserlichen und königlichen Wehrmacht von 1618 bis Ende des XIX. Jahrhunderts),published by the Directorate of the Imperial and Royal Military Archives.
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2 法国
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1.French History(Französische Geschichte),1:369.
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2.Susane, Histoire de la cavallerie française,1:82.
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3.Campaigns of Prince Eugene(Feldzüge des Prinzen Eugen),1:507.
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4.Susane, Histoire de l’infanterie,1:78.
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5.The Spanish terzios, which were created in 1544,may have served as a model; their relationship to the columellas is not clear.
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6.Mention, L’armée de l’ancien régime.1900.
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7.Ritter, German History in the Period of the Counterreformation(Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Gegenreformation),3:518.
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8.André,Le Tellier, p.26.
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9.André,p.217.
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