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23.Leo, p.59，estimates the strength of the Catholic army between 40，000 and 50，000 men, a small portion of which remained in position facing Nördlingen, while he considers the strength of the Swedes between 19，000 and 22，000 regulars and 5，000 to 6，000 Württemberg militia. M. Ritter, History of the Thirty Years’War（Geschichte des Dreissigjährigen Krieges），p.580，agrees with these estimates, as does Jacob, p.109. Unfortunately, we learn nothing specific about the employment and conduct of this militia in the battle. It must have been in position on Bernhard’s flank and therefore probably remained unengaged in the actual battle but was overtaken by the enemy on the withdrawal and cut down. Even in Kaiser’s account, where we would most likely expect it, there is nothing further of any significance.
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24.Leo, p.66，note, cites several sources to the effect that Bernhard from the very start—that is, as early as in the council of war that decided on the march onto the Arnsberg—wished to bring on the decisive battle and so recommended. But Leo’s sources are not completely reliable, and it could, for example, easily be the case that remarks by the prince on the evening of the march or the morning of the battle, when it was a question of whether or not they should seek to take the Allbuch position by force, were transposed back to the council of war.
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25.The authoritative monograph is Rudolf Schmidt’s “The Battle of Wittstock”（“Die Schlacht bei Wittstock”），Halle，1876.
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26.Letter to Field Marshal Count Götz, who was in command in Hesse, dated 9 October, and therefore five days after the battle. Quoted in von dem Decken, Duke George of Braunschweig and Lüneburg（Herzog Georg von Braunschweig und Lüneburg），3：277.
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第三篇 常备军时代
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1 总论
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1.On the origin and development of the Austrian army see History of the Imperial and Royal Armed Forces from 1618 to the End of the Nineteenth Century（Geschichte der kaiserlichen und königlichen Wehrmacht von 1618 bis Ende des XIX. Jahrhunderts），published by the Directorate of the Imperial and Royal Military Archives.
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2 法国
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1.French History（Französische Geschichte），1：369.
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2.Susane, Histoire de la cavallerie française，1：82.
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3.Campaigns of Prince Eugene（Feldzüge des Prinzen Eugen），1：507.
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4.Susane, Histoire de l’infanterie，1：78.
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5.The Spanish terzios, which were created in 1544，may have served as a model; their relationship to the columellas is not clear.
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6.Mention, L’armée de l’ancien régime.1900.
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7.Ritter, German History in the Period of the Counterreformation（Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Gegenreformation），3：518.
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8.André，Le Tellier, p.26.
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9.André，p.217.
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10.According to Susane, Ed.of 1876，p.312，at the beginning of 1791 the rank and file of the infantry did not number more than 125，000 men.
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11.Susane, Histoire de la cavallerie française, pp.136，154.
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12.Louis André，Michel Le Tellier et l’organisation de l’armée monarchique, Paris, Felix Alcan，1906. This is a large work, supported by many documents. At times the tendency to emphasize Le Tellier’s accomplishments is somewhat too strong. In 1900 the French War Ministry published a work entitled Historiques des Corps de Troupe de l’armée française（1569-1900）. The introduction gives a summary of the important references since the work by Daniel in 1721. The book contains a tabular presentation of all troop units since 1589 without any further source studies, as well as the names of the commanders, of the battles in which the units participated, and so forth.
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13.Susane, p.100. De la Noue concludes that the Spanish infantry was better than the French from the fact that so many noblemen were in the Spanish service（Jähns, p.564）. A remarkable account of weekly changes of the Spanish commanders, determined by lot, is reported for the year 1538 by Jovius, Book 37，Ed.1578，pp.364，366.
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14.Discours XIV, Ed.1587，p.338.
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15.The first trace of a distinction in principle between officers and noncommissioned officers I find in a remark by de la Noue in Discours XIII, Ed.1587，p.322. In that passage he praises the Spanish for obeying the orders of even simple sergeants, and their officers all the more.
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16.I.G. Hoyer, History of the Art of War（Geschichte der Kriegskunst），p.188，who was still familiar with the living tradition, considers that the principal reason for the poor discipline of the French in the eighteenth century was the selling of officer positions. But we may not observe such points in isolation and then consider them as basic causes. In the English army, too, the sale of positions was common, and it not only maintained its discipline, but this deformity even offered the advantage that an outstanding man, if he was also rich, could attain a higher command position at a very young age. Thus Wellington became a lieutenant colonel at age twenty-three.
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17.The relationship of the noble and bourgeois officers in the French army is treated very thoroughly in the book by Louis Tuetey, The Officers under the Ancien Régime, Nobles and Commoners（Les officiers sous l’ancien régime, nobles et roturiers），Paris，1908.
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