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29.von Osten-Sacken, Prussia’s Army from Its Beginnings to the Present（Preussens Heer von seinen Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart），1911，1：173.
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30.These numbers are estimated for the regiment that was named “Thüna” in 1784 and “Winnig” in 1806. Ollech，“Life of Reiher”（“Leben Reihers”），Militär-Wochenblatt，1859，p.11. Kunhardt von Schmidt, Militär-Wochenblatt，1909，col.3771. The latter correctly assumes that, in view of the uniformity throughout the army, these lists give a picture not only of the individual troop unit but of the entire infantry of the period. Similar age relationships already existed in 1704. Schrötter, p.453.
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31.M. Lehmann, p.278.
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32.Basta（Book I, Chap.6—consequently, long before the Thirty Years’War）was already complaining about the start of the practice of filling the captains’positions only with aristocrats, even when they were completely inexperienced, so that no private soldier any longer had the hope of moving up, except in very exceptional cases. According to Löwe, Organization of Wallenstein’s Army（Organisation des Wallensteinschen Heeres），p.86，most of the colonels and generals in the Thirty Years’War were nobles, but among the lower officers there were still quite a number of former privates. G. Droysen，“Contributions to the History of the Military System During the Period of the Thirty Years’War”（“Beiträge zur Geschichte des Militärwesens während der Epoche des 30jährigen Krieges”），Zeitschrift für Kulturgeschichte, Vol.4，1875，emphasizes strongly, in opposition to Gansauge, that there was not yet any officer corps at that time.
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33.Schrötter, Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen, Vol.27.
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34.Treated very clearly by Richard M. Meyer，“The Military Titles”（“Die militärischen Titel”）in the Zeitschrift für deutsche Wortforschung, Vol.12，Book 3（1910），p.145.
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The 1726 regulation of Frederick William I shows a great similarity to a Spanish regulation. Jähns，2：1577，believes that it goes back directly to the Spanish. Erben, in the Mitteilungen des kaiserlichen und königlichen Heeresmuseums，1（1902）：3，seems to refute that. I hesitate to make any definitive judgment.
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35.Schmoller in the Historische Zeitschrift，30：61.
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36.Observations on the Art of War（Betrachtungen über die Kriegskunst），section 13.
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37.G.Droysen，“Beiträge，”Zeitschrift für deutsche Kulturgeschichte, new series，4（1875）：592.
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38.“Report of the Ambassador Valory of 1748.”Ed. Koser, Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen，7（1894）：299. Valory stresses the marching in step of the Prussians so strongly that we may doubt whether the French had it.
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39.Daniels，“Ferdinand von Braunschweig，”Preussische Jahrbücher, Vols.77，78，79，80，82.
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40.According to Frederick’s so-called Military Testament, there are supposed to have been 110，000 natives and 80，000 foreigners in 1780，but the numbers are not entirely certain, since natives who were not from the regimental canton were also counted as foreigners.
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41.The Militia Gallica by Wallhausen（French Military Service; translation of a book by Montgommery），p.44，precisely states how broad was the power of punishment of each position. The colonel was allowed to strike and kill with the sword, even officers. The sergeant-major had similar authority, but he could also strike with the staff, that is, with his measuring stick. Nobody was to feel insulted by this. The captain was allowed to strike with the flat of his sword. The lieutenants and sergeants could do likewise on the march or in the trenches, but in garrison only against their direct subordinates. The ensign was allowed to do this only when substituting for the lieutenant or captain. The sergeant（in contradiction to the foregoing！）could strike only on the march, in battle, on guard duty, and in the trenches, with the shaft of the halberd, and not with the sword, if a soldier left his post, but not in garrison or for other reasons.
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42.Daniels, Preussische Jahrbücher，82：270.
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43.According to the estimates of the General Staff Work. That was, therefore, at the moment Frederick started the war. Ranke，3：148 cites a memorandum, according to which Frederick William I, on his death, had left behind 83，484 men, including 72，000 men in the field army; other statements show up to 89，000 men. According to Schrötter, the Prussian army on 2 January 1705，when it had been strongly reinforced with the assistance of the subsidies of the sea powers, already amounted to 47，031，and with the militia 67，000 men, that is, almost 4 percent of the population.
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44.Preussische Jahrbücher，142：300.
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4 操练与18世纪的战术变化
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1.Rüstow, Geschichte der Infanterie，2：42 ff.
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2.Jany, p.108.
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3.Pastenacci, Battle of Enzheim（Schlacht bei Enzheim）.
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4.In the battles of Klissow（1702）and Fraustadt（1706），the Saxon infantry tried unsuccessfully to protect itself against the Swedes with chevaux-de-frise.
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5.According to Würdinger, Military History of Bavaria（Kriegsgeschichte von Bayern），2：349，such an “awl spear” appears in a Passau armory register of 1488.
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6.According to sources cited by Firth in Cromwell’s Army, p.87，a light musket with a flintlock was already in widespread use as a hunting weapon by the German peasants at the start of the seventeenth century. In 1626 with these muskets the peasants completely wiped out imperial regiments that Christian of Braunschweig had defeated.
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7.At this point I wish to assemble a number of data concerning the technical improvements of the firearm, without claiming accuracy for each individual date. From this listing, however, we gain an overall view as to how gradually such a development occurs, step by step.
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