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When Frederick planned to begin the war in 1756，he estimated that each campaign would cost him 5 million talers and that Prussia together with Saxony, which he planned to conquer, could afford that. The expenses increased, however, to 15 million talers annually, and he had to request English subsidies. Maria Theresa waged war essentially with French subsidies, but in 1761 she had used up her resources so completely that even during the continuing war she reduced the army and discharged troops for reasons of economy.
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4.These passages are to be found in “Frederick the Great’s Ideas on War”（“Friedrichs des Grossen Anschauungen vom Kriege”），Vol.27 of the Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, p.268.
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5.Jochim，“The Military Testament of the Great King”（“Das militärische Testament des Grossen Königs”），supplement to the Militär-Wochenblatt，1914，pp.269，278.
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6.Lenz, Historische Zeitschrift，49：458.
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7.Schmalkaldic War（Schmalkaldischer Krieg），German edition，1853，p.90.
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8.Even before the start of the Schmalkaldic War, the Venetian ambassador reported that the emperor would not fight any battle. In this connection he noted
:“… Protestants do not have captains … the German nation alone is not suitable to do battle on its own with determination, and the emperor will avoid that but will probe and encircle the enemy army with his light cavalry, and with the Italian infantry（which is experienced in the business of war）he will attempt to drive them back, wear them out, and annihilate them.”Bern.Navagero, Report from Germany of July 1546（Relation aus Deutschland vom Juli 1546），Ed. Albèri, Series 1，1：362.
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9.Viktor Löwe, The Organization and Administration of Wallenstein’s Armies（Die Organisation und Verwaltung der Wallensteinschen Heere），1895. Reviewed by Schrötter in Schmollers Jahrbücher，1895，Vol.19，Book 4，p.327. Konze，“The Strengths etc.of Wallenstein’s Army in 1633”（“Die Stärke usw der Wallensteinschen Armee im Jahre 1633”），Bonn dissertation，1906. Hoeniger，“The Armies of the Thirty Years’War”（“Die Armeen des 30jährigen Krieges”），supplement to the Militär-Wochenblatt，1914，Vol.7，claims that at the climax of the war, when Gustavus Adolphus and Wallenstein stood facing one another, on both sides together there was a total of between 260，000 and 280，000 men under arms. That estimate is certainly somewhat high. Hoeniger gave too high a strength to the armies, especially at Nuremberg.
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10.According to Deuticke, Schlacht bei Lützen, p.52.
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11.For the train and rations among the Swiss, see Elgger, Military System of the Swiss（Kriegswesen der Schweizer），p.117 ff.
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12.Jähns, pp.502，505.
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13.Jähns, p.521.
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14.Knaake, Contributions to the History of Emperor Charles V（Beiträge zur Geschichte Kaiser Karls V.），Stendal，1864，p.11.
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15.Spont, Revue des questions d’histoire，22（1899）：63.
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16.See also Rudolf Schmidt, Schlacht bei Wittstock, p.49. Letter of Field Marshal Hatzfeld. Also p.57.
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17.Daniels, Preussische Jahrbücher，78：487. In 1757，when Cumberland’s army was marauding because of a shortage of rations, he ordered that the high provost was to have hanged without ceremony every soldier caught in the act. A priest accompanied him as he rode about, in order to comfort the poor sinners before they went to hell. Daniels, Preussische Jahrbücher，77：478.
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18.Montecuccoli, Writings（Schriften），2：122，states that in 1648 the Swedes held nine fortresses in Silesia. They had won them very easily, since they were not occupied, and they had then developed the insignificant older works. For this reason Montecuccoli advises that one should demolish all the old, unimportant fortresses and hold only a few really good fortresses, or have only open cities. He anticipates garrisons of only 100 to 500 men, except for Prague, which was to have 1，500. On page 135 he explains how the many fortresses were detrimental to the Spaniards in the Netherlands because they could not satisfactorily occupy and feed all of them, whereas they were useful for the Netherlanders because they were naturally strong positions and the inhabitants themselves provided the necessary defenders.
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19.Printed in the Preussische Jahrbücher，153（1913）：423.
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20.Henckel, Military Testament（Militärischer Nachlass），2：79.
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21.This is excellently described in the Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften，27：364. On 23 December 1757 Colonel Marainville reported of Frederick’s tactics
:“… he does not follow up his advantages. When he wins battles, he limits himself almost always to possession of the battlefield.”Quoted in Stuhr, Research and Clarifications of the History of the Seven Years’War（Forschungen und Erläuterungen zur Geschichte des 7jährigen Krieges），1：387.
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22.This, too, is excellently described in the Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften，27：353.
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23.Details on winter quarters or winter campaigns in Frederick’s General-Prinzipien, Articles 27 and 28.
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24.Here, too, as we have already seen above in the quotation from Höpfner（p.279），is a reason for the oblique battle formation.
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25.Archives of Orange-Nassau，2d Series，2：378.
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26.Quoted in Krebs, Battle on the White Mountain（Schlacht am weissen Berge），p.12.
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27.The Campaigns of Prince Eugene（Die Feldzüge des Prinzen Eugen），1：1：587.
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