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22.This, too, is excellently described in the Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften，27：353.
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23.Details on winter quarters or winter campaigns in Frederick’s General-Prinzipien, Articles 27 and 28.
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24.Here, too, as we have already seen above in the quotation from Höpfner（p.279），is a reason for the oblique battle formation.
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25.Archives of Orange-Nassau，2d Series，2：378.
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26.Quoted in Krebs, Battle on the White Mountain（Schlacht am weissen Berge），p.12.
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27.The Campaigns of Prince Eugene（Die Feldzüge des Prinzen Eugen），1：1：587.
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28.According to the citation in Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften，27：385.
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29.Letter to Louis XV dated 12 July 1744. Letter to the prince of Prussia forwarding the General-Prinzipien.
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6 战略概述及战例介绍
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1.All the previous descriptions of this campaign and of the battle have been significantly corrected by the careful study with its critical analysis of the sources by Rudolf Israel，“The Campaign of 1704 in South Germany”（“Der Feldzug von 1704 in Süddeutschland”），Berlin dissertation，1913.
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2.Of course, Tallart intended to attack the allies as soon as they had crossed through the mist moving across his front, and he also made a few movements toward attacking in the battle. But in view of the formation of his troops, especially the unusually strong occupation of Blindheim and the lack of a reserve, we can still say that the battle was planned as a purely defensive action.
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3.The battle was first completely explained in its strategic as well as tactical sequence by Georg Schmoller，“The Campaign of 1706 in Italy”（“Der Feldzug von 1706 in Italien”），Berlin dissertation，1909.
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4.Schmoller, pp.35-36，“The Hussars in front of the two Echelons of Cavalry.”
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5.Franz Mühlhoff，“The Genesis of the Battle of Oudenarde”（“Die Genesis der Schlacht bei Oudenaarde”），Berlin dissertation，1914.
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6.In Coxe, Life and Correspondence of Marlborough（Leben und Briefwechsel Marlboroughs）.
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7.The battle is treated excellently in the 1912 Berlin dissertation by Walter Schwerdtfeger. It is to be noted particularly that the account by Rüstow in the Geschichte der Infanterie is corrected and expanded in very important points by this study. Sautai, too, Bataille de Malplaquet（1906），had already rejected Rüstow’s account.
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8.The wars of Frederick the Great have recently been treated comprehensively by both the Prussian and the Austrian general staffs. The Prussian work suffers from a false basic concept of the strategy of the period, which has also presented many details in a false light. The two general staff works have been compared in an excellent article by Otto Herrmann in the Jahrbücher für die Armee und Marine, January，1906.
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9.The Generalstabswerk, p.392，states that the opposing strengths in the battle were “not significantly different from one another，” but it estimates the Prussian infantry 1，200 men too low and the Austrian cavalry 1，800 horses too high. Furthermore, it does not at all take into consideration the fact that the Prussians also had 1，400 cavalry in position in the rear of the Austrians at Ohlau, who could be counted on to intervene in the battle, and also a corps of seven battalions and six squadrons, as well as five squadrons from the homeland.
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10.In the introduction to the second volume of the Gen-eralstabswerk, the unsatisfactory exploitation of the Prussian victory is retroactively explained by the “heavy losses of troops, which influenced most deeply the commander’s easily excited spirit” and similar reasons, but the great numerical superiority of the Prussians remains unmentioned.
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11.How important this viewpoint was for Frederick is explained by Senftner，“Saxony and Prussia in 1741”（“Sachsen und Preussen im Jahre 1741”），Berlin dissertation，1904.
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12.Monograph by Paul Müller. Berlin dissertation，1905. According to the Austrian Generalstabswerk，3：670，Frederick did not push his success to a complete victory because for political reasons he wished to spare Austria. That would be the direct opposite of the strategy that is normally attributed to Frederick, but it seems to me to go too far when it draws the political motive into the tactical action. It was sufficient that the victory was not further pursued strategically. The Generalstabswerk is to be compared with the very different account in Koser, Friedrich der Grosse, and Bleich，“The Moravian Campaign，1741-42”（“Der mährische Feldzug 1741-42”），Rostock dissertation，1901. I agree with Koser with respect to the facts, but I evaluate them very differently from the strategic viewpoint. Bleich, too, has not yet hit upon the correct points of view.
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13.The account of the battle in the Generalstabswerk has been corrected in many respects, including the army strengths, in the comprehensive monograph by Rudolf Keibel（1899）. The reproach concerning the unsatisfactory pursuit that is directed against the king in the Generalstabswerk is rejected by Oskar Schulz in “Frederick’s Campaign after the Battle of Hohenfriedberg up to the Eve of the Battle of Soor”（“Der Feldzug Friedrichs nach der Schlacht bei Hohenfriedberg bis zum Vorabend der Schlacht bei Soor”），Heidelberg dissertation，1901.
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14.In this saying lies the key to understanding the battle of Soor, which, although it was already correctly recognized by Clausewitz（10：30），is missing in the Generalstabswerk. Hans Stabenow，“Die Schlacht bei Soor，”Berlin dissertation，1901.
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15.This point has been strongly confirmed in detail by Hans Kania，“The Conduct of Prince Leopold before the Battle of Kesselsdorf”（“Das Verhalten des Fürsten Leopold vor der Schlacht bei Kesselsdorf”），Berlin dissertation，1901.
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16.Iwan Jowanowitsch，“Why Did Frederick the Great not Participate in the Battle of Kesselsdorf?”（“Warum hat Friedrich der Grosse an der Schlacht bei Kesselsdorf nicht teilgenommen?”），Berlin dissertation，1901.
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