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6.E.Daniels，“Ferdinand von Braunschweig，”Preussische Jahrbücher, Vols.77-80，82.
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2 革命军
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1.De la Jonquière, La Bataille de Jemappes, Paris，1902，gives the Austrians 16，000 men on page 124，but a bare 14，000 men on page 143；on page 146 Dumouriez is said to have had between 40，000 and 42，00®men, including Harville’s corps, which provided important cooperation.
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2.The results of the February recruiting were estimated at 180，000 men, while the levée en masse of August produced between 425，000 and 450，000. Kuhl, Bonaparte’s First Campaign（Bonapartes erster Feldzug），pp.32-33.
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3.According to the apparently generally reliable description by Duruy in the memoirs of Barras.
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4.Of course, other judgments concerning the newly formed French officer corps read in quite the opposite way; for example, von der Marwitz, Autobiography（Lebensbeschreibung），edited by Meusel，1：459.
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5.According to the Wars of Frederick the Great（Kriege Friedrichs des Grossen）by the Great General Staff, Vol.1，Supplement No.2，p.38，that had already been the case in 1740.
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6.Lehmann, Scharnhorst，2：147.
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7.Supplements to the Militär-Wochenblatt，1901，p.436.
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8.That is correctly given strong emphasis by Caemmerer, The Development of the Strategic Science in the Nineteenth Century（Die Entwicklung der strategischen Wissenschaft im 19.Jahrhundert），1904，Chap.2.
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9.Klippel, Life of Scharnhorst（Leben Scharnhorsts），1：44，note. The agreement in principle expressed here was nevertheless very limited from a practical viewpoint, according to Lehmann, Scharnhorst，1：51.
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10.Jähns，3：2588.
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11.Certainly with accuracy.Kuhl, p.43.
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12.A particularly valuable witness is Duhesme, who participated in the wars of the revolution from the start and in 1814，as a lieutenant general, published a book, Essay on the Light Infantry（Essai sur l’infanterie légère），which he had begun to write in 1805. He shows that skirmishing was accepted only as an expedient, and on p.114 he says that in 1793 the entire French infantry had adopted the combat method of the light infantry. This point is not expressed entirely appropriately, since, of course, the new combat method consisted not only of skirmishing but also of the following assault columns, which did not belong to the nature of the light infantry.
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13.The quotations are from Kuhl, p.44.
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14.Hermann Giehrl reports very clearly and accurately from the sources concerning other branches of Napoleon’s military activity in his work General Napoleon as an Organizer（Der Feldherr Napoleon als Organisator），Observations on His Means of Transport and Communications, His Methods of Working and Command, Berlin, E. S. Mittler and Son，1911.
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15.2：360.
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16.Reprinted in Klippel，3：40.
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17.In a thorough study，“The Expenditure of Manpower in the Principal Battles of the Last Centuries”（“Der Menschenverbrauch in den Hauptschlachten der letzten Jahrhunderte”），Preussische Jahrbücher，72（1893）：105，Gustav Roloff established a wavelike falling and rising of the casualty figures since the seventeenth century, in which various factors（weapons, tactics, strategy）work together and in opposition to one another.
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18.Freytag-Loringhoven, Napoleon’s Military Leadership（Die Heerführung Napoleons），p.43，estimated for 1809“hardly more than one and a half cannon for 1，000 men，” and for 1812 he estimates three and a half.
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19.Caemmerer, History of Strategic Science（Geschichte der strategischen Wissenschaft），p.14 f.，from Colin, L’Education militaire de Napoléon.
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20.Caemmerer gives a masterful survey of the difference in battle leadership between Frederick and Napoleon in Defense and Weapons（Wehr und Waffen），2：100 ff.，especially p.108.
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21.According to Lehmann, Scharnhorst，2：149.
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22.History of the Infantry（Geschichte der Infanterie），2：296.
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23.Compare Gneisenau’s statement to York on the evening of the battle on the Katzbach. Delbrück, Life of Gneisenau（Leben Gneisenaus），1：342. On 24 October 1805 Napoleon wrote in Augsburg to the general intendant of the army, Petit, that he had necessarily operated without depots but despite the favorable season and the repeated victories, the soldiers had suffered a great deal.“In a season when there were no potatoes in the fields, or if the army experienced some reverses, the lack of depots would lead to the greatest misfortunes.”
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