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这些目标不难实现，因为它们取决于中国单方面的选择。中国在亚洲的影响力，及其在全球的影响力，是另外一回事。影响力取决于发展，而中国领导人至多能在一定程度上控制好发展问题。在发展问题上，最难办的问题是，在国内保持经济前所未有的增长率的同时，在外交方面避免在国外的多边论坛上出现冲突。中国的影响力还取决于，他国如何看待中国的目标并加以适应。我们的观点是，中国的现行政策和长期目标并未构成德意志帝国和苏联那样的威胁。在某种程度上，中国领导人更感兴趣的是地区影响力，而非霸权；支撑全球化的国际秩序，而不是推翻它。中国的目标是兼容于美国及其他发达国家的安全、经济利益的。然而，真正的问题依然存在，主要在于对环境的关注，中国对人权和国际劳工标准的尊重，避免因稀缺资源而导致的竞争升级。只要中国继续扩大其影响力，并借助影响力获取资源，就可以通过谈判对所有这些领域加以改进，而不是靠言辞上的肆意抨击。
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[1]Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004); Peter Hays Gries, “Identity and Conflict in Sino-American Relations,” in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S.Ross, eds., New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 309—339.
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[2]Andrew Bingham Kennedy, “China’s Perceptions of US Intentions toward Taiwan,” Asian Survey 47, no.2 (2007)
:268—287.
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[3]David M.Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2008), 25—27.
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[4]“Full Text of Jiang Zemin’s ‘Report’ at 16th Party Congress,” Section 9, “On the International Situation and Our External Work,” Sixteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Beijing, 8 November 2002, http://english.people.com.cn/200211/18/eng20021118_106985.shtml (accessed 4 June 2013).
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[5]Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power, 27—32; Tang Shiping, “From Offensive to Defensive Realism: A Social Evolutionary Interpretation of China’s Security Strategy,” in Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, eds., China’s Ascent: Power, Security and the Future of International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 141—162.
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[6]Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power, 25—35, 252—274.
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[7]Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security 27, no.4 (2003)
:5—56.
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[8]Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus: Notes on the New Physics of Chinese Power (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2004), 12—14.
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[9]Robert Kaplan, “Don’t Panic about China,” Atlantic, 28 January 2010, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/10/dont-panic-about-china/307926 (accessed 5 June 2013); “China Military ‘Closing Key Gaps, ’” 25 August 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/world-asia-pacific-14661027 (accessed 25 August 2011).
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[10]Kaplan, “Don’t Panic about China”; John Lee, “China Won’t be a Responsible Stakeholder,” Wall Street Journal, 1 February 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704722304575037931817880328.html (accessed 5 March 2013); Elizabeth C.Economy, “The Game Changer: Coping with China’s Foreign Policy Revolution,”Foreign Affairs 89, no.9 (2010)
:142—154.
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[11]John J.Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 400; John J.Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” Current History 105 (2006)
:160—162; John J.Mearsheimer, “Trouble Brewing in the Hood,” Sydney Morning Herald, 3 August 2011; Aaron L.Freidberg, “The Future of US-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” International Security 30, no.2 (2005)
:7—45; Aaron L.Freidberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: Norton, 2011); Christopher Layne, “The Waning of US Hegemony—Myth or Reality?” International Security 34, no.1 (2009)
:147—172.
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[12]Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of the Great Powers, 402.
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[13]Steven W.Mosher, Hegemon: China’s Plan to Dominate Asia and the World (San Francisco: Encounter, 2000); Stefan Halper, The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century (New York: Basic Books, 2010).
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[14]一种审慎的观点，参见Robert S.Ross and Zhe Feng, eds., China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008)。
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[15]Susan Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 4.
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[16]A.F.K.Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf, 1958); A.F.K.Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
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[17]Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
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[18]Ibid., 186—187.
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[19]Ibid., 191—193.
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[20]Richard Ned Lebow and Benjamin Valentino, “Lost in Transition: A Critique of Power Transition Theories,” International Relations 23, no.3 (September 2009)
:389—410; Jack S.Levy, “Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China,” in Ross and Feng, eds., China’s Ascent, 11—33,这是另一个具有批判性的评价。
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[21]Richard Ned Lebow, Why Nations Fight (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
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[22]参见Lebow, Why Nations Fight, chap.4。
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[23]US Department of Defense, 11th Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 2011).
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[24]Tai Ming Cheung, “How China Innovates in Defense Science and Technology,” lecture at Centre d’Etude des Relations Internationales, Sciences Po, Paris, 31 January 2013.进一步的讨论，参见Tai Ming Cheung, “The Chinese Defense Economy’s Long March from Imitation to Innovation,” Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no.3 (June 2011)
:325—354; Tai Ming Cheung, Fortifying China: The Struggle to Build a Modern Defense Economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), 2。
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