打字猴:1.70327579e+09
1703275790 [22]新斯多葛主义在16、17世纪的复兴中,最为值得注意的是 Antoine Le Grand(见 Man Without Passion; or, the Wise Stoick,according to the sentiments of Seneca. Translated Anonymously. London,1675)和 Guillaume Du Vair(见Moral Philosophy of the Stoics. Translated by T. J【ames】,London,1598)。 更多关于斯多葛在16、17世纪的复兴,见Schneewind,1998,pp.170—175。
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1703275792 [23]Thomas Hobbes,Leviathan(1651). Edited with Introduction and Notes by Edwin Curley. Indianapolis,Ind.: Hackett,1994,I.vi.46,p.32.
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1703275794 [24]例见IBV,2.2.8,p.111和SC,2: 2,p.59。
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1703275796 [25]参见IBV,2: Introduction,p.86;ENC,1: 1: 3,pp.24—27;SMP,1.3,Vol. I,pp.38—52.
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1703275798 [26]试图将巴特勒的心理论证局限为一个概念上的论证,然后总结道在这样的理解下,它是有力却并不成功的论证,见John Rawls,Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy. Edited by Samuel Freeman. Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press,2007,pp.441—446。
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1703275800 [27]John Locke,An Essay Concerning Human Understanding(1690)2.1.2. Edited with an Introduction by Peter H. Nidditch. New York: Oxford University Press,1979,pp.104—105.
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1703275802 [28]休谟和这个几乎一样的论证,见T,3.1.2.6。
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1703275804 [29]参见Marc D. Hauser,Moral Minds: How Nature Designed our Universal Sense of Right and Wrong. New York: Ecco,2006。也参见Hauser,Liane Young,and Fiery Cushman,“Reviving Rawls’s Linguistic Analogy: Operative Principles and the Causal Structure of Moral Actions”,in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong,ed. Moral Psychology. 3 vols. Cambridge,Mass.: MIT Press,2008,vol. 2,pp.107—144。
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1703275806 [30]Ron Mallon,“Reviving Rawls’s Linguistic Analogy Inside and Out”,Sinnott-Armstrong,ed.,2008,vol. 2,pp.145—156,p.154。也参见Jesse J. Prinz,“Resisting the Linguistic Analogy: A Commentary on Hauser,Young and Cushman”,in Ibid.,vol. 2,pp.157—170;Nathan A. Fox and Melanie Killen,“Morality,Culture and the Brain: What Changes and What Stays the Same”,in Ibid.,vol. 3,pp.313—316。对这些辩论的详述,见本书第七章。
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1703275808 [31]哈奇森对这两种“义务”的解释,见ENC,2.1,p.146;SMP,2.3.6,vol. I,p.264。
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1703275810 [32]对这些讨论的总结,参见Isabel Rivers,Reason, Grace and Sentiment: A Study of the Language of Religion and Ethics in England 1660—1780. Volume 2: Shaftesbury to Hume. New York: Cambridge University Press,2000,pp.154—237。最近的对沙夫茨伯里的理性主义理解,见Stephen Darwall,The British Moralists and the Internal “Ought” 1640—1740. New York: Cambridge University Press,1995,pp.176—206,pp.184—190。关于沙夫茨伯里试图同时保持理性主义和情感主义立场的论证,见Michael B. Gill,“Shaftesbury’s Two Accounts of the Reason to be Virtuous”,Journal of the History of Philosophy 38: 4(October 2000),pp.529—548。
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1703275812 [33]Letter 13,September 17,1739,写给Francis Hutcheson,见L,I: 33。
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1703275814 [34]克劳斯因而认为这是休谟的情感主义的一大优点,因为我们“可以想象”这样的理论被与宗教信仰者的虔信联系起来。(Civil Passions,p.131)不过我们没有必要去想象,因为历史上这样做的已有其人,比如巴特勒和哈奇森。
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1703275816 [35]Letter 19,January 10,1743,写给Francis Hutcheson,见L,I: 47。
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1703275818 [36]类似的论证,参见Michael B. Gill,“A Philosopher in his Closet: Reflexivity and Justification in Hume’s Moral Theory”,Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 26: 2(1996),231—256。
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1703275820 [37]Korsgaard,1996,p.55,p.62。贝尔认为休谟的《人性论》本质上是在寻求“一个可以通过自身审核的精神运作……那种一旦进入‘矛盾’或者自我毁灭性的冲突时,能够针对其自身的”(Annette C. Baier,Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume’s Treatise. Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press,1991,p.97)。
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1703275822 [38]哈奇森对政府如何通过社会契约组成的论述,参见PMIC,3.5.1—3.5.2,pp.240—241;SMP,3.5,vol. 2,pp.225—240。
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1703275824 [39]沙夫茨伯里更多的对社会契约作为正义基础的反驳,见MPR,2: 4,pp.175—177。
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1703275826 [40]Letter 19,January 10,1743,写给Francis Hutcheson,见L,I: 47。
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1703275828 [41]在“Freedom and Resentment”一文中,彼得·斯特劳森重新将憎恶这个感情引入,作为直接针对导致他人受苦的主体的感情。(Peter Strawson,In Gary Watson,ed.,Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press,1983,pp.59—80)
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1703275830 第二章
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1703275832 [42]比如密尔就将休谟描述为“史上最伟大的怀疑论者”,并认为休谟积极建构的哲学之意义不能与其怀疑论的哲学相媲美。参见John Stuart Mill,“Bentham”,London and Westminster Review. August 1838. Reprinted in Utilitarianism and On Liberty. Edited with an introduction Mary Warnock,Malden,Mass.: Blackwell,2003,pp.52—87,p.55。较新的对密尔立场的辩护,参见Francis Snare,Morals, Motivation and Convention: Hume’s Influential Doctrines. New York: Cambridge University Press,1991,p.34。
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1703275834 [43]例如,大卫·米勒论证道“太注重休谟道德哲学的消极一面”会让我们将“理性应受感情统治”这种错误理论归于休谟;“这就好像若只看休谟对理性主义的攻击也会导致在认识论领域对他的误认一样”(David Miller,Philosophy and Ideology in Hume’s Political Thought. New York: Oxford University Press,1981,p.40)。将休谟的哲学分为积极和消极这一做法来自 Barry Stroud,Hume. New York: Routledge,1977。
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1703275836 [44]Frederick G. Whelan,Order and Artifice in Hume’s Political Philosophy. Princeton,N.J.: Princeton University Press,1985,p.68,p.73.
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1703275838 [45]在现在的学者中,“休谟并非纯粹的道德怀疑论者”这种观点被广泛接受,这要归功于 David Fate Norton的作品,见David Hume: Common Sense Moralist,Skeptical Metaphysician. Princeton,N.J.: Princeton University Press,1982。更细致的读者一直都拒斥休谟在道德和形而上学领域是怀疑论者这样的观点;在1752年1月发表于《每月评论》的William Rose,Enquiry Concerning the principles of morals的评论中,作者说道这个道德哲学是“不包括像在他其他作品中出现的那种怀疑的因素”(引言来自Ernest Campbell Mossner,The Life of David Hume. New York: Oxford University Press,1980,p.226)。
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