打字猴:1.70327623e+09
1703276230 [236]Kohlberg,1984,pp.174—175。科尔伯格承认亚当·斯密“为道德心理学的第三阶段因素提供了绝妙的阐述”,虽然他拒绝将亚当·斯密划归第三阶段。(Kohlberg,The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice. Vol. 1 of Essays on Moral Development. San Francisco: Harper and Row,1981,p.150)
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1703276232 [237]Carol Gilligan,In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development. Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press,1982/1993.
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1703276234 [238]Baier,1995,chapter 4;Nel Noddings,Caring: A Feminist Approach to Ethics and Moral Education. Berkley: University of California Press,1984,p.79;Joan C. Tronto,Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care. New York: Routledge,1993,p.20.
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1703276236 [239]Gilligan,1982/1993,p.2.
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1703276238 [240]苏珊·M.奥金总结了80年代在这个问题上的许多研究,她总结道:“关于女人和男人在思考道德问题的差异(至少目前)并不明显;到底这样所谓差异的原因是什么也不甚明朗。”(Susan Moller Okin,Justice Gender and the Family. New York: Basic Books,1989,p.15)其余的一些质疑吉利甘的经验性研究的总结,参见Tronto,1993,pp.82—85。
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1703276240 [241]Hoffman,2001,pp.250—270.
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1703276242 [242]对这些文本的总结和综合的建议,见Steven L. Blader and Tom R. Tyler,“Justice and Empathy: What Motivates People to Help Others?” In Michael Ross and Dales T. Miller,eds.,The Justice Motive in Everyday Life. New York: Cambridge University Press,2002,pp.226—250。
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1703276244 [243]双过程认知模式的低级方式的第一个重要研究,见R.B. Zajonc,“Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences”,American Psychologist 35(1980),pp.151—175。关于无意识启发性研究经典论文集,参见Daniel Kahneman,Paul Slovic,Amos Tversky,eds.,Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heurestics and Biases. New York: Cambridge University Press,1982。更近一些的广泛研究,见Thomas Gilovich,Dale Griffin,Daniel Kahneman,eds.,Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment. New York: Cambridge University Press,2002。后一卷中,尤其可参考Paul Slovic,Melissa Finucane,Ellen Peters,Donald G. MacGregor,“The Affect Heuristic”,pp.397—420。
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1703276246 [244]Jonathan Haidt,“The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment”,Psychological Review 108,2001,pp.814—834。另外请参见Haidt and Fredrik Bjorklund,“Social Intuitionists Answer Six Questions about Moral Psychology”,in Sinnott-Armstrong,ed.,2008,pp.181—218。
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1703276248 [245]参见Hauser,2006,另见Hauser,Young,Cushman,2008。同时,本书第一章的类似批判也可以对哈奇森和豪泽适用。
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1703276250 [246]海特他们认识到在有意识的道德反思发生时,它可能不是“那种哲学家尊重的逻辑冰冷的思维”,而是“感情扮演了重要角色的权衡不同可能的过程”。(Haidt and Bjorklund,2008,p.201)他们虽然没有进一步在这方面做研究,但是他们提到安东尼奥·达马西奥的神经科学的研究,并将其作为感情在理性思维中重要角色的研究模式的范例。参见Antonio R. Damasio,Descartes’ Error: Emotion,Reason and the Human Brain. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons,1994。
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1703276252 [247]Davis,1996,p.102.
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1703276254 [248]George E. Marcus,W. Russell Neuman,Michael Mackuen,Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,2000。另外请参见George E. Marcus,The Sentimental Citizen: Emotion in Democratic Politics. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press,2002。对情感智能理论的重要应用,参见Ted Brader,Campaigning for Hearts and Minds: How Emotional Appeals in Political Ads Work. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,2006。对情感智能理论应用及其回应的广泛讨论论文集,参见W. Russell Neuman,George E. Marcus,Ann N. Crigler,Michael MacKuen,eds.,The Affect Effect: Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,2007。
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1703276256 [249]Marcus,et. al.,2000,p.129。另一个由休谟主义角度对马库斯的批评,参见Krause,2008,pp.55—56。
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1703276258 [250]这种意见确实是普遍的,证据参见Brader,2006,pp.38—39。这种看法似乎是隐藏在“自由家长主义”背后的。也就是说,试图利用精英们理性有意识的思想来引导大众的自动,感情和启发式的决策过程。参见Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein,Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health,Wealth and Happiness. Updated edition. New York: Penguin,2009;Sunstein,Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle. New York: Cambridge University Press,2005。
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1703276260 [251]Brader,2006,especially pp.96—103,pp.140—143.
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1703276262 [252]对此研究的讨论和总结,参见Darren Schreiber,“Political Cognition as Social Cognition: Are We All Political Sophisticates?” in Neuman et. al.,eds.,2007,pp.48—70。
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1703276264 [253]Brader,2006,pp.142—143.
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1703276266 [254]对施赖伯这样解释这项发现的一个批评大概是这样的,政治老手虽然并没有表现出“无心的对反射性的依赖”,但他们“处理信息的方式,更依赖于自我相关的评判而不是抽象的联系”。参见Michael L. Spezio and Ralph Adolphs,“Emotional Processing and Political Judgment: Toward Integrating Political Psychology and Decision Neuroscience”,in Neuman et. al.,eds.,2007,pp.71—95. p.78。
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1703276268 [255]G. E. Moore,Principia Ethica(1903). Edited with an introduction by Thomas Baldwin. New York: Cambridge University Press,1993.
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1703276270 [256]对感情主义的元伦理学的经典陈述,参见Alfred Jules Ayer,Language,Truth and Logic(1936). New York: Dover,1952,Ch. 6(pp.102—119);Charles L. Stevenson,Ethics and Language. New Haven,Conn.: Yale University Press,1944/1960。关于启蒙情感主义的分析元伦理学的研究一直延续到今天,而且这样研究所达到的概念上的成熟性是史蒂文森和艾耶尔所无法预见的。也许其中最杰出的研究是 Allan Gibbard,Wise Choices,Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press,1990。
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1703276272 [257]参见Kwame Anthony Appiah,Experiments in Ethics. Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press,2008,especially pp.5—28。实验哲学的宣言,以及一些最近的论文,参见Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols,eds.,Experimental Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press,2008。
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1703276274 [258]例见Blackburn,2000;Michael Slote,Morals from Motives. New York: Oxford University Press,2001;Shaun Nichols,Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment. New York: Oxford University Press,2004;Slote,The Ethics of Care and Empathy. New York: Routledge,2007;以及Prinz,2007。
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1703276276 [259]相对比较新的,为一般读者所写的一本关于情感主义正义理论的书,参见Robert C. Solomon,A Passion for Justice: Emotion and the Origins of the Social Contract. Lanham,Md.: Rowman & Littlefield,1995。
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1703276278 [260]Walter Sinnott-Armstrong,“Framing Moral Intuitions”,in Sinnott-Armstrong,ed.,2008,Volume 2,pp.47—76,pp.50—51。类似的观点,参见Joshua D. Greene,“The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul”,in Ibid,Volume 3,pp.35—80,p.67;Greene,“From Neural ‘Is’ to Moral ‘Ought’: What are the Moral Implications of Neuroscientific Moral Psychology?” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 4(2003),pp.848—850。值得注意的是,现在的情感主义者常常在面对描述性道德心理学的时候,带上的是休谟主义的面具。而当问题变成了这种描述性心理学对道德的规范权威性论证时,就都变成了尼采主义的普遍道德的揭露和批判者,比如,Prinz,2007。
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