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[5]对于这几个重要概念的联系，可参考PL,pp.385-394。
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[6]TJ,395/347 rev.．罗尔斯曾说过，他认为《正义论》第三部分是整本书中最有原创性的，但却不明白为何这么少人对其做出评论。见Samuel Freeman,“Congruence and the Good of Justice”,in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls,ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2003),p. 308。
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[7]例如在讨论罗尔斯的几本专书中，完全没有触及此问题，包括Brian Barry,The Liberal Theory of Justice(Oxford
:Clarendon Press,1973);Normal Daniels (ed.),Reading Rawls(Stanford,California: Stanford University Press,1975);☆omas Pogge,Realizing Rawls(Ithaca
:Cornell University Press,1989);石元康，《罗尔斯》（桂林：广西师范大学出版社，2004）。Chandran Kukathas和Philip Pettit的著作有注意到此问题，但却认为那主要是为了解决坐顺风车（free-riding）的问题，我认为这曲解了罗尔斯的意图。参见Rawls
:A Theory of Justice and its Critics(Cambridge
:Polity Press,1990)。而在《政治自由主义》出版后，对稳定性的讨论依然不多；即使有，也认为是次要的或衍生的问题，例如George Klosko,“Rawls’s Argument from Political Stability”,Columbia Law Review 94(1994),p.1890;Stephen Mulhall及Adam Swift亦持这种观点，参见Liberals and Communitarians(Oxford
:Blackwell,2nd edition,1992),Chap. 5。就我所知，对此问题着力最多的，是罗尔斯的学生Samuel Freeman，见“Political Liberalism and the Possibility of a Just Democratic Constitution”,Chicago-Kent Law Review 69(1994),pp. 619-668;“Congruence and the Good of Justice”,in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls,pp.277-315。
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[8]例如：Brian Barry,“John Rawls and the Search for Stability”,Ethics 105(1995),pp. 874-915; Jürgen Habermas,“Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason
:Remarks on John Rawls’s Political Liberalism”,The Journal of Philosophy 92(1995),pp.109-131;G.A.Cohen,“Facts and Principles”,Philosophy and Public Affairs 31,no. 3,pp. 211-245; Jean Hampton,“Should Political Liberalism Be Done without Metaphysics? ”,Ethics 99,pp.791-814。
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[9]对于国家作为特定疆界内，唯一的具有正当性使用武力的机构这一点，罗尔斯基本上跟从韦伯的定义。Max Weber,“Politics as a Vocation”,in From Max Weber
:Essays in Sociology,ed.H.H.Gerth and C.Wright Mills (London: Routledge),p. 78.
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[10]原文是：“In a constitutional regime the special feature of the political relation is that political power is ultimately the power of the public,that is,the power of free and equal citizens as a collective body.”PL,p.136.
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[11]对于这几个重要概念的定义，可参见PL,Lectures I and II。
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[12]PL,p.137.
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[13]Rawls,Lectures on the History of Political Thought,p.13.
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[14]Max Weber,Economy and Society,ed.G.Roth and C.Wittich(Berkeley and LA: University of California Press,1978),pp. 212-214.
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[15]对于韦伯的观点的批评，可参考David Beetham,The Legitimation of Power(New York
:Palgrave,1991),Chap.1;John H.Schaar,“Legitimacy in the Modern State”,in Legitimacy and the State,ed.William Connolly(New York: New York University Press,1984),pp. 104-133。
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[16]西蒙斯对此有强烈批评，认为必须将证成和正当性两者做出清楚区分。A.John Simmons,Justification and Legitimacy(Cambridge
:Cambridge University Press,2001),pp. 122-157.
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[17]康德的观点，见Immanuel Kant,Political Writings,ed.H.S.Reiss and H.B. Nesbit (Cambridge
:Cambridge University Press,1979),p. 79。
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[18]卢梭的契约论，也可被理解为这一类。Jean-Jacques Rousseau,The Social Contract and the Discourses,trans. G. D. H. Cole (London: Everyman’s Library,1973),pp. 257-265.
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[19]沃德隆称前者为“自愿主义式”（voluntaristic）的契约论，后者为“理性主义式”（rationalistic）的契约论。Jeremy Waldron,Liberal Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1993),p. 51.
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[20]西蒙斯对于这点有很锐利的观察。Simmons,Justification and Legitimacy,p.147.
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[21]Joseph Raz,“Introduction”,in Authority,ed.Joseph Raz(New York
:New York University Press,1990),p. 5.
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[22]罗尔斯基本上接受了沃德隆的观点。Waldron,Liberal Rights,pp.45-47;Rawls,Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy,p.15.
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[23]Simmons,Justification and Legitimacy,pp.131,142-145．对于这种将正当性和义务从概念上分开的讨论，可参考R. Ladenson,“In Defense of a Hobbesian Conception of Law”,in Authority,pp.32-55。
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[24]对于这点，可参考Waldron,Liberal Rights,pp.35-62;William Connolly,“Introduction
:Legitimacy and Modernity”,in Legitimacy and the State,pp.1-19.
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[25]原文是：“To insure stability men must have a sense of justice or a concern for those who would be disadvantaged by their defection,preferably both. When these sentiments are sufficiently strong to overrule the temptations to violate the rules,just schemes are stable.”TJ,497/435 rev..
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[26]这三个阶段，分别是“权威的道德”（morality of authority）、“社群的道德”（morality of association），以及最高的“原则的道德”（morality of principles）。TJ, Chap.VII．对于稳定性的这一部分，《政治自由主义》并没做出任何改变。PL,p.141.
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[27]这并不表示道德原则是单向的唯一影响人们道德动机的因素。我反而认为，这是一个互动的反思均衡的过程。一个正义理论本身必须预设了某种对人性及道德动机的看法，而这个理论应用到具体的社会政治制度时，自然会对个体有相应的道德要求。人们是否有足够的正义感去遵从这些要求，也需视乎这些要求和人们的个人心理及人生价值观之间的复杂互动。内格尔认为罗尔斯的稳定性问题，正是对此问题的思考。☆omas Nagel,Equality and Partiality(Oxford
:Oxford University Press,1991),p.27.
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[28]罗尔斯认为公平式的正义较效益主义及霍布斯式的理论优胜之处，是它能够更有效地培养人们的正义感，因此更加稳定。见TJ,496-504/434-441 rev.。
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[29]Nagel,Equality and Partiality,p.26.
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