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22.The value of a patent is de.ned as including the value of selling the patent to another party, who will obtain value by excluding rivals from the market.
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23.The Boston Manufacturing Company did have difficulty enforcing its patents for the double speeder (a machine used for winding cotton prior to spinning), in part because of faulty drafting of the patent.However, the power loom was the key invention, and it appears that the BMC had no difficulty getting $15 per loom for a patent license or $35 gross pro.t on manufactured looms through 1823.The persistence of this royalty through 1823 suggests that the BMC did not experience significant price competition from Rhode Island mechanics using other designs, including Gilmour’s.Moreover, the patent royalty of $15 compares reasonably well with the $25 royalty that the powerful sewing machine patent pool was able to charge on a comparably priced piece of equipment.
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24.Draper patented this device in 1816 and he obtained a patent on an improved version in 1829.In 1830, Draper’s successor licensed the patent and also sold his own manufactured version for $2.By comparison, the loom temple saved cloth manufacturers about $35 each year on each loom in labor costs.As with the power loom, patents captured less than 1 percent of the value created.In a highly competitive market for textiles, a manufacturer without the least costly technology would lose money.Under these conditions, the independent inventor with sole rights to that technology has all the bargaining power and can demand full value.But when competition between the manufacturers was soft, independent inventors did not have as much bargaining power, and bargaining was more along the lines of what economists call a bilateral monopoly.
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25.Bessen, “More Machines.” The three minutes saved was from the loom temple, for which there were many designs, not all of them patented.Even ignoring the initial power loom invention, the reduction in labor time was about eight minutes per yard, so the majority of the reduction was still from unpatented improvements.
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26.Lemley, “Myth of the Sole Inventor.”
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27.Merton, “Singletons and Multiples.”
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1704380873
28.Mokyr, Gifts of Athena, p..101.There are other explanations.For example, common innovations might arise from sharp changes in consumer demand or in the availability of general purpose technologies.
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29.For example, Edwin Mansfield, “Technical Change,” studied twelve innovations and only one of them was adopted by most of the firms in less than a decade.
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30.See Bessen and Nuvolari, “Di.using New Technology.”
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1704380879
31.Darby and Zucker, “Change or Die”; Darby, Zucker, and Welch, “Going Public”; Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong, “Geographically Localized Knowledge”; Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong, “Commercializing Knowledge”; Zucker, Darby, and Brewer, “Intellectual Human Capital.”
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1704380881
32.Darby,Zucker, and Wang, “Joint Ventures”; Lach and Schankerman, “Royalty Sharing.”
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1704380883
33.Parker and Grimm, “Recognition.”
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1704380885
34.Von Hippel, Democratic Innovation.
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1704380887
35.Mokyr, British Industrial Revolution, p..43; Bessen and Meurer, Patent Failure, pp..77–81.Some, such as Samuel Crompton, did not obtain patents.Others, such as Edmund Cartwright and Richard Roberts, inventor of a successful automatic spinning machine, did not pro.t from their patents.Some others, such as John Kay, inventor of the “.ying shuttle” for weaving, lost money thanks to ruinous litigation trying to enforce their patents.And just a few, like James Watt, made out well.
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1704380889
36.Moser, “How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation?”
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1704380891
37.MacLeod, Inventing the Industrial Revolution.
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1704380893
38.Cohen et al., “Industry and the Academy.”
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39.Saxenian, Regional Advantage.
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40.Saxenian, Regional Advantage, pp..2–3.
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41.Gilson, “Legal Infrastructure”; Hyde, “High Velocity Labor Market.”
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42.Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming, “Mobility, Skills, and the Michigan Non-Compete Experiment”; Fallick, Fleischman, and Rebitzer, “Job-Hopping in Silicon Valley”; Garmaise, “Ties That Truly Bind”; Samila and Sorenson “Noncompete Covenants”; Lobel, Talent.
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43.Noncompete agreements may have their most important impacts on investments in knowledge and on knowledge sharing but they also have other effects, including the disclosure of trade secrets to employees and the effect of labor mobility on the functioning of labor markets—in particular, on matching heterogeneous employers and employees.
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44.Garmaise, “Ties That Truly Bind.”
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45.Png, “Trade Secrets.”
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46.These states have confirmed their trade secret statutes with the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.See Samuels and Johnson, “Uniform Trade Secrets Act.” As of this writing, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act has been adopted in most states.
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