打字猴:1.704418373e+09
1704418373 博弈论基础 1.6 参考文献
1704418374
1704418375 Aumann,R.1974.“Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies”.Journal of Mathematical Economics1:67—96.
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1704418377 ——.1976.“Agreeing to Disagree.”Annals of Statistics4:1236—39.
1704418378
1704418379 ——.1987.“Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality.”Econometrica55:1—18.
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1704418381 Bertrand,J.1883.“Theorie Mathematique de la Richesse Sociale.”Journal des Savants499—508.
1704418382
1704418383 Brandenburger,A.1992.“Knowledge and Equilibrium in Games.”Forthcoming in Journal of Economic Perspectives.
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1704418385 Cournot,A.1838.Recherches sur Les Principes Mathematiques de la theorie des Richesses.English edition:Researches into the Methematical Principles of the Thoery of Wealth.Edited by N.Bacon.New York:Macmillan,1897.
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1704418387 Dasgupta,P.,and E.Maskin.1986.“The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games,I:Theory.”Review of Economic Studies53:1—26.
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1704418389 Farber,H.1980.“An Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration.”Journal of Conflict Resolution35:683—705.
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1704418391 Friedman,J.1971.“A Noncooperative Equilirium for Supergames.”Review of Economic Studies28:1—12.
1704418392
1704418393 Gibbons,R.1988.“Learning in Equilibrium Models of Arbitration.”American Economic Review78:896—912.
1704418394
1704418395 Hardin,G.1968“The tragedy of the Commons.”Science162:1243—48.
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1704418397 Harsanyi,J.1973.“Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs:A New Rationale for Mixed Strategy Equilibrium Points.”International Journal of Game Theory2:1—23.
1704418398
1704418399 Hotelling,H.1929.“Stability in Competition.”Economic Journal39:41—57.
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1704418401 Hume,D.1739.A Treatise of Human Nature.Reprint.London:J.M.Dent.1952.
1704418402
1704418403 Kakutani,S.1941.“A Generalization of Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem.”Duke Mathematical Journal8:457—59.
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1704418405 Kreps,D.,and J.Scheinkman.1983.“Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes.”Bell Journal of Economics14:326—37.
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1704418407 Montgomery,J.1991.“Equilirium Wage Dispersion and Interindustry Wage Differentials.”Quarterly Journal of Economics106:163—79.
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1704418409 Nash,J.1950.“Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games.”Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences36:48—49.
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1704418411 Pearce,D.1984.“Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection.”Econometrica52:1029—50.
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1704418413 Stackelberg,H.von.1934.Marktform und Gleichgevuicht.Vienna:Julius Springer.
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1704418415 [1] 相应的逆命题也很有趣:如果某一参与者(对其他参与者选择的战略)无法作出这样的推断,从而使战略si成为他的最优反应,我们能否得到结论,一定存在另一战略是si的严格占优战略?答案是肯定的。前提是对“推断”和“另一战略”的正确理解,两者都涉及到将在第1.3.A节中介绍的混合战略。
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1704418417 [2] 本书的绝大多数例子都取自经济学的实际应用,而很少使用纯数字的抽象例子,这不仅因为应用本身往往饶有趣味,还因为应用经常是解释理论的较好方式。不过在说明一些基本的理论原理时,我们有时也求助于没有现实经济含义的抽象例子。
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1704418419 [3] 在第1.3.A节中,我们将区分纯战略和混合战略,那时我们就会看到此处所给的纳什均衡定义是指纯战略均衡,但有时也可能有混合战略均衡存在。除非有明确说明,本节所说纳什均衡都是指纯战略均衡。
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1704418421 [4] 这一结论即使在不限于纯战略的条件下也同样成立,因为在这些战略中不存在混合战略纳什均衡。参见习题1.10。
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