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[1] 克雷普斯和威尔逊通过对序贯均衡（sequential equilbrium）的定义，对均衡的这一特点进行了规范分析，序贯均衡作为一种均衡概念，在很多经济学应用中等同于精炼贝叶斯均衡，但某些情况下可能更强一些。序贯均衡无论在概念上，还是在应用中均要较精炼贝叶斯均衡更为复杂，所以大多数教科书现在都使用后者了。还有一些使用精炼贝叶斯均衡的作者（不精确地）称为序贯均衡。克雷普斯和威尔逊证明，任意的有限博弈（即所有有限参与者、类型有限，可能的行动步数有限的博弈）都有序贯均衡，这也意味着在任何有限博弈中都存在精炼贝叶斯均衡。
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