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[7]Boyan Jovanovic and Peter L. Rousseau,“General Purpose Technologies,” inHandbookofEconomicGrowth, ed. Philippe Aghion and Steven Durlauf, vol. 1,1181 -1224（Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005）.
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[8]Elhanan Helpman and Manuel Trajtenberg,“Diffusion of General Purpose Techno logies,” inGeneral Purpose Technologies and Economic Growth, ed. E. Helpman,85 -119（Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998）.
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[9]本节内容是以Paul David的主要观点为基础，参见Paul David,“The Dynamo and the Computer: An Historical Perspective on the Modern Productivity Paradox,”AmericanEconomicReview80, no. 2（1990）
:355 -361.
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[10]Paul David,“The Dynamo and the Computer: An Historical Perspective on the Modern Productivity Paradox,”AmericanEconomicReview80, no. 2（1990）
:355 -361.
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[11]Bergeaud, Cette, and Lecat,LeBelAvenirdelacroissance.
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[12]Salome Baslandze,“The Role of the IT Revolution in Knowledge Diffusion,Innovation and Reallocation,”2016 Meeting Papers No. 1509, Society for Economic Dynamics, 2016.
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[13]Eric Brynjolfsson and Shinkyu Yang,“Information Technology and Productivity
:A Review of the Literature,” inAdvancesinComputers, ed. Marvin Zelkowitz,vol. 43（1996）
:179 -214.
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[14]See Joseph Zeira,“Workers, Machines, and Economic Growth,”QuarterlyJournalofEconomics113, no. 4（1998）
:1091 -1117; Daron Acemoglu and Pascual Restrepo,“Robots and Jobs: Evidence from US Labor Markets,”JournalofPoliticalEconomy128, no. 6（2020）
:2188 -2244; Philippe Aghion,Benjamin F. Jones, and Charles I. Jones,“Artificial Intelligence and Economic Growth” （NBER Working Paper No. 23928, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, October 2017）.
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[15]Aghion, Jones, and Jones,“Artificial Intelligence and Economic Growth. ”
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[16]Gravenor Henson,The Civil,Political,and Mechanical History of the FrameworkKnittersinEuropeandAmerica（Nottingham: Richard Sutton, 1831）,45.
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[17]但直至1832年的《改革法案》（Reform Bill），英国议会才不再受贵族大地主阶层的主导。
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[18]Keynes,“Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren.”
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[19]Wassily Leontief,“Machines and Man,”ScientificAmerican187, no. 3（1952）
:150 -164.
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[20]对这些文献的更完整综述，可参见Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel,“Artificial Intelligence, Growth and Employment: The Role of Policy,”EconomicsandStatistics, 510 -511 -5（2019）
:149 -164.
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[21]服务业也有这一数据，但高度综合，更难以做具体分析。
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[22]Acemoglu and Restrepo,“Robots and Jobs.”
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1704514555
[23]Philippe Aghion, Celine Antonin, Simon Bunel, and Xavier Jaravel, “What Arethe Labor and Product Market Effects of Automation? New Evidence from France,” Working Papers, Observatoire Français des Conjonctures Economiques（OFCE）, January 2020.
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[24]定义来自Encyclopaedia Britannica（2015）,“Automation.”
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创造性破坏的力量 第4章 竞争的得失
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竞争似乎有截然不同的两幅面孔。某些人认为竞争是模仿、复制的过程，或者是更广义的侵蚀创新租金、打击创新的力量。另一些人则把竞争看作永不停歇的驱动力，为保持领先而必须持续改进发明。从现实看，这两种相反的作用力何种占据主导？更一般地讲，对于竞争与创新、竞争与增长之间的关系，我们该如何反思？美国的竞争是否有所退化，是否导致了美国增长率下跌？竞争政策与知识产权保护制度的关系该如何协调？这两类政策是彼此抵触，还是有互补的作用？我们能否协调竞争政策与产业政策，尤其是，能否设计出促进竞争、鼓励而非妨碍新企业进入的产业政策？
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解答上述问题的前提是弄清楚如何测算竞争程度。
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