打字猴:1.70451721e+09
1704517210 [4]关于金融与创新引领型增长的综合分析,参见Philippe Aghion, Peter Howitt, and Ross Levine,“Financial Development and Innovation-Led Growth,”inHandbookofFinanceandDevelopment, ed. Thorson Beck and Ross Levine(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2018).
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1704517212 [5]Philippe Aghion, Mathias Dewatripont, Caroline Hoxby, Andreu Mas-Colell,and André Sapir,“Why Reform Europe’s Universities?” Policy Brief 34,Bruegel, Brussels, September 2007.
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1704517214 [6]Philippe Aghion, Mathias Dewatripont, Caroline Hoxby, Andreu Mas-Colell,and André Sapir,“The Governance and Performance of Universities: Evidence from Europeand the US,”EconomicPolicy25, no. 61(2010):7 -59.
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1704517216 [7]Gustavo Manso,“Motivating Innovation,”JournalofFinance66(2011):1823 -1860; Bengt Holmström and Paul Milgrom,“Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses:Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design,”JournalofLaw,Economics,and Organization7(1991):24 -52.
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1704517218 [8]委托代理的表述是指如下的经济关系:委托人的行动取决于代理人的行动或特征,但委托人并不掌握代理人的完全信息。例如,委托人可以是一家企业,不掌握其雇员如何工作的完全信息。或者委托人是一家银行,并不掌握其顾客的完全信息。Bengt Holmström与Paul Milgrom的“多任务委托代理分析”(Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses)发现,当代理人同时承担几项任务时,这一关系中会出现新的利益冲突根源。
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1704517220 [9]根据美国的《破产法》,企业申请第11章规定的保护,将暂停债权人的权利要求以及偿还债务的法律诉讼。在此程序下,企业将继续经营,从而能给债权人之间达成重组协议提供时间。
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1704517222 [10]Pierre Azoulay, Joshua S. Graff Zivin, and Gustavo Manso,“Incentives and Creativity: Evidence from the Academic Life Sciences,”RANDJournalofEconomics42, no. 3(2011):527 -554.
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1704517224 [11]如果企业利润低于对贷款人承诺的固定回报,则全部利润归贷款人。
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1704517226 [12]Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton,“An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting,”ReviewofEconomicStudies59, no. 3(1992):473 -494.
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1704517228 [13]Aghion and Bolton,“An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting”;Steven N. Kaplan and Per Ströberg,“Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts,”ReviewofEconomicStudies70, no. 2(2003):281 -315.
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1704517230 [14]若干研究强调了风险资本对创新融资的作用,最早见于Samuel S. Kortum and Josh Lerner,“Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation,”RANDJournalofEconomics31, no. 4(2000):674 -692. See also publications by Josh Lerner and Paul Gompers: Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner,TheVentureCapitalCycle(Cambridge, MA: MITPress, 2004); Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner,“The Venture Capital Revolution,”JournalofEconomicPerspectives15,no. 2(2001):145 -168.
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1704517232 [15]Ufuk Akcigit, Emin Dinlersoz, Jeremy Greenwood, and Veronika Penciakova,“Synergizing Ventures” (NBER Working Paper No. 26196, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, August 2019).
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1704517234 [16]创新的测量指标是企业获得第一项专利之后的3年内,其专利被引用的总次数。
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1704517236 [17]创新活动的测算指标是专利的数量结合质量(以专利被引用的次数计算)。
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1704517238 [18]Ghizlane Kettani,“Capital-risque, innovation et croissance” (Ph. D. diss. ,Université Paris-Dauphine, 2011).
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1704517240 [19]机构投资者是指筹集储蓄资金,并代表自身或客户把资金投资于市场的组织。机构投资者包含3种类型:养老基金,在养老金由资本化资金支持的国家(如美国和英国)负责管理退休储蓄;投资基金;保险公司。
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1704517242 [20]Philippe Aghion, John Van Reenen, and Luigi Zingales,“Innovation and Institutional Ownership,”AmericanEconomicReview103, no. 1(2013):277 -304.
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1704517244 [21]研发密度的测算办法是考虑专利质量权重后的专利数量。
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1704517246 [22]这一“职业发展”理论来自: Bengt Holmström,“Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective,”ReviewofEconomicStudies66, no. 1(1999):169 -182.
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1704517248 [23]我们的隐含假设是,市场知道项目的创新程度如何,创新项目成功给经理人带来的声誉提升幅度比传统项目成功更大。
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1704517250 [24]Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales,“Innovation and Institutional Ownership.”
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1704517252 [25]竞争力度以垄断租金的相对值来测算。
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1704517254 [26]世界银行数据。
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1704517256 [27]法国的数据来自France Invest;美国的数据来自Prequin。
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1704517258 [28]与税收抵扣不同,免税额度影响的不是应税收入,而是实际纳税额。它直接从纳税额中扣除,如果免税额度超出应缴税额,甚至可能导致退款。
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