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[6]Philippe Aghion and Alexandra Roulet,Repenserl’État（Paris: Seuil in collaboration with La République des idées, 2011）.
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[7]腐败感知指数是由非政府组织透明国际（Transparency International）每年发布，根据专家和企业高管对一个国家公共部门的腐败程度的感知来排名。得分接近0代表腐败非常严重，接近100代表腐败程度较低。产品市场规制指数（Product Market Regulation index）由经合组织编制，是测算公共政策对产品市场竞争的促进或限制程度的综合指标。
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[8]János Kornai, “Innovation and Dynamism: Interaction between Systems and Technical Progress,”EconomicsofTransition18, no. 4（2010）
:629 -670.
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[9]不完备合同理论受到瑞典皇家科学院的重视，为此将2016年的诺贝尔经济学奖授予Oliver Hart与Bengt Holmström。我们推荐相关参考书目: Oliver Hart,Firms
:Contracts:and Financial Structure（Oxford: Clarendon Press,1995）.最早两篇利用该理论来分析宪法的本质和作用的论文为: Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton,“Incomplete Social Contracts,”JournaloftheEuropeanEconomicAssociation1, no. 1（2003）
:38 -67; and Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina, and Francesco Trebbi,“Endogenous Political Institutions,”QuarterlyJournalofEconomics119, no. 2（2004）
:565 -611.
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[10]Montesquieu,Del’espritdeslois（Geneva: Barrillot & fils, 1748）; Montesquieu,TheSpiritoftheLaws, ed. and trans. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller,and Harold Samuel Stone（Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989）;Friedrich A. Hayek,TheConstitutionofLiberty（Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 1960）; James M. Buchanan,Fiscal Theory and Political Economy（Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960）; James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock,The Calculus of Consent
:Logical Foundations of ConstitutionalDemocracy（Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962）.
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[11]Alexis de Tocqueville,DemocracyinAmerica, ed. and trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop（1835; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000）.
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[12]Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, Federalist No. 70（1788）,inTheFederalistPapers, ed. Clinton Rossiter（New York: New American Library, 1961）.
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[13]每个国家都有宪法，即便没有以之作为名称的文件。例如，英国从正式文件的角度看可以说没有宪法，但从实质来看，却有规范政治制度运转的成文和不成文规则。英国还有作为宪法基础的若干文件，包括古代的（如Magna Carta of 1215, Bill of Rights of 1688）和现代的（如Parliament Acts of 1911,1949）。
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[14]Aghion and Bolton,“Incomplete Social Contracts.”
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[15]See Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi,“Endogenous Political Institutions”;之前关于既得利益集团的政治经济学文章，可参见: Per Krusel and Jose Victor Rios-Rull,“On the Size of U. S. Government: Political Economy in the Neoclassical Growth Model,”AmericanEconomicReview89, no. 5（1999）
:1156 -1181.
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[16]Hayek,The Constitution of Liberty.
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[17]Rafael La Porta, Florencio López-de-Silanes, Christian Pop-Eleches, and Andrei Shleifer,“Judicial Checks and Balances,”JournalofPoliticalEconomy112, no. 2（2004）
:445 -470.
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[18]La Porta et al.,“Judicial Checks and Balances.”
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[19]Daniel R. Pinello,“Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-Analysis,”JusticeSystemJournal20, no. 3（1999）
:219 -254.
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[20]Arnaud Philippe and Aurélie Ouss,“‘No Hatred or Malice, Fear or Affection’
:Media and Sentencing,”JournalofPoliticalEconomy126, no. 5（2018）
:2134 -2178.
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[21]Ioana Marinescu,“Are Judges Sensitive to Economic Conditions? Evidence from UK Employment Tribunals,”Industrial and Labour Relations Review64, no. 4（2011）
:673 -698.
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[22]Daniel L. Chen, Tobias J. Moskowitz, and Kelly Shue,“Decision Making under the Gambler’s Fallacy: Evidence from Asylum Judges, Loan Officers, and Baseball Umpires,”QuarterlyJournalofEconomics131, no. 3（2016）
:1181 -1242.
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[23]Daniel L. Chen and Jess Eagel,“Can Machine Learning Help Predict the Outcome of Asylum Adjudications?”Proceedings of the Sixteenth InternationalConferenceon Artificial Intelligence and Law（2017）
:237 -240; Daniel L. Chen,“AI and Rule of Law: Machine Learning, Causal Inference, and Judicial Analytics,” course at the Toulouse School of Economics, 2019.
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[24]Ozkan Eren and Naci Mocan,“Emotional Judges and Unlucky Juveniles,”American Economic Journal
:Applied Economics10, no. 3（2018）
:171 -205;Daniel L. Chen and Arnaud Philippe,“Clash of Norms: Judicial Leniency on Defendant Birthdays,” unpublished manuscript, February 2020, https: //papers. ssrn. com/ sol3 / papers. cfm? abstract_id = 3203624.
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[25]Jon Kleinberg, Himabindu Lakkaraju, Jure Leskovec, Jens Ludwig, and Sendhil Mullainathan,“Human Decisions and Machine Predictions,”QuarterlyJournalofEconomics133, no. 1（2018）
:237 -293.
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[26]计算机或者说算法也可能有偏向性，这方面的研究文献日益增多。依靠机器学习的算法包含了人类法官的偏向性，他们的决策是机器学习行为的基础。可参见Cathy O’Neil,WeaponsofMathDestruction（New York: Broadway Books, 2016）。
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[27]Samuel Bowles and Wendy Carlin,“Shrinking Capitalism,”AEAPapersandProceedings110（2020）
:372 -377.
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[29]关于政府与民间社会的必要的互补性，参见Monique Canto-Sperber,LaFin des libertés. Ou comment refonder le libéralisme（Paris: Robert Laffont, 2019）.
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[30]阿西莫格鲁与罗宾逊的TheNarrowCorridor用“缺位利维坦”来描述无政府社会。他们以尼日利亚的Tiv社群为例，描述民间社会取消政府的情形。该社群建立了一套社会习俗和惩罚体系，以防止任何人将其意指强加于他人。
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