1704543840
Debreu,G.,1959,Theory of Value,New York:John Wiley&Sons.
1704543841
1704543842
Davis,L.,and D. C. North,1970,“Institutional change and American economic growth:a first step toward a theory of institutional innovation,”Journal of Economic History,30(1):131-149.
1704543843
1704543844
——,1971,Institutional Change and American Economic Growth,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
1704543845
1704543846
Friedman,M. and R. Friedman,1980,Free to Choose,New York:HBJ.
1704543847
1704543848
Gibbard,A.,1973,“Manipulation of voting schemes,”Econometrica,41(4):587-601.
1704543849
1704543850
Hurwicz,L.,1960,“Optimality and informational efficiency in resource allocation processes,”in K. J. Arrow,S. Karlin and P. Suppes(eds.),Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences,Stanford,California:Stanford University Press.
1704543851
1704543852
——,1972,“On informationally decentralized systems,”in C. B. McGuire and R. Radner(eds.),Decision and Organization,Amsterdam:North-Holland,297-336.
1704543853
1704543854
——,1973,“The design of mechanisms for resource allocation,”American Economic Review,63(2):1-30.
1704543855
1704543856
——,1995,“What is the Coase Theorem,”Japan and the World Economy,7:49-74.
1704543857
1704543858
Moffatt,P. G.,2002,“Is Giffen behavior compatible with the axioms of consumer theory?”Journal of Mathematical Economics,37(4):259-267.
1704543859
1704543860
North,D. C.,1990,Institutions,Institutional Change,and Economic Performance,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
1704543861
1704543862
Nash,J.,1950,“The bargaining problem,”Econometrica,18(2):155-162.
1704543863
1704543864
——,1951,“Non-cooperative games,”Annals of Mathematics,54(2):286-295.
1704543865
1704543866
Ruttan,V. W.,1978,“Induced institutional change,”in H. P. Binswanger and V. W. Ruttan(eds.),Induced Innovation:Technology,Institutions,and Development,Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press,327-357.
1704543867
1704543868
Schultz,T. W.,1968,“Institutions and the rising economic value of man,”American Journal of Agricultural Economics,50(5):1113-1122.
1704543869
1704543870
Scarf,H. E.,1960,“Some examples of global instability of the competitive equilibrium,”International Economic Review,1(3):157-172.
1704543871
1704543872
Samuelson,P.,1995,“Some uneasiness with the Coase Theorem,”Japan and the World Economy,7:1-7.
1704543873
1704543874
Satterthwaite,M. A.,1975,“Strategy proofness and Arrow’s conditions:existence and correspondences theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions,”Journal of Economic Theory,10(2):187-217.
1704543875
1704543876
Starrett,D. A.,1972,“Fundamental nonconvexities in the theory of externalities,”Journal of Economic Theory,4(2):180-199.
1704543877
1704543878
Tian,G.,2004,“Lecture notes on microeconomic theory,”Texas A&M University,http://econweb.tamu.edu/tian/micro1.pdf
1704543879
1704543880
(本文原为为上海财经大学讲座而准备的报告稿,部分文字刊于《经济研究》2005年第2期)
1704543881
1704543882
(1)田国强,明尼苏达大学经济学博士,美国得克萨斯州A&M大学终身教授,现任上海财经大学经济学院院长。
1704543883
1704543884
(2)当然,许多经济问题也可以通过经验性的定量分析来进行研究,下面在讨论数学在现代经济学的作用时将简要地讨论一下,但这不是本文的重点。本文主要讨论对一个经济问题进行理论分析时所用到的基本框架。
1704543885
1704543886
(3)制度环境和制度安排的区分要根据具体情况具体区分,没有严格的界定。当制度安排作为外生给定时,它实质上就退化为制度环境。比如,当考虑经济制度的选择时,市场制度可看成经济制度安排。但当将市场制度作为给定来研究人们的行为和经济现象时,市场制度可看成经济制度环境。
1704543887
1704543888
(4)完全准确的描述甚至也可能是没有价值的。比如,将这个世界看成是一幅世界地图应该是完全精确的,但它却毫无价值。
1704543889
[
上一页 ]
[ :1.70454384e+09 ]
[
下一页 ]