打字猴:1.70454428e+09
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1704544316 Samuelson, Paul, 1958,“An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or without the Social Contrivance of Money,”Journal of Political Economy,66(6): 467-482.
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1704544318 Shleifer, Andrei,2000,Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance, Clarendon Lectures in Economics,New York: Oxford University Press.
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1704544320 Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert Vishny,1997.“A Survey of Corporate Governance,”Journal of Finance,52(2):737-83.
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1704544322 Spence,Michael,1973,“Job Market Signaling,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3): 355-374.
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1704544324 Stiglitz,Joseph,1974, “Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping,”Review of Economic Studies. 41(2): 219-255.
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1704544326 Thaler, Richard,1994,The Winner’s Curse: Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life,Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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1704544328 Thaler, Richard(editor),1993,Advances in Behavioral Finance, New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
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