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［41］这个问题首先由Armen Alchian and Harold Demstetz提出，参见“Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization,” American Economic Review 62 (1972): 777-795。
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［42］核心资源理论最早来自一些社会学家对权力来源的研究，例如Richard Emerson, “Power Dependence Relations,” American Sociological Review 27 (1963): 31-41。管理学的理论家进一步发展了这个学说，重点强调企业的竞争力就是核心资源，参见Birger Wernerfelt, “A Resource Based View of the Firm,” Strategic Management Journal 5 (1984): 171-180, and G. Hamel and C. Pralahad, “The Core Competence of the Corporation,” Havord Business Review 68 (1990): 79-91。在经济学方面的早期研究是由S. Grossman and O. Hart完成，他们强调财产的所有权是权力的来源，并提出了支配权力为什么要采取非合同形式的问题，参见“The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,” Journal of Political Economy 94 (1986): 691-719。在这以后的理论研究就不再把财产的所有权当成支配权力的唯一来源，而同时注意到其他因素的作用 (参见R. Rajan and L. Zingales, “Power in a Theory of the Firm,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 \[1998］ : 387-432, or Bengt Holmstrom, “The Firm as a Subeconomy,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15 \[1999］ : 74-102) 。
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［43］本段落的数据来自Statistical Asstract of the United States, 2001, table 593。
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［44］Rebecca Demsetz, “Human Resources Needs in the Evolving Financial Sector,” Current Issues, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 3, no. 13, November 1997.
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［45］Larry Hunter, Annette Bernhardt, Katherine Hughes, Eva Skuratowicz, “It’s Not Just the ATMs: Technology, Firm Strategies, Jobs, and Earnings in Retail Banking,” Wharton Financial Institutions Center, working paper, 2000.
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［46］感谢Mark Knez为这个案例的贡献。
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［47］L. Katz and K. Murphy, “Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987: Supply and Demand Factors,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (February 1992): 33-78.
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［48］参见Paul Beaudry and David Green, “Changes in U.S. Wages 1976-2000: Ongoing Skill Bias or Major Technological Change?” NBER working paper no. 8787。有一个疑问是，如果说人力资本变得越来越重要了，那为什么在20世纪的大部分时间里资本和劳动在分配中所占的份额却依然保持相对稳定呢？（参见Thomas Piketty and Emmanual Saez, “Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998,” NBER working paper no. w8467, 2001)。一个可能的解释是，劳动的资本密集程度提高了，这部分反映了资本的供应更加充足，另外一个可能的解释是劳动得到的部分补偿有了更多的选择机会。
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［49］关于处理软信息时遇到的组织问题，参见Jeremy Stein, “Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralized vs. Hierarchical Firms,” Journal of Finance, October 2002; and A. Berger, N. Miller, M. Petersen, R. Rajan, and J. Stein, “Does Function Follow Organizational Form? Evidence from the Lending Practices of Large and Small Banks,” NBER working paper w8752, 2002。关于银行取消中间管理职位的研究，参见Hunter et al., “It’s Not Just the ATMs.”关于工业企业取消中间管理层，组织结构扁平化和分散化的研究，参见R. Rajan and J. Wulf, “The Flattening Firm,” University of Chicago, working paper, 2002。
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［50］“John Meriwether by the Numbers,” Institutional Investor, November 1996, 62.
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［51］“John Meriwether by the Numbers”记录了所罗门兄弟公司的CEO Derek Maughan与Lazard Freres公司的Gerald Rosenfeld之间的谈话。Maughan问Rosenfeld，他最担心所罗门公司发生什么事情，Rosenfeld说，“由于梅里韦瑟走了，那些得力的员工有可能也会离开。”但是Maughan却说：“不可能，那些人都离不开所罗门公司。”
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［52］在这场危机发生时，在所罗门的老板是John Gutfreund，他还经常到交易大厅走动，但是他的继任者就比较喜欢高高在上了。
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［53］Economist, April 8, 2000, 76.
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［54］C. Prendergast, “The Provision of Incentives in Firms,” Journal of Economic Literature 37, no. 1 (March 1999): 7-63.
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［55］Piketty and Saez, “Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998”.
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［56］Robert Fogel, The Fourth Great Awakening and the Future of Egalitarianism (London: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 219.
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第4章
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［1］International Financial Risk Institute, “Not Just One Man-Barings,” Http://newrisk.ifci.ch/137550.htm.
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［2］有关的模型参见Douglas Diamond and Raghuram Rajan, “Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking,” Journal of Political Economy 109 (2001): 287-327。
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［3］有关的模型参见S. Myers and R. Rajan, “The Paradox of Liquidity,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 113, no. 3 (August 1998)。
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［4］描述市场有效性的一个办法是价格等于基本价值，另一个办法是很难获得超出风险收益以上的超额利润。对此的经典论述参见Eugene Fama, “Risk, Return, and Equilibrium,” Journal of Political Economy 78, no. 1 (February 1971): 289-298; and Eugene Fama, “Efficient Capital Markets II,” Journal of Finance 46, no. 5 (December 1991): 1575-1617。
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［5］L. Roshental and C. Young, “The Seemingly Anomalous Price Behavior of Royal Dutch Shell and Unilever nv/plc,” Journal of Financial Economics 26 (1990)
:123-141. K. Froot and E. Debora, “How Are Stock Prices Affected by the Location of Trade?” Journal of Financial Economics 53 (1999): 189-216.
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［6］根据如下资料整理：O. Lamont and R. Thaler, “Can the Market Add and Subtract? Misprici-ng in Tech-Stock Carve-outs,” working paper, University of Chicago, 2000。同时参见Brad Cornell and Qiao Liu, “The Parent Company Puzzle: When Is the Whole Worth Less Than One of the Parts?” Journal of Corporate Finance 7, no. 6 (2000): 341-366; Michael Schill and Chunsheng Zhou, “Pricing an Emerging Industry: Evidence from Internet Subsidiary Carve-guns,” and Mark Mitchell, Todd Pulvino, and Erik Stafford, “Limited Arbitrage in Equity Markets,” Journal of Finance 32, no. 2 (February 2002)。关于互联网泡沫的有先见之明的论述，参见Michael J. Mandel, The Coming Internet Depression: Why the High-Tech Boom Will Go Bust, Why the Crash Will Be Worse Than You Think, and How to Prosper Afterward (New York: Basic Books, 2000)。
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［7］另外一个难堪的问题是“你为什么要告诉我们？”假如有人向你兜售《怎样在股市上轻松成为百万富翁》之类的书籍，你就应该向他提出这个问题。
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［8］Michael C. Jensen, “Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency,” Journal of Financial Economics 6 (1978): 95-101.
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