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［52］John P. Powelson, The Story of Land: A World History of Land Tenure and Agrarian Reform (Cambridge, Mass.: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 1998), 89.
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［53］Abhijit Benerjee and Lakshmi Iyer, “History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India,” MIT, working paper, 2002.
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［54］有关解决方式的发展理论，参见D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson, and J. Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Study,” American Economic Review 91 (2001): 1369-1401。
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［55］参见Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, Privatizing Russia (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1995)。事后的分析总是更正确。但是公平地说，由于没有一个成熟的企业家阶层，俄罗斯的改革者在当时缺乏帮助，也没有过去的经验可以参考。相反，制度经济学最近的很多进展倒是要感谢俄罗斯的改革实践。
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［56］Richard Ehrenberg, Capital and Finance in the Age of the Renaissance: A Study of the Fuggers and Their Connections (New York: Harcourt, 1928).
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第7章
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［1］E. Glaeser, S. Johnson, and A. Shleifer, “Coase vs. the Coasians,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, no. 3 (2001): 853-899.
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［2］Alexander Dyck and Luigi Zingales, “Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison,” NBER working paper no. 8771, 2002.
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［3］Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer, “Coase vs. the Coasians.”
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［4］Dyck and Zingales, “Private Benefits of Control.”
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［5］Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer, “Coase vs. the Coasians.”
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［6］Carol J. Simon, “The Effect of the 1933 Securities Act on Investor Information and the Performance of New Issues,” American Economic Review 79, no. 3 (1989): 295-318.
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［7］R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, “Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation,” Journal of Finance 57, no. 3 (2002): 1147-1171.
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［8］U. Bhattacharya and H. Daouk, “The World Price of Insider Trading,” Journal of Finance 57 (2002): 75-108.
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［9］Paul Halpern, Michael Trebilcock, and Stuart Turnbull, “An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporate Law,” University of Toronto Law Review 117 (1980): 30.
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［10］Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), and G. Stigler, “Theory of Economic Regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics 2 (1971): 3-21。
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［11］有三位杰出的经济学家对这项研究有过贡献，并仍然活跃在研究领域，包括Sam Peltzman (“Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,” Journal of Law and Economics 19, no. 2 \[1976］ : 211-240)，Richard Posner (“Taxation by Regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics 2 \[1971］ : 22-50)，Gary Becker (“A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,” Quarterly Journal of Finance 98, no. 3 \[1983］ : 371-400)。
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［12］1997年的数据来自The Taxi and Limousine Commission. www.schallerconsult.com/taxi/intro.htm。
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［13］理性无知的术语来自Anthony Downs的著作An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957)。
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［14］对这些观点的扩展，参见R. Rajan and L. Zingales, “The Tyranny of Inequality: An Inquiry into the Adverse Consequences of Power Struggles,” Journal of Public Economics 76 (2000): 521-558。
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［15］Randall Morck, David Strangeland, and Bernard Young, “Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic Growth: The Canadian Disease?” in Concentrated Capital Ownership, ed. R. K. Morck (Chicago: UOF Press, 2000), 347.
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［16］Tarun Khana and Krishna Palepu, “Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging Markets?” Journal of Finance 55, no. 2 (2000)
:867-891.
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［17］Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, “The Regulation of Entry,” NBER working paper no. 7892, 2000.
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［18］这种负相关关系在统计上是显著的，在排除人均GDP的影响后的回归分析表明该相关关系依然存在。
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第8章
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