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［25］Toniolo, “Crisi economica e smobilizzo pubblico delle banche miste,” 329.
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［26］1946年，意大利议会建立了专门委员会来决定国有控股公司IRI的命运，当时的工业家协会主席对委员会陈述道，“从经济的角度，如果我们认为私人部门可以吸收IRI，那我们完全同意立刻清算IRI，让私人部门买过去。但是在今天，我们并不认为有哪一家私人公司有能力购买，例如Ansoldo就不行。”出自Ministero per la Costitiente, 1946, p. 89，转引自F. Barca and S. Trento, “La Parabola delle partecipazioni statali: Una missione tradita,” in Storia del capitalismo Italiano, ed. F. Barca (Rome: Donzelli Editore, 1997)。
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［27］Toniolo, “Crisi economica e smobilizzo pubblico delle banche miste,” 331.
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［28］Marcello de Cecco and Giovanni Ferri, Le banche d’affari in Italia (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1996).
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［29］Barca and Trento, “La Parabola delle partecipazioni statali,” 194.
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［30］Giancarlo Galli, Il Padrone dei padroni (Milano: Garzanti, 1995).
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［31］G. Ferri and S. Trento, “La dirigenza delle grandi bancje e delle grandi imprese: Ricambio e legami,” in Storia del capitalismo Italiano, ed. F. Barca (Rome: Donzelli Editore, 1997).
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［32］Galli, Il Padrone dei padroni， 74.
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［33］同上，第83页。
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［34］Napoleone Colajanni, Il capitalismo senza capitale (Milano: Sperling and Kupfer, 1991), 64，转引自Galli, Il Padrone dei padroni, 83。
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［35］Galli, Il Padrone dei padroni, 9.
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［36］Barca and Trento, “La Parabola delle partecipazioni statali.”
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［37］Marcello De Cecco, Saggi di politica monetaria (Milan: Giuffre, 1968), 40.
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［38］M. Pagano, F. Panetta, and L. Zingales, “Why Do Companies Go Public? An Empirical Analysis,” National Bureau of Economic Research, working paper, 1995.
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［39］M. Pagano, F. Panetta, and L. Zingales, “Why Do Companies Go Public? An Empirical Analysis,” Journal of Finance 53 (February 1998): 27-67.
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［40］M. Aoki, H. Patrick, and P. Sheard, “The Japanese Main Bank System: An Overview,” in The Japanese Main Bank System, ed. M. Aoki and H. Patrick (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), and T. Hoshi and A. Kashyap, Corporate Finance and Government in Japan (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), 59, table 3.2.
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［41］J. M. Ramseyer and F. M. Rosenbluth, The Politics of Oligarchy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 104.
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［42］引自 Hoshi and Kashyap, Corporate Finance and Government in Japan, 29。
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［43］同上，第58页。
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［44］Aoki, Patrick, and Sheard, “The Japanese Main Bank System,” 44.
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［45］数据来自J. Teranishi, “Loan Syndication in War-Time Japan,” in The Japanese Main Bank System, ed. M. Aoki and H. Patrick (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 57, table 2.2。
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［46］这是一个卡特尔组织，根据T.Hoshi and A.Kashyap的研究，没有参加1931年协定的证券公司依然在承销业务上展开激烈竞争，并继续承销无担保债券。因此，无担保债券的灾难并不是市场本身造成的，而是由于卡特尔组织的束缚。参见 Hoshi and Kashyap, Corporate Finance and Government in Japan, 31。
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［47］Tetsuji Okazaki (1991), 382，cited in Hoshi and Kashyap, Corporate Finance and Government in Japan, 61.
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［48］Hoshi and Kashyap, Corporate Finance and Government in Japan, 80.
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［49］Lucian Bebchuk and Mark J. Roe, “A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance,” Stanford Law Review 52 (1999): 127-170，发展了关于管制导致这些结果的理论。
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