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1704623741
［45］数据来自J. Teranishi, “Loan Syndication in War-Time Japan,” in The Japanese Main Bank System, ed. M. Aoki and H. Patrick (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 57, table 2.2。
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［46］这是一个卡特尔组织，根据T.Hoshi and A.Kashyap的研究，没有参加1931年协定的证券公司依然在承销业务上展开激烈竞争，并继续承销无担保债券。因此，无担保债券的灾难并不是市场本身造成的，而是由于卡特尔组织的束缚。参见 Hoshi and Kashyap, Corporate Finance and Government in Japan, 31。
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［47］Tetsuji Okazaki (1991), 382，cited in Hoshi and Kashyap, Corporate Finance and Government in Japan, 61.
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［48］Hoshi and Kashyap, Corporate Finance and Government in Japan, 80.
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［49］Lucian Bebchuk and Mark J. Roe, “A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance,” Stanford Law Review 52 (1999): 127-170，发展了关于管制导致这些结果的理论。
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［50］Mark. J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994).
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1704623753
［51］G. Benston, “The Origins and Justification for the Glass-Steagall Act,” in Universal Banking in the United States: What Could We Gain? What Could We Lose? ed. A Saunders and I. Walter (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
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［52］Paul G. Mahony, “The Political Economy of the Securities Act of 1933,” working paper no. 00-11, Social Science Research Network, 2000, 8.
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［53］R. Kroszner and R. Rajan, “Organization on Structure and Credibility: Evidence from the Commercial Bank Securities Activities before the Glass-Steagall Act,” Journal of Monetary Economics 39 (1997): 475-516.
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［54］Mahony, “The Political Economy of the Securities Act of 1933.”
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［55］一般的论证参见George J. Benston, The Separation of Commercial and Investment Banking: The Glass-Steagall Act Revised and Reconsidered (New York: OPU, 1990)，系统性的论证参见R. Kroszner and R. Rajan, “Is the Glass-Steagall Act Justified? A Study of the U.S. Experience with Universal Banking before 1933,” American Economic Review 84 (September 1994): 810-832。
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［56］Kroszner and Rajan, “Organization on Structure and Credibility.”
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［57］Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners.
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［58］Benston, “Origins and Justification for the Glass-Steagall Act,” 38.
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［59］Mahony, “The Political Economy of the Securities Act of 1933.”
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第10章
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［1］Standard and Poor’s, “U.S. Steel Tariffs: Who Gains, Who Loses, and at What Price?,” March 14, 2002.
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［2］AISI, “The New Steel Industry,” www.steel.org/facts/newsindus.htm.
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［3］雇佣人数的数据来自Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Current Employment Statistics, www.bls.gov/webapps/legarcy/cesbtabl.htm。生产的数据来自American Iron and Steel Industry, 1997 Annual Statistical Report。
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［4］Alan Greenspan, chairman, Federal Reserve Board, before the Senate Banking Committee, July 28, 1999.
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［5］W. H. Barringer and K. J. Pierce, 256-257，cited in B. Linsey, D. Griswold, and A. Lucas, “The Steel ‘Crisis’ and the Cost of Protectionism,” Cato Institute, trade briefing paper, April 16, 1999, 6.
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［6］www.steelnet.org.
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［7］Economist, “Anger over Steel,” March 11, 2002.
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［8］Economist, “Romancing Big Steel,” February 14, 2002.
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［9］W. H. Barringer and K. J. Pierce, 112,cited in Dan Ikenson, “Steel Trap: How Subsidies and Protectionism Weaken the U.S. Steel Industry,” Cato Institute, trade briefing paper, March 1, 2002, 5.
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