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西南联大英文课（英汉双语版） [:1705033865]
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38 希特勒之谜
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这个阿道夫·希特勒真是个奇怪的人。在采访中，他极为客气，彬彬有礼，在每句话后都有意停顿一下，以免采访者想插话。在他的手下向他敬礼时，他的回礼以及他向纳粹党旗敬礼时的一丝不苟，几乎到了堂吉诃德式可笑的地步。但奇怪的是，在正式聚会或别人跟他说话时，他似乎从来没有轻松自在过。他似乎是一只被追捕的猎物，随时准备寻求庇护，而他的庇护就是发表一个简短的演说。即使别人的问题一两个字就能回答，他也要做个演说。在发表演说时，他至少有个坚实的基础。他不需要思考，因为这些话他已经说了几千遍，而且会一直说到死。
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一个根本的事实是，希特勒从来没有跟他人有过真正的个人接触。我们看到的那些迷人的照片，无论是他从小朋友手里接过花束，或者握着那些给人印象深刻的老农的粗糙坚硬的手，都是预先安排好的。这些照片是他的老朋友霍夫曼的摄影杰作。霍夫曼把照片上希特勒周围的卫兵挡在了照片外，这才有了我们看到的结果。元首出现时从来都不是一个人。巨人布鲁克纳跟他形影不离，而且无论到哪里，都由特别卫兵组成的“敢死队”前呼后拥。他出门时总是乘坐他那辆硕大的梅赛德斯奔驰车（特制的，以便他可以站在前排并有所倚靠，不致太疲乏），而且前后都有党卫队组成的摩托车队和汽车队护卫。他生活在一种极不自然的与其他人的隔绝中，这使他更加狂妄自大，给自己打上神性的标签。即使心智最健全的人，如果长期过着这样的生活，也会失去现实感。而希特勒在最理性的时候，也没人敢说他是情绪稳定的人。大部分评论希特勒的人，在他的饮食和独身生活方面大做文章。而在我看来，他缺乏与普通人接触这一点，更为重要。他本身就不太正常，而长期和大肆的吹捧使他更加病态。他听到的都是他身边的狂热分子、密谋者及死心塌地的爱国者多次蒸馏后的观点。没有人敢对他讲实情，或坦言相告，更不用说批评他的政策或他本人了。他生活在自己的精神世界里，比“太阳王”更加与大众格格不入，只凭着一个政治鼓动者的狭隘心理和经验引导着自己。除非一个人接受当时在德国盛行的观点，即希特勒的灵感直接来自于上帝（某个最有权势的纳粹分子曾经说过，他有直通上天的电话！），那他一定会得出这样的结论，即德国的未来和世界和平如今寄托在一个心智混乱的人身上，而这个人连他的朋友也认为不正常。在这个科学和进步的年代，人类的命运居然寄托在一个非正常心灵的异想天开上，比我们大肆批评的旧专制君主时代尤甚，这真是人类历史上最不同寻常的事件！
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但是，最令人费解之谜依然没有解开。假如希特勒是一个不切实际的人，一个情感动物，一个智力平庸之人，一个能吸引观众的演说家，一个生活简单的元首，对自己的使命感同“神”授——那么，这样一个人是如何爬上权力的顶峰，并在他开始统治的四年里统一了德国这个民族？有许多原因可以部分地解开这个谜。首先，在政局混乱和德意志全民沮丧的时期，希特勒是最受民众欢迎的演说家。他的“觉醒吧，德意志”的思想正好契合了当时的德意志民族心理，因此他发起的运动成了麻痹德国民众的精神鸦片。其次，他的追随者能力非凡。与他们一起，希特勒建立了最好的党组织。第三，他头脑简单，这使他能够将一场异常复杂的革命进行到底；如果换了一个能清楚分析这场革命后果的领导人，肯定会畏缩不前。最后一点是，他成了德意志民族神话的象征。他与这个神话融为一体，他的任务就是按照这个神话的要求思考和行动。这种融合到了这样的地步，以至于任何一个在德国取代了希特勒政党的力量，都可能不得不继续把希特勒奉为名义上的元首。希特勒神话是当今德国民族生活中的显著特色。的确，他不再把自己当作一个普通人，而是一个占领了圣城的十字军战士，民族的象征，日耳曼尼亚活着的受神启的代言人，最神秘意义上的元首——我们最终是不是要加上：元首上帝？
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（余苏凌 译）
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西南联大英文课（英汉双语版） [:1705033866]
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39 BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY
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By John Gunther
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BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY, by John Gunther, from his Inside Europe , published by New York, Harper and Brothers, 1937, pp. 224, 225.
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John Gunther, foreign news reporter for the Chicago Daily News , of America, has worked for his newspaper in almost every country of Europe. He then made a trip around the world and expected to put out a new book Outside Asia very much along the lines of his Inside Europe .
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British foreign policy, which is extraordinarily constant, changing little （as Sir Samuel Hoare recently said） from generation to generation, is based, broadly speaking, on the concept of the balance of power with Britain holding the balance. “All our greatest wars,” Sir Austen Chamberlain put it, “have been fought to prevent one great military power dominating Europe, and at the same time dominating the coasts of the Channel and the ports of the Low Countries.” Trevelyan has said, “From Tudor times onwards, England treated European politics simply as a means of insuring her own security from invasion and furthering her designs beyond the ocean.” In modern times, following this policy, Britain has tended, when France was stronger than Germany, to support Germany; when Germany was stronger than France, to support France. Since the war the League of Nations has been a convenient mechanism to this end; if the League ceases to serve British purpose, Britain ignores it. Since with great shrewdness in 1919, Britain obtained the entrance of the Dominions （and India） into the League as separate states, she is always able to dominate its deliberations. Before the war it was a cardinal principle of British politics not to commit the nation to any action on the Continent in regard to hypothetical future contingencies. Locarno, the apex of the balance of power policy, changed this. All these considerations are, of course, dominated by the principle of Pax Britannica; Britain, a great trading nation, wants peace. When the sanctions crisis arose, as Walter Duranty put it, “the British did not want a war to such a degree that they were prepared to fight to avoid it.”
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Another and a very curious minor factor should be mentioned. It causes much puzzlement to observers on the Continent. The British think even of foreign policy as a sort of game. Unlike the Germans or the French, to whom politics is a matter of life or death, the British are capable of extreme detachment in the direction of their complex foreign affairs. Europe is a sort of stage;the play that is going on is a play. And if someone misses his cue, or blunders with his lines, the average Briton always assumes that the drama is merely a rehearsal, and can be played over again—better.
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Roughly there are two groups in the foreign office. The first comprises the pro-Leaguers who are idealists. They hope through a system of collective security to bring Germany into the amicable concert of great powers. They view war as a literal horror; the Abyssinian crisis meant to them the collapse of moral law in Europe. The second group, mostly represented by older men, are willing enough to give the League a bit of rope, but they distrust the efficacy of the collective security principle, and put their hopes in （1） a powerful navy, and （2） isolationism. The opinions of this group served to encourage Germany, because isolation—noninterference in Europe—is tantamount to taking the German side.
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Notes
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Sir Samuel Hoare, English statesman, secretary of state for India, foreign minister （1935）, then first lord of the Admiralty, often spoken of as the next prime minister.
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Sir Austen Chamberlain, English statesman, approaching his eighties, has filled practically every great political office in England.
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the Channel, the English Channel, separating England from Europe.
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the Low Countries, Holland and Belgium.
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Trevelyan, George Otto （1838-1928）, English politician, biographer, and historian.
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Tudor times, the times of the English sovereigns from Henry VII to Elizabeth, from 1485 to 1603.
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hypothetical future contingencies, thing that may happen in the future but based on a supposition that may not be founded on truth.
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Locarno, the Pact of Locarno, a set of treaties concluded at Locarno in 1925, with France, Germany, and Belgium, as chief parties, and Great Britain and Italy as guarantors, intended to secure the inviolability of the frontiers and other safeguards of peace. Locarno is in Switzerland.
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apex, highest point, culmination.
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Pax Britannica, the peace of Britain, the abstention from war enforced on States subject to the British Empire.