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In this case, evidence is used to convince an audience to accept a claim; audience acceptance of the claim is the primary goal of the debater. An example of evidence being used to produce a claim is presented in the following diagram:
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Here, the claim that the debater wants the audience to accept is, “Smoking should be banned in public places.” That claim is supported by evidence suggesting “Second-hand smoke contributes to health problems for children.”
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In other instances, claims are used to produce other claims. For example, evidence is used to produce Claim 1, then Claim 1is used to convince an audience or judge to accept yet another claim. Thus, Claim 1 produced by the evidence was not the debater’s ultimate goal. Here, Claim 2 is the ultimate goal, but Claim 1 was necessary to convince the audience of Claim 2. For example:
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The above example demonstrates how one piece of evidence can be used to produce one claim, and how that claim can be used to produce yet a second claim. Of course, many different combinations exist where claims are used to convince an audience of subsequent claims. The following is another example:
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In this example, evidence is used to produce Claim 1 and Claim 2. Then the two claims are used to convince the audience to accept Claim 3. Using an example of wireless cities can clarify how this combination of evidence and claims works:
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Three pieces of evidence about wireless cities are produced. One suggests that a wireless city would relieve traffic, a second that traffic relief and bill-paying are important to local government, and a third that wireless cities will simplify bill-paying. The combination of Evidence 1 and Evidence 2 are used to create Claim 1, that “Relieving traffic will improve management of local governments.” Then, the combination of Evidence 2 and Evidence 3 are used to produce Claim 2 that “Simplifying bill-paying process will improve management of local governments.” Then, Claims 1 and 2 lead to Claim 3 that “Wireless cities are desirable”—which is precisely the claim that the debater wants the audience to accept. To attain this goal, the arguer uses 3 pieces of evidence and 2 other claims in combination with one another. Therefore, from the perspective of the arguer, Claim 1 and Claim 2 are important only because they can be used to convince the audience to accept Claim 3.
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Convincing an audience to accept a claim may be the ultimate objective of the debater, or, that objective may be to create a claim that is to be used to convince the audience of a subsequent claim. The process of combining claims to produce subsequent claims will be considered further in Chapter 20. Understanding that process requires understanding the different types of claims.
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15.1.1 Kinds of Claims
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A number of authors writing about argumentation and debate have proposed various taxonomies of claims. The most traditional method of classifying claims is by classic categories of “fact,” “value,” and “policy.” David Zarefsky has added a fourth category of “definition” (Zarefsky, 2005). Bill Hill and Richard Leeman, while following the traditional categories of fact, value, and policy, subdivided fact into being, designation, and relationship. The viewpoint advocated here is not to accept or reject any particular category system, but rather to suggest that no single system is capable of providing a list of categories that are exhaustive and mutually exclusive.
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Claims can be made about a nearly endless number of concepts. However, creating a taxonomy for discussing claims is important for a variety of reasons. One reason is that different kinds of claims require different kinds of support. Thus, a taxonomy that distinguishes different types of claims from one another allows students of argumentation and debate to learn how to support various types of claims. A second reason that taxonomies are useful is a functional one. As discussed earlier, claims can be combined to create other claims. As will be discussed in Chapter 20, certain types of claims can be created by a combination of other kinds of claims. Thus, a taxonomy of claims is useful because different kinds of claims require different kinds of support and because certain kinds of claims can be combined to produce other kinds of claims.
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In this section, a taxonomy of claims will be created and compared to more traditional taxonomies. As stated earlier, no taxonomy is perfect. The one suggested in this text is, in many respects, no better or worse than others. It is chosen because it is more functional for the purposes of this text. This taxonomy includes descriptive, definitional, associational, and evaluative claims.
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15.1.1.1 Claims of Description and Definition
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Claims of description and of definition are used in this text as a replacement for the traditional category of claims of fact. Some argue that, in addition to their factual dimension, claims about description and definition also carry value implications. In Schiappa’s words, “The primary thesis of this book [Defining Reality] is that definitional disputes should be treated less as philosophical or scientific questions of ‘is’ and more of sociopolitical and pragmatic questions of ‘ought.’”(Schiappa, 2003: 3). In other words, Schiappa is arguing that claims of definition and description ultimately are more about values than about facts. In order to explain the reasons that descriptions and definitions are appropriate replacements for the fact category, a few words about facts are in order. Linguist John Searle distinguishes between what he calls institutional and brute facts. Institutional facts are those that are most clearly human creations. What is marriage? What is the difference in a ball and a strike in baseball? Brute facts, on the other hand, are about those things that would continue to exist should humans completely vanish. What is a giraffe? What is water?
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Definitions and descriptions are human creations about both institutional and brute facts. The difference is that, supposedly, a brute fact would be the same whether or not humans were around to describe it. Giraffes would be on the earth even if they were never defined or described by human beings. Institutional facts, on the other hand, would be nothing if humans did not define and describe them. Marriage for instance, would not exist if not defined and described as a human institution.
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Definitions and descriptions of brute facts and institutional facts work somewhat differently. A definition or a description of a brute fact is a good one to the extent that the definition or description conforms to some empirical, observed reality. A description of a giraffe is a good description to the extent it conforms to the characteristics of an actual giraffe. A giraffe might be described as the tallest living terrestrial animal on earth. This is a good description to the extent that the description actually matches the features of a real giraffe. The criterion for a good definition or description of an institutional fact is different. A definition or a description of an institutional fact is good to the extent that it serves the needs and interests of the community(Rorty, 2000). So with respect to the definition of marriage, the question is whether, it serves the interests of the community to define marriage as a union between one man and one woman, or does it serve community interests to define marriage as a union between any two persons? Certain religious communities insist that marriage should be defined only as a union between one man and one woman. Others say that marriage should be defined as a union between one man and one or more women. Still others believe that marriage is legitimately defined as a union of any two persons, regardless of biological sex. The point is that each of those groups would point to their own community interests to support their definition of the concept of marriage. Marriage, they would insist, is defined as they say because it supports their own religious or community beliefs.
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Of course, the distinction between brute and institutional facts is not always a clear-cut one. Some things exist on the border of each kind. In other words, some kinds of facts are judged both by whether or not they conform to empirical, observed reality, and by whether or not they serve the needs and interests of the community. The following are a couple of examples of such borderline cases. First, consider the claim that “The universe began and will end with a ‘big bang’.” Whether or not the universe began and will end with a big bang is not dependent on what humans believe about the beginning and end of the world. How the universe began and how it will end is independent of any human belief or conclusion. So, on its face, that claim seems as if it should be judged by whether or not the claim conforms to some elements of observed reality. On the other hand, some will argue that a belief that the world began with a “big bang” does not conform to community interests because it appears, at least on its face, to be inconsistent with some versions of religion. To the extent that those versions of religion are seen as good for the community, the definition of the beginning of the world as being with a big bang will be seen as bad for the community. Consider a similar claim that “The human condition is the result of a process of evolution.” In order to satisfactorily support such a claim, a person needs to describe how the claim corresponds to empirical observations or lived experiences in the world. At the same time, some may argue against that claim because it, like the big bang example, does not serve the interests of a certain religiously inclined community.
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Definitions, in particular, almost always contain an imbedded question about the needs and interests of the community—about the values and principles by which the community lives. Claims of definition frequently suggest that a certain definition ought to apply to a particular category of things. Claims of definition frequently involve controversial questions—what should something be named? Should a group be called “terrorists” or “freedom fighters?” Should an abortion be called “terminating a pregnancy” or “killing a baby?” These claims of definition not only are attempts to answer controversial questions, but are also efforts to provide answers that can then be used to develop other kinds of claims, especially evaluative ones. For instance, supporting freedom fighters has a more positive connotation than supporting terrorists, even though the people described as “freedom fighters” may be engaging in the same kinds of activities as those who are described as “terrorists.” Similarly, “terminating a pregnancy” does not have nearly the negative connotations as “killing a baby.” Thus, by supporting certain definitions of “freedom fighters” or “pregnancy termination” the arguer provides a more effective way to evaluate those concepts.
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In Botswana, the debate over how to use wilderness areas and manage wild animals features a claim of definition. Government sources use “natural resources” to refer to animals and exotic locations, advertising on roadside billboards using gigantic pictures of rhinoceroses and giraffes accompanied by phrases such as, “Save our natural resources.” A nation that historically has relied on its diamond mines to raise its standard of living above that of surrounding countries, the government of Botswana is attempting to supplant the dwindling diamond supply with a “natural resource” that brings income through tourist business. Thus, the claim is that exotic animals and locations should be defined as a “natural resource.” Farmers who defend their livestock against attacks by lions, and ranchers who give up land to wilderness areas may find that they need to argue against defining animals and wilderness areas as “natural resources.” For them, lions and other animals that attack their livestock are “wild, predatory animals,” not “natural resources.”
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