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87 Wilson, pp. 210—211; text in Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 3, pp. 395—396.
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88 Wilson, p. 203; Heinrichs, Threshold of War, p. 159.
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89 Wilson, pp. 212, 214.
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90 See Wilson, pp. 223—224 and 231—234, 266—267, for reactions in the United States.
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91 Sherwood, White House Papers, vol. 1, p. 369.
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92 Freidel, p. 389.
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93 Sherwood, White House Papers, vol. 1, p. 374.
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94 Bailey and Ryan, pp. 168—173.
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95 Bailey and Ryan, pp. 173—174.
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96 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, ed. Samuel I. Rosenman, vol. 10 (1941), New York, 1950, pp. 374—383; Bailey and Ryan, pp. 175—176.
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97 Bailey and Ryan, pp. 171, 173, 175.
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98 Sherwood, White House Papers, vol. 1, pp. 371—373 (quotation p. 373). 史汀生告诉霍普金斯，总统没有询问过他对讲话有什么意见建议，但是他认为“除非总统愿意说一些真正强有力的话语，否则最好还是别说”。当史汀生听完总统的演说之后，认为这个讲话是他做的最有决定性的演讲，见 Stimson Diaries，Reel 7，entries for 9—10.9.41。在赫尔的回忆录当中，他提到，在 10 日晚上，他认同总统“应该明确强调指出我们在大西洋上的海军舰船，将对任何胆敢在我们的防御水域试图拦截商船的轴心国潜艇或者水面舰船开火”，见 Cordell Hull，The Memoirs of Cordell Hull（New York，1948），vol. 2，第 1047 页。
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99 Lash, p. 417.
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100 Public Papers and Addresses, vol. 10, pp. 384—392; FDR’s Fireside Chats, ed. Russell D. Buhite and David W. Levy, New York, 1992, pp. 189—196.
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101 FDR’s Fireside Chats, pp. 188—189.
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102 Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, pp. 742, 746.
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103 Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p. 746.
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104 Heinrichs, Threshold of War, p. 168.
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105 Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p. 747; Lash, p. 419.
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106 Bailey and Ryan, pp. 177 n. and 182 n.
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107 Quoted in Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p. 747.
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108 Quoted in Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p. 747.
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109 Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p. 749.
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110 FDR’s Fireside Chats, p. 196.
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111 尽管如此，罗斯福利用误导性信息绕过国会的行为，即使是处于好的目的，也给后来的越南战争开了先例，带来了灾难性的后果（Lash，第 420—421 页）。
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