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134 Ike, p. 271.
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135 Ike, p. 279.
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136 Ike, p. 282.
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137 Ike, pp. 282—283; Bix, p. 433.
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138 Butow, p. 363; Toland, The Rising Sun, p. 182.
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139 Toland, The Rising Sun, p. 183; Morley, The Final Confrontation, p. 323.
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140 Morley, The Final Confrontation, p. 344; The ‘MAGIC’ Background of Pearl Harbor, vol. 4, appendix, pp. A130—A134.
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141 Morley, The Final Confrontation, p. 329.
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142 Morley, The Final Confrontation, p. 338.
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143 Robert E. Sherwood, The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, London, 1948, vol. 1, p. 430; also quoted in Morley, The Final Confrontation, p. 344; Toland, The Rising Sun, p. 194.
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144 Toland, The Rising Sun, pp. 193—194, 198—199; Bix, p. 436.
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145 Morley, The Final Confrontation, p. 344; Iriye, Origins, p. 183.
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146 前一年 7 月进行的一项有先见之明的调查，其实已经提出了日本利用航空母舰发动空中打击的可能性，指出需要加强珍珠港的防御（Prange，第 185—188 页）。此后，陆海军联合设计了保卫珍珠港的夏威夷防务计划，以预防来自空中的突然袭击；这是个非常好的计划（Toland，The Rising Sun，第 195 页）。似乎没有人想起格鲁大使去年 1 月份的警告 （Grew，第 368 页）。
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147 Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, pp. 926—927 (and p. 911); Iriye, Origins, p. 183; Morley, The Final Confrontation, p. 345; Heinrichs, Threshold of War,p. 216.
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148 Toland, The Rising Sun, pp. 201—202; Morley, The Final Confrontation, pp. 334—335, 344—345.
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149 Morley, The Final Confrontation, p. 338.
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150 I. C. B. Dear and M. R. D. Foot (eds.), The Oxford Companion to the Second World War, Oxford/New York, 1995, p. 872; Toland, The Rising Sun, pp. 221, 235; Dallek, p. 311; Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms. A Global History of World War II, Cambridge, 1994, pp. 260—261.
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151 Letter to Sasakawa Ryochi, 24 January [1941], appended as a last folio to the Konoe Memoirs.
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152 总有阴谋论说美国政府事先知道进攻来临，故意不采取防范措施，让灾难性的进攻降临，这样就可以找到合适的宣战理由。这种阴谋论在珍珠港事件后不久开始出现，从来也没有彻底平息过。普兰格仔细分析了美日双方关于珍珠港事件前加强防备的材料（参见 Prange，第 725—738 页，这个总结性章节中的评论）；Roberta Wohlstetter，Pearl Harbor：Warning and Decision（Stanford, Calif.，1962），第 382—396 页，分析了美国情报。这些研究毫不含糊地指出，判断错误，而不是阴谋诡计，才是事件背后的原因。最近的研究更证实了这个结论，见 Richard J. Aldrich，Intelligence and the War against Japan：Britain，America and the Politics of Secret Service（Cambridge, 2000）。同时这本书（第 68—84 页）还驳斥了另一个版本的阴谋论，即丘吉尔事先知道袭击珍珠港，但是欺瞒了美国人。
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153 Toland, The Rising Sun, p. 227. 当木户在皇宫中听到这个“伟大的消息”时，他“觉得简直是天助我也”，见 Kido Diary，doc. no. 1632W（90），8.12.41。
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154 Bix, pp. 436—437; text of the Imperial Rescript on the Declaration of War, in Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War (Part IV), Japanese Monographs, 150, appendix 7 (http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos/150/150app07.html).
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155 Hull, vol. 2, pp. 1095—1097 (quotation p. 1096); Morley, The Final Confrontation, p. 338; The ‘MAGIC’ Background of Pearl Harbor, vol. 4, p. 101; Toland, The Rising Sun, pp. 224—225. Nomura’s description is in Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War (Part IV), Japanese Monographs, 150, appendix 6 (http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos/150/150app06.html).
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156 Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt. A Rendezvous with Destiny, Boston, 1990,p. 407; Bergamini, vol. 2, p. 1096; Carr, p. 166.
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157 Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, pp. 938—939.
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158 Nazli Choucri, Robert C. North and Susumu Yamakage, The Challenge of Japan before World War II and After, London/New York, 1992, pp. 37—38, 40—43, 118—120, 132—137.
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