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创造性破坏的力量 [:1704513545]
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创造性破坏的力量 3.结论
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本章挑战了有关技术革命的两个普遍的先入之见。第一是技术革命必然导致增长加速，第二是技术革命必然不利于就业。然而现实完全相反。虽然增长的确会加速，但在大多数情况下需要一定时滞才会发生。特别是，不合时宜的制度可能阻碍新技术革命带来的增长潜力。另外，过去的技术革命历程表明，它们都没有造成许多人预想的大规模失业。事实上如我们所见，致力于生产活动自动化的企业或工厂会成为就业的净创造者；开展自动化不力的企业才会破坏就业，因为自动化推进不成功会导致它们走下坡路，甚至退出市场。我们在本章的分析带来的一个有意思的启发是，对机器人征税可能造成反生产的效果，因为这种税收不利于自动化，将束缚企业开展创新、拓宽市场和创造新就业的潜力。
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图3.6 工业设备投资对市场退出概率的影响
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注：对工业设备的投资多于中位数水平的企业，在之后数年的退出概率较低（相对于投资少于中位数水平的企业）。
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资料来源: P. Aghion, C. Antonin, S. Bunel and X. Jaravel, “What Are the Labor and Product Market Effects of Automation? New Evidence from France,” CEPR Discussion Paper no. DP14443, Centre for Economic Policy Research, March 2020。
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[1]“One big wave,” see Robert Gordon,“US Economic Growth since 1870: One Big Wave?”AmericanEconomicReview89, no. 2（1999）:123 -128. Antonin Bergeaud, Gilbert Cette, and Rémy Lecat, “Productivity Trends in Advanced Countries between 1890 and 2012,”ReviewofIncomeandWealth62, no. 3（2016）:420 -444.
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[2]Antonin Bergeaud, Gilbert Cette, and Rémy Lecat,LeBelAvenirdelacroissance.Leçons du XXe siècle pour le futur（Paris: Odile Jacob, 2018）.
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[3]我们将在第6章对此现象展开探讨。
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[4]See John M. Keynes,“Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren” （1930）, inEssaysinPersuasion（New York: W. W. Norton, 1963; repr. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010）.
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[5]Robert M. Solow,“We’d Better Watch Out,”NewYorkTimes, July 12,1987.
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[6]See Timothy F. Bresnahan and Manuel Trajtenberg,“General Purpose Technologies‘Engines of Growth?’”JournalofEconometrics65, no. 1（1995）:83 -108.我们建议读者参考如下著作中收录的各位作者的成果: E. Helpman, ed. ,General Purpose Technologies and Economic Growth（Cambridge, MA: MITPress,1998）.
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[7]Boyan Jovanovic and Peter L. Rousseau,“General Purpose Technologies,” inHandbookofEconomicGrowth, ed. Philippe Aghion and Steven Durlauf, vol. 1,1181 -1224（Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005）.
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[8]Elhanan Helpman and Manuel Trajtenberg,“Diffusion of General Purpose Techno logies,” inGeneral Purpose Technologies and Economic Growth, ed. E. Helpman,85 -119（Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998）.
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[9]本节内容是以Paul David的主要观点为基础，参见Paul David,“The Dynamo and the Computer: An Historical Perspective on the Modern Productivity Paradox,”AmericanEconomicReview80, no. 2（1990）:355 -361.
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[10]Paul David,“The Dynamo and the Computer: An Historical Perspective on the Modern Productivity Paradox,”AmericanEconomicReview80, no. 2（1990）:355 -361.
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[11]Bergeaud, Cette, and Lecat,LeBelAvenirdelacroissance.
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[12]Salome Baslandze,“The Role of the IT Revolution in Knowledge Diffusion,Innovation and Reallocation,”2016 Meeting Papers No. 1509, Society for Economic Dynamics, 2016.
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[13]Eric Brynjolfsson and Shinkyu Yang,“Information Technology and Productivity:A Review of the Literature,” inAdvancesinComputers, ed. Marvin Zelkowitz,vol. 43（1996）:179 -214.
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[14]See Joseph Zeira,“Workers, Machines, and Economic Growth,”QuarterlyJournalofEconomics113, no. 4（1998）:1091 -1117; Daron Acemoglu and Pascual Restrepo,“Robots and Jobs: Evidence from US Labor Markets,”JournalofPoliticalEconomy128, no. 6（2020）:2188 -2244; Philippe Aghion,Benjamin F. Jones, and Charles I. Jones,“Artificial Intelligence and Economic Growth” （NBER Working Paper No. 23928, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, October 2017）.
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[15]Aghion, Jones, and Jones,“Artificial Intelligence and Economic Growth. ”
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[16]Gravenor Henson,The Civil,Political,and Mechanical History of the FrameworkKnittersinEuropeandAmerica（Nottingham: Richard Sutton, 1831）,45.
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[17]但直至1832年的《改革法案》（Reform Bill），英国议会才不再受贵族大地主阶层的主导。
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[18]Keynes,“Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren.”
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