1700075640

1700075641 7.Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte 1：39；（2d edition, p.58）.

1700075642

1700075643 8.This point is correctly observed by Dahn in Procop von Cäsarea, p.391.

1700075644

1700075645 9.Ammianus 12.12.61.

1700075646

1700075647 10.Lavisse, Histoire de la France 1：2. Les Origines, la Gaule indépendant et la Gaule Romaine, by G. Bloch, Paris.1901，p.299 f. Ad. Blanchet, in The Roman Walls of Gaul（Les enceintes Romaines de la Gaule），1907，rejects, on the basis of the broadest research, the theories that would place the construction of these fortifications as late as Diocletian’s period, in the fourth century or even later.

1700075648

1700075649 11.According to the citation by Dahn, in Könige der Germanen 5：26.

1700075650

1700075651 12.Mommsen, Ostgotische Studien, Neues Archiv für ältere deutsche Geschichte 14：460. L. Schmidt, Geschichte der Vandalen，1901，pp.65，72，122.

1700075652

1700075653 13.The study on the battle at the Milvian Bridge by F. Trebelmann in the Abhandlung der Heidelberger Akademie，1915，is very valuable topographically, but from the military history viewpoint it misses the mark just as much as Seeck’s account does. Both authors are still entangled in the concept of massive armies. They even believe the sources to the effect that Maxentius had superior forces—and even several times as many—to those of Constantine. Since it is naturally impossible to construct any reasonable account with such preconceptions, Seeck grasps the expedient of having both commanders lead their armies by dreams and portents rather than strategic considerations. I do not see why both Constantine and Maxentius should not have been capable of interpreting their dreams and signs in the same way as had previously been done by Themistocles. Pausanias, and Mardonius. The account by Landmann in Dölgner’s Constantine the Great and His Times（Konstantin der Grosse und seine Zeit），1913，is reasonable, but in view of the lack of sources, it is without any conclusion of importance to military history.

1700075654

1700075655 2　斯特拉斯堡会战　无

1700075656

1700075657 3　阿德里安堡会战

1700075658

1700075659 1.It is curious that the West Roman troops were fighting in the Dobrudscha and when they were returning to Illyricum, they encountered the Taefalae. Is it possible that they had previously left the Taefalae behind them? These bands probably did not cross the Danube until the Roman troops had already moved farther eastward. Perhaps the East Goths under Alatheus and Safrax also did not come across the Danube until now, although Ammianus recounts this earlier. In any case, the reinforcements that moved to join the Germans must have been very significant.

1700075660

1700075661 2.Here I believe it is permissible to combine the accounts by Eunapius and Zosimus with that of Ammianus. See Excursus.

1700075662

1700075663 3.Constantine Joseph Jirecek. The Military Road from Belgrade to Constantinople（Die Heerstrasse von Belgrad nach Konstantinopel），1877，p.145.

1700075664

1700075665 4.In addition to the Generalkarte of the Balkans, published by Artaria in Vienna in 1897，there is now available a still better Bulgarian map（1：420，000），which I have used. It is based on surveys made by Russian officers during the war of 1877-1878. The map of European Turkey published by the Turkish general staff, although it bears the title “Drawn up by the General Staff of His Majesty, through Allah’s Grace all-powerful and all-protecting，” is only a scarcely changed reproduction of the Austrian Generalkarte, according to Hardt von Hartenthurm in the Mitteilungen des königlich-kaiserlichen militärischen geographischen Instituts, Vol.18. See Austria-Hungary and the Balkan Countries（Oesterreich-Ungarn und die Balkanländer），by L.v. Thalloczy, Budapest，1901.

1700075666

1700075667 5.Socrates 4.38.

1700075668

1700075669 6.Theodoret 4.33.

1700075670

1700075671 7.Sozomenos 6.40.

1700075672

1700075673 8.Socrates 4.38.

1700075674

1700075675 4　军队兵力

1700075676

1700075677 1.G.Kaufmann, Deutsche Geschichte 1：89.

1700075678

1700075679 2.I cannot understand how Schmidt, in Geschichte der Vandalen, p.130，can interpret the remark by Procopius 2.7，that Belisarius with 5，000 horsemen defeated the enemy, as meaning that the Guard was 5，000 men strong and these are to be added to the 15，000 men that Procopius 1.11 gives as the army strength.

1700075680

1700075681 3.Panegyriki 9 praises Constantine for having accomplished more with fewer troops than did Alexander, who had supposedly had 40.000.

1700075682

1700075683 Panegyriki 8. 3.3.says he defeated Maxentius “vix enim quarta parte exercitus contra centum milia hostium”（“with scarcely a quarter of his army against 100，000 of the enemy”）.

1700075684

1700075685 In 313 against Licinius, he is also said by Anon. Bales.to have had 25，000 men.

1700075686

1700075687 4.A very energetic addition to the analysis of the figures reported by Procopius is given by H. Eckhardt in the Königsberg Program（1864），“On Agathias and Procopius as Sources for the War with the Goths”（“Ueber Agathias und Procop als Quellenschriftsteller für den Gotenkrieg”）. In the final analysis, however, he still holds that, everything considered, a figure of 200，000 men for the East Goths is quite believable（page 11）.

1700075688

1700075689 5.The number of Cimbrian warriors who crossed the Brenner Pass in 101 and descended into Italy is given by the Romans as 200.000. Judging from the length and the type of route they took, I have felt justified in estimating that they were at most 10，000 strong. See Vol. I, page 513. Preussische Jahrbücher 147（1912）：199.

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