1700084447

1700084448 32.Sello, p.101.

1700084449

1700084450 33.The last three examples are taken from the collected passages in R. Schneider, Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum，1909，p.139. The effectiveness of the giant Turkish cannon before Constantinople is pictured on the other side, however, as very strong. See Essenwein, p.34，and Jacobs, p.128 ff.

1700084451

1700084452 34.Rudolf Schneider, Anonymi de rebus bellicis liber，1908. Schneider，“Beginning and End of the Torsion Engines”（“Anfang und Ende der Torsionsgeschütze”），Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum，1909. Schneider, The Artillery of the Middle Ages（Die Artillerie des Mittelalters），1910. In these otherwise excellent writings I consider as erroneous what is said about the Carolingian period. The capitularies are not “laws，” but simple prescriptions for individual cases, and there is no proof that leverage engines did not exist at the time of Charlemagne. Consequently, nothing prevents us from considering that the passages from Paulus Diaconus and from the vita Hludowici（Life of Hludowicus）cited by Schneider, p.24 f.，refer to such leverage engines. There is no basis（p.61）for ascribing their invention to the Normans. Erroneous, too, is the rationale on p.22 for the inability of the scara to manufacture and use projectile weapons.

1700084453

1700084454 35.Rathgen and Schäfer，“Feuer-und Fernwaffen beim päpstlichen Heer.”

1700084455

1700084456 36.Jähns, p.429. Burckhardt, Geschichte der Renaissance in Italien, Sect.108，p.224，says that Federigo of Urbino（1444-1482）introduced low forts instead of high ones, since the cannon was less effective against the lower ones. Von Stetten, Geschichte von Augsburg，1：195 ff.，reports that, whereas in that city in the second half of the fifteenth century the very energetic work on the city fortifications still consisted of raising the height of the walls, with the turn of the century a clearly recognizable turnabout took place. Walls and towers were lowered to a certain height, strong mounds of earth were erected, the moats were deepened and “lined，” bastions and ravelins were installed, and so on. The law governing the radius became stricter and stricter; in 1542，despite the protests of the clergy, even a church was razed. For further information, see the considerations of Guicciardini in Historia d’Iitalia, Venice，1562，pp.388，425. According to this source, the conquest of Otranto by the Turks in 1480 and the reconquest by Duke Alfonso of Calabria in the following year were landmarks in siege warfare. De la Noue，18.discours，2. Paradox. Ed.1587，p.387. I shall go no further into the techniques either of fortification or of the attack; instead, I refer the reader to the corresponding sections in Jähns, Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften. From a methodological viewpoint, it is interesting to see what kinds of exaggerations gain credence in something that is new and surprising. In his History of the Artillery, Napoleon III establishes the fact that Charles VIII in his campaign into Italy in 1494 transported 100 cannon of medium caliber and 40 heavy cannon. A whole series of authors, however, give him as many as 240 cannon and 2，040 field pieces, indeed as many as 6，000 light cannon. These exaggerations are due in part to copying errors and in part to the fact that the 6，000“vastardeurs”（pioneers, workers）who accompanied the army were misunderstood as cannon.

1700084457

1700084458 37.According to Sources for the History of Firearms（Quellen zur Geschichte der Feuerwaffen），p.100，the word “cannon” appears for the first time in a Spanish ordnance book of Charles V.

1700084459

1700084460 38.Guicciardini, Historia d’Italia，1：24. Jovius for the year 1515. Hist. Lib.XV，1：298.

1700084461

1700084462 39.von Ellgger, Military System and Military Art of the Swiss Confederation（Kriegswesen und Kriegskunst der schweizerischen Eidgenossen），Lucerne，1873，p.139.

1700084463

1700084464 40.Jovius lib. I for the year 1494 and lib.XV before Marignano.

1700084465

1700084466 41.The Swiss at Frastenz（Die Schweizer bei Frastenz）：Stettier，342，cited in Ranke, Werke，34：115. Valerius Anshelm, Bern Chronicle, Bern，1826，2：396. Jovius, Leben Gonsalvos, Venice，1581，p.292，at Cerignola in 1503. Likewise at Suriano in 1497：Jovius, Hist.lib.IV. At Marignano: Jovius, Lib.XV. At Ravenna in 1512: Jovius, Leben Leos, X，lib.II；Guicciardini, Historia d’Italia, lib.XI; Reissner, Leben Frundsbergs, Frankfurt，1620，fol.41-42. At Novara the Swiss supposedly fired with conquered French cannon they had turned around: Fleuranges, Mémoires, p.151.

1700084467

1700084468 The Venetian ambassador Quirini wrote the following description of the German battle square at the end of 1507:

1700084469

1700084470 … as soon as they see the fire of the cannon, the infantrymen automatically have to lift the halberds and long lances all together over their heads and to cross one lance over the other, and likewise the halberds, and at the same time to drop to the ground so low that the cannon, which do not fire downward, pass over them or hit in the halberds and long lances, not doing much harm to the infantrymen of the formation. For this reason, the Germans customarily now make the wheels of the gun carriages so small and low that the enemies can be harmed, even if they drop down as indicated; and when the formation is about to assault, the halberdiers and likewise those with the long lances all lower their halberds and also their long lances, with the points forward and not above their shoulders.（Relazioni degli Ambasc. Veneti [Reports of the Venetian Ambassadors]，Ed. Albèri, Series I，6：21-22）.

1700084471

1700084472 In 1537 de Langey taught that the best defense against the artillery was to take it by storm so that it would not have time for a second shot, or to approach it in a wide formation so that it would hit fewer men. Trewer Rath, fol. III, recommends having 300“runners”（including a few good musketeers）close quickly on the cannon.

1700084473

1700084474 42.“Nullo prope usui fore”（“It would be nearly useless”），Jovius, Hist. Lib. I, Venice，1553，1：30.

1700084475

1700084476 43.Book II, Chap.17. See also the account in Comines，2：258. Ed. Mandrot.

1700084477

1700084478 44.Essais, Book I.

1700084479

1700084480 45.Le vite de dicenove huomini illustri（The Lives of Nineteen Famous Men），Venice，1581，lib.III.

1700084481

1700084482 46.Avila, Schmalkaldic War（Schmalkaldischer Krieg），Venice，1548，p.40.

1700084483

1700084484 47.Sixl，2：167.

1700084485

1700084486 48.The name “hook firearm” was derived from this hook and survived for a long time, taking the form “haquebutte” in French. This word may also have been influenced by its similarity to “arkebuse”（harquebus）. Jähns, however, has surmised that the name “hook firearm” was derived from the hook into which the match was clamped, and this interpretation is actually supported by common sense. The invention of this “hook” represented a much more important step forward than the invention of the recoil hook. The latter, of course, could only be used in a prepared defensive position and in target shooting. The fork did not provide any resistance for the recoil; even a three-legged stand would have been too weak for that.

1700084487

1700084488 49.Sixl, Zeitschrift für historische Waffenkunde，2：334，407，409，on the basis of firing reports from Zurich in 1472，Würzburg in 1474，Eichstädt in 1487，and others. In noteworthy contradiction to these is Guicciardini’s comment that before Pavia in 1525 the entrenched lines of the two sides were only 40 paces apart and the bastions were so close that the harquebus marksmen could have fired on each other. The greater distances in competitive shooting are so extensively confirmed that we cannot doubt them, but even if the paces were taken to be of the smallest possible length, it is still difficult to understand why they wanted to shoot at targets at such distances with the firearms of that period.

1700084489

1700084490 50.Forrer, Zeitschrift für historische Waffenkunde，4：55.

1700084491

1700084492 51.Zeitschrift für historische Waffenkunde，1：316.

1700084493

1700084494 52.Institution de la discipline militaire au Royaume de France, Lyon，1559，Vol.I, Chap.10，p.46. According to Jovius, Charles V suffered heavy losses in Algiers in 1541 because a rainfall extinguished the matches. A similar report appears in Vieilleville, Mémoires, Vol.Ill, Chap.22.

1700084495

1700084496 53.According to the Badminton Archery Book, by Charles Longman. London，1894.

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