1700084570 18.Chemnitz, Swedish War（Schwedischer Krieg），Part IV, Book 2，p.141.

1700084571

1700084572 19.Pufendorf, B.19，Ed.1688，2：320. Apparently from Chemnitz.

1700084573

1700084574 20.Such a convention “de bonne guerre”（“of good war”）was signed by Gonzago and Brissac in 1553. Hardy, Histoire de la tactique française, p.463. Men-at-arms and private soldiers “will suddenly be released，” without having to pay, after they have been “dévalisés”—that is, disarmed and relieved of their possessions.

1700084575

1700084576 21.Kriegskunst zu Fuss, pp.16，22. Jähns，2：1018.

1700084577

1700084578 5　战例介绍

1700084579

1700084580 1.Hobohm，2：518.

1700084581

1700084582 2.This battle is thoroughly treated by Rüstow in History of the Infantry（Geschichte der Infanterie），by Jähns in Manual of a History of Warfare（Handbuch einer Geschichte des Kriegswesens），and by Ranke, History of the Romanic and Germanic Peoples（Geschichte der romanischen und germanischen Völker），Werke，33：25. All these accounts, which differ significantly from one another, need serious correcting. Rüstow based his work too exclusively on Guicciardini, while Ranke and Jähns used as their principal source Coccinius, who can hardly be compared to the better sources. The standard study, based on the sources, is the Berlin dissertation by Erich Siedersleben（1907）. Published by Georg Nauck. His principal sources are a letter written by Fabricius Colonna, who commanded the knights on the Spanish side（printed in Marino Sanuto, Diarii，14：176. Venice，1886），and a report from the Florentine ambassador, Pandolfini, who was present at the battle in the French headquarters（printed in Desjardins, Négociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane，2：581.Paris，1861）.

1700084583

1700084584 3.According to Colonna’s letter.

1700084585

1700084586 4.The Italian survey map indicates that the ditch still exists today but does not extend as close to the Ronco as it did, according to our sources, at the time of the battle in 1512.

1700084587

1700084588 5.I include the 400 lances that were in position at the Ronco bridge under Alègre and intervened in the battle.

1700084589

1700084590 6.The artillery maneuver is not completely clear, since we cannot assume, as Guicciardini recounts, that Este drove completely into the right flank of the enemy, and the cannon certainly did not have enough range to shoot along the entire enemy front. Perhaps another inspection of the battlefield would clarify this point.

1700084591

1700084592 7.This battle is treated in two valuable monographs that appeared in quick succession: Novara and Dijon. Apogee and Decline of the Swiss Great Power in the Sixteenth Century（Novara und Dijon. Höhepunkt und Verfall der schweizerischen Grossmacht im 16. Jahrhundert），by Doctor of Philosophy E. Gagliardi. Zurich，1907. Published by Leemann Brothers and Co.“The Battle of Novara”（“Die Schlacht bei Novara”），by Georg Fischer. Berlin dissertation，1908. Published by Georg Nauck.

1700084593

1700084594 8.Gagliardi and Fischer arrange the individual elements of the battle very differently, indeed even contradicting one another, since Fischer places on the right flank what Gagliardi seems to report for the left flank. I agree with Fischer. Nevertheless, when Fischer assigns only 1，000 men to the north square of the Swiss，2，000 to the center square, and 7，000 to the south square, I do not say that that is impossible, but I do not consider it as certain. If the Swiss had good information on the enemy and knew that the lansquenets were in the southern part of the camp but that there was no favorable terrain there for horsemen, they may well have made the northerly and central columns of infantry very weak, assigning in return the horsemen to the former and the cannon to the latter. But they may have given these two units only missions calling for demonstrations, while assigning the actual attack exclusively to the third square and giving it seven-tenths of the entire infantry. But we may believe such fine points only if we have direct and reliable sources concerning them.Consequently, although I agree essentially with Fischer, I have expressed myself more carefully and with more restraint and have avoided giving specific numbers for the various troop units.

1700084595

1700084596 9.The sources speak of 400 Swiss halberdiers who reportedly first drove off the harquebusiers of the lansquenets and then attacked the main body in the flank. Gagliardi（p.162）considers them to be a unit that arrived by chance, while Fischer（p.138）considers this a detachment that was sent out intentionally. I suspect that these were men who welled out on one side when the main bodies clashed.

1700084597

1700084598 10.This battle is studied in an exemplary way by Otto Haintz in the dissertation “From Novara to La Motta”（“Von Novara bis La Motta”）. Berlin，1912.

1700084599

1700084600 11.This polarity is developed excellently by Gagliardi, Novara und Dijon, p.327.

1700084601

1700084602 12.The monograph by Heinrich Harkensee（Göttingen dissertation，1909），while also contributing to the research in detail, did not arrive at tactically correct concepts of the overall battle. The corrections that need to be made are apparent when this work is compared with the account above. In particular, Harkensee attributes too much credibility to the exaggerations in the figures for the French strength. Hadank’s review in the Deutsche Literaturzeitung, No.26，1910，concentrates too much on details and unjustly raises the accusation that the author did not understand the strategic situation. He may, however, be correct in his reckoning of the French strength as 30，000. He also justifiably defends the report that the Gascons had large shields that could be placed on the ground as a base. Such shields（pavesen）were used by the marksmen. He refers to a miniature showing crossbowmen with large shields of this kind in front of them. Hewett, Ancient Armour and Weapons，3：543（Supplement）.

1700084603

1700084604 13.On page 36 above there is a quote that praises the Swiss artillery. The facts do not justify this.

1700084605

1700084606 14.“The Battle of Bicocca”（“Die Schlacht bei Bicocca”），by Paul Kopitsch. Berlin dissertation，1909. Published by E. Ebering.

1700084607

1700084608 15.In Guicciardini the account reads：“They wanted to return home, but in order to show the whole world that it was not because of fear, they first wanted to defeat the enemy.”It is possible that this statement was made, but if they had been victorious, the Swiss would no doubt still have remained, and so they no doubt intended in the bottom of their hearts to do so from the start.

1700084609

1700084610 16.The standard monograph is the Berlin dissertation by Reinhard Thom（1907），which, as a result of precise source analysis, corrects many individual errors in earlier accounts. A few additional sources mentioned in the review of this monograph in the Deutsche Literaturzeitung, No.8，1909，are not of concern to us.

1700084611

1700084612 17.The report by the ambassador from Siena specifically gives this as the reason for the carelessness of the French.

1700084613

1700084614 18.Berlin dissertation by Karl Stallwitz，1911. Review by Hadank in the Deutsche Literaturzeitung, No.16，1912.

1700084615

1700084616 6　马基雅维利

1700084617

1700084618 1.Guillaume, p.165.

1700084619

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