1700084820
12.A letter from Sandolin to Lipsius, dated 16 July 1595. Cited in Jähns，2：880. Duke Henri Rohan reported later in his document（cited in Jähns，2：951）that Maurice had found that the armament with shields was better but had not been able to have his opinion accepted, since, of course, he was not the sovereign. See Hobohm，2：452.
1700084821
1700084822
13.Mulder, Van Duyck’s Journal，1：636 ff. From 9 August to 26 October 1595. Similarly in 1598. Reyd, Niederländische Geschichte, Vol.XV, Ed.1626，p.569. In the same year the brother of William Louis, John of Nassau, reported from Groningen to their father on drills in the garrisons. Archives of Oranien-Nassau，2d Series，2：403. Wallhausen, Kriegskunst zu Fuss, p.23，reproaches those who say
:“What is drilling? When one is fighting for the enemy, one does not drill long.”
1700084823
1700084824
14.Chapters IV and VII and a particular paragraph，144，of Chapter XVIII are erroneously identified in the letter as Folio 144. The three echelons are prescribed in it：“Has très acies ad usum separatas, propinquitate conjunctas, ad se mutuo adjuvandas idoneas esse perspeximus”（“We observed that these three battle lines, separated for use and joined by their proximity, are suitable to aid each other mutually”）. The depth of the echelons is given as ten men in Leo. It is interesting to note, incidentally, how understanding and misunderstanding are often confused. In a rather careless way, Leo transferred the tradition concerning the Roman infantry（which eventually goes back to Livy，8.8）to the cavalry. But this attracted so little attention that William Louis, apparently without noticing Leo’s error, was able to transfer it back again to the infantry.
1700084825
1700084826
15.A set of instructions for the training of the individual man was Handling of the Guns, Muskets, and Spears（Waffenhandlung von den Rören, Musqueten und Spiessen）by Jacob de Geyn. The Hague，1608. Dedicated to Joachim Ernst, Margrave of Brandenburg. The book is illustrated with large, handsome copper plates. Republished in 1640. The copper plates in Wallhausen’s Kriegskunst zu Fuss are different ones, also quite often different in their arrangement. Geyn distinguishes between marksmen and musketeers; he has forty-two commands for the former and forty-three for the latter. The musketeers have wooden powder containers on bandoliers, while the marksmen do not. For the spearmen there are twenty-one commands, many of them to be carried out in three speeds.
1700084827
1700084828
16.Rüstow，1：345，characterizes Maurice’s reforms as having simplified to the maximum the tactical formations. This seems to be the direct opposite of my description, to the extent that I see in the new formations something that had to be worked out and was not at all simple but possible only through hard work. But the difference is apparent rather than real. Rüstow is thinking of those artificial theoretical formations which he thoroughly discusses, like the cross battalion and the eight-cornered unit; they were nothing more than ingenious contrivances and never played a role in actual practice. And in comparison with this, the Netherlandish formation was, of course, a simplification. In comparison with the square of men or the geometric square, which up to that point were the only ones under practical consideration, the Netherlandish method was not a simplification but a far-reaching refinement, and it is only with this explanation that the historical progress is placed in the right light.
1700084829
1700084830
17.John of Nassau gives 135 as the normal number, of which 45 have the long spear and 74 are musketeers and marksmen. Plathner, p.40.
1700084831
1700084832
18.Everardus Reidanus, Belgarum aliarumque gentium annales（Annals of the Belgians and other Nations），Leyden，1633，8：192. Emmius, Guilelmus Ludovieus（William Louis），1621，p.67. See also Mulder’s preface to Duyck’s Journal，1：16.
1700084833
1700084834
19.Krebs, Battle on the White Mountain（Schlacht an dem Weissen Berge），p.25 ff.
1700084835
1700084836
20.Reyd, p.281.
1700084837
1700084838
21.Billon, p.191.
1700084839
1700084840
22.Maurice（19 June 1593），Archives-Oranien-Nassau，2d Series，1：24.
1700084841
1700084842
23.Printed in the Works of the Historical Society（Historisch Genootschap）in Utrecht. New series, No.37. Utrecht，1883，p.448 ff.
1700084843
1700084844
4 古斯塔夫·阿道夫
1700084845
1700084846
1.Fahlbeck, Preussische Jahrbücher，133：535.
1700084847
1700084848
2.According to G. Droysen, Gustav Adolf，2：85，the king landed in Pomerania in 1630
1700084849
1700084850
with 13，000 men
1700084851
1700084852
He already had in Stralsund 6，000
1700084853
1700084854
Follow-up forces ca. 7，000
1700084855
1700084856
Withdrawn from Prussia 13，600
1700084857
1700084858
Total: approximately 40，000
1700084859
1700084860
Some 36，000 men remained behind in Sweden, Finland, Prussia, and so forth. Consequently, the entire military strength amounted to 76，000 men，43，000 of whom were levied nationals.
1700084861
1700084862
3.Jähns，2：952.
1700084863
1700084864
4.In his writings of the year 1673（Schriften，2：672），Montecuccoli actually considers the usual ratio of two-thirds musketeers and one-third pikemen to be wrong. He believes more pikemen are needed to cover the musketeers in battle, for the latter, alone, would be overpowered by the cavalry. He points out that this was what happened at Lens, for example, where Condé defeated the Lotharingians. At Breitenfeld, hesays, the Holstein regiment held fast because of its pikemen until it was overcome by the artillery. He reports the same thing in 2：223. He claims that the ratio of two-thirds to one-third was acceptable only because on so many occasions outside of battle the musketeers were more useful than the pikemen.
1700084865
1700084866
5.“The Swedish Discipline，” cited in Firth, Cromwell’s Army, p. 105.
1700084867
1700084868
6.According to Firth, p.104.
1700084869
[
上一页 ]
[ :1.70008482e+09 ]
[
下一页 ]