1700084870 7.Firth, Cromwell’s Army, p.98，from the Swedish Intelligencer，1：124.

1700084871

1700084872 8.On the leather cannon, see Gohlke in the Zeitschrift für historische Waffenkunde，4：392，and Feldhaus, p.121.“Leather pieces” are also mentioned in the introductory poem to the Little War Book（Kriegsbüchlein）of Lavater of Zurich，1644. He says they did not come first from Sweden to Zurich，“but rather from us to them.”

1700084873

1700084874 9.Letter to Aldringer，2 January 1633，reproduced in Förster, Wallenstein’s Letters（Wallensteins Briefe）. Daniel’s statement in History of the Military（Geschichte des Kriegswesens），5：12，that Henry IV of France had already required that his squadrons fire a single salvo with their pistols and then attack with cold steel, must be based on a misunderstanding. I have found nothing on this in the sources, and the objective prerequisite for such action is missing, that is, a stricter discipline. Davila states expressly that at Ivry, the last large battle of Henry IV, his squadrons used the caracole.

1700084875

1700084876 10.This explanation has been preserved for us in the work of an English military author, Turner, and it goes back to English officers who had served under Gustavus Adolphus. I draw the quotation from Firth, Cromwell’s Army, p.289. The passages cited in Mareks, Coligny, p.56，and Hobohm, Machiavelli，2：373，385，which seem to prove an earlier occurrence of the running of the spear gauntlet—especially Bouchet, Preuves de l’histoire de l’illustre maison de Coligny（Evidence on the History of the Illustrious House of Coligny），1642，p.457—are based on erroneous translations.“Passer par les piques”（“to pass before the pikes”）is the “law of the long spears，” mentioned on p.61 above. Of course, La Curne de St. Palaye, Dictionnaire de l’ancien langage français, Vol.8，understands this expression as meaning striking with the spear shafts. I consider that impossible; the spears are too long to be used that way.

1700084877

1700084878 11.Cited in Firth, Cromwell’s Army, p.321.

1700084879

1700084880 5　克伦威尔

1700084881

1700084882 1.The outstanding book by C.H. Firth, Cromwell’s Army, London，1902，covers exhaustively the subject of Cromwell as a military organizer, the role in which he is of most interest to us. The extensive work by Fritz Hoenig, Oliver Cromwell, Berlin，1887，is not up to par. See the review in the Historische Zeitschrift，63：482，and the Historical Review, Vol.15（1889），19，p.599. It was only in his later writings that Hoenig brought his considerable talent to its full development.

1700084883

1700084884 2.According to Hoenig, II，2，269，this command originated in 1643.

1700084885

1700084886 3.According to an estimate by W.G. Ross, reported in the Historische Zeitschrift，63（1889）：484，the parliamentary army numbered 13，500 men, including 7，000 infantry, whereas the royal army had only 8，000 men, half infantry and half cavalry. See Firth, p.111.

1700084887

1700084888 4.Hoenig attributed to Cromwell specific creations in the tactical employment of cavalry, the formation of echelons, and so on, and saw in him the predecessor of Frederick and Seydlitz and even the guiding spirit for our time. I cannot agree with him on this. The entire organization of military units of the seventeenth century with the matter of effectiveness of their weapons is too different from the conditions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to justify such comparisons. Hoenig is also in error（I，2，247）when he attributes to Cromwell the formation of divisions in the Napoleonic sense.

1700084889

1700084890 5.Firth, p.101.

1700084891

1700084892 6.See my article “Anglicanism and Presbyterianism” in the Historisch-Politische Aufsätze.

1700084893

1700084894 6　战例介绍

1700084895

1700084896 1.H.von Koss，“The Battles of St. Quentin and Gravelingen”（“Die Schlachten bei St. Quentin und Gravelingen”），Berlin dissertation，1914，E. Ebering Press. I am not so sure whether the analysis of Gravelingen in this otherwise very worthwhile work is appropriate. The points raised by Elkan against this work in his review in the Historische Zeitschrift，116：533，apply only to secondary items, partly simple typographical errors. The question, too, of the intervention of the English ships, which Koss, with good reasons, doubts, is not significant from the military history viewpoint, but, on the basis of testimony cited by Elkan and overlooked by Koss, this point calls for further study.

1700084897

1700084898 2.Swiss battle reports in Segesser, Ludwig Pfyffer and His Times（Ludwig Pfyffer und seine Zeit），1：621.

1700084899

1700084900 3.Special study on the battle by Gigon, La troisième guerre de religion，1912. Gigon gives the Huguenots a strength of 12，000 infantry and 7，000 cavalry and the Catholics 15，000 infantry and 8，000 cavalry. Other writers assume considerably higher numbers for the Catholics. According to Popelinière, Coligny supposedly used the method of blending the infantry and the cavalry（“d’enlacer l’infanterie et la cavallerie”）in small units. The account of the battle, however, does not show that.

1700084901

1700084902 4.The standard monograph is by J. Krebs, Berlin，1879. Brendel，1875，gives nothing useful from a military standpoint. A few details are to be found in Riezler, Sitzungsberichte der Münchener Akademie, Phil. Abt.，Vol.23，1906.

1700084903

1700084904 5.Riezler, p.84，of course assumes that the army of the League was only 10，000 men strong and had lose 12，000 to 15，000 men from sickness in the preceding campaign. The “Hungarian fever” was raging at that time in all camps.

1700084905

1700084906 6.According to Anhalt, the formation of the Bohemians was 3，750 paces wide at most, and it appears as if the animal park was not included in that figure. According to the illustration in Krebs, however, the width was not even 2，000 meters, including the position in the animal park, and, remarkably enough, this was estimated on the same scale as equal to 5，000 feet. On page 171 Krebs assumes that the front was about 3，600 meters. In any case, the front was very long for the small army.

1700084907

1700084908 7.Later, Tilly reproached his colleague Buquoi for having divided up his horsemen into “little squadrons”（“squadronelli”）.

1700084909

1700084910 8.In his report Christian speaks only of Thurn’s musketeers, as if there were no pikemen there at all.

1700084911

1700084912 9.According to Gindely，2：119，the units（Fähnlein）of the Bohemian regiments were composed of 24 privates first class，76 pikemen, and 200 musketeers.

1700084913

1700084914 10.The standard special study on the battle is by Walter Opitz（Leipzig, A. Deichert，1892）. The dissertation by Wangerin, Halle，1896，is only a study of the sources without significant conclusions.

1700084915

1700084916 11.Opitz, p.76，established the fact that Tilly wanted to move from Leipzig to the Elbe, in order to gain a crossing and to draw Field Marshal Tiefenbach to him from Silesia. Once he had this latter force, Pappenheim was to be detached to Mecklenburg in the rear of the Swedish king. That was the plan in case the enemy again avoided battle. For the battle itself the plan was only significant to the extent that it may have contributed to the fact that they did not want to go back behind the Elster to await Aldringer.

1700084917

1700084918 12.Jähns, History of Military Sciences（Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften），1：572.

1700084919

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